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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the historical and discursive contours of the „relevance‟ debate in 
South African psychology. It begins by contextualizing the debate, detailing how appeals for 
„relevance‟ in the broader discipline proliferated during the sixties and seventies in American, 
European and „Third World‟ psychology. The thesis observes further how widespread 
conditions of social turmoil precipitated the development of this crisis over „relevance‟, 
which was encouraged also by traits peculiar to psychology. These include the discipline‟s 
indecisiveness regarding its cognitive interest, its reliance on a basic but rarefied science for 
its scientific eminence, and its longstanding difficulty accommodating sociality. Proponents 
of „relevance‟, that is, insist that psychology attend to „real world‟ concerns. However, since 
the thesis advances the position that materiality can only be accessed via language, it is 
asserted that the credentialing of „relevance‟ occurs rhetorically. The research questions, in 
turn, reflect this discursive emphasis: 1) What are the terms of debate within South African 
psychology concerning its „relevance‟?; 2) How have these changed with passage of time?; 3) 
How is „relevance‟ articulated currently within the discipline?; and 4) How can changes in 
South African psychology‟s discourses about „relevance‟ be understood? In order to answer 
these questions, forty-five presidential, keynote and opening addresses, delivered at annual 
national psychology congresses between 1950 and 2011, were collected from national 
libraries, university archives and private collections. Norman Fairclough‟s three-dimensional 
model for critical discourse analysis provided the analytic frame, which focused on the 
textual/rhetorical, discursive and socio-historical features of addresses. At the discursive level 
in particular, discourses pertaining to disciplinarity, professionalism, ethnic-national service, 
liberation, salvation, civic responsibility and the market were identified, all of which 
interpreted „relevance‟ in contrasting ways. Currently, however, it is „market relevance‟ that 
serves as the hegemonic reference point for South African psychology‟s discursive order. 
This explains why the emancipatory „social relevance‟ that psychologists have been 
espousing since the 1980s remains out of reach. Indeed, since „market relevance‟ has become 
invisibilized, a seeming lack of critical language awareness about their discursive practices 
suggests that South African psychologists will continue to lament, without prospect of 
remedy, the „social irrelevance‟ of the discipline. 
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NOTE TO EXAMINERS 
This thesis adopts the spelling conventions of U.S. English. Where quotes appear making use 
of U.K. English, the spelling has been retained.  
The following papers emerged during the course of this study and were drawn on in various 
parts of the thesis: 
 Long, W. (2013). The many faces of „relevance‟: South African 
psychology in context. In A. Marvakis, J. Motzkau, D. Painter, R.C. Ruto-
Korir, G. Sullivan, S. Triliva & M. Wieser (Eds.), Doing psychology under 
new conditions: Selected papers from the 14th biennial conference of the 
International Society for Theoretical Psychology in Thessaloniki, Greece 
(pp. 103-111). Concord, CA: Captus Press. 
 Long, W. (2013). Rethinking „relevance‟: South African psychology in 
context. History of Psychology, 16(1), 19-35. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come. (Victor Hugo) 
 
BECOMING A PSYCHOLOGIST IN SOUTH AFRICA 
It was early 2005. I had just submitted a formal request to the Professional Board of 
Psychology to have my name removed from the professional register. Having recently 
completed a year of compulsory community service as a newly qualified clinical 
psychologist, all that stood between me and my chosen career was a board exam. The trouble 
was that twelve months of visiting community health centers in the most impoverished areas 
of the Western Cape had left me feeling disillusioned about the social value of the profession. 
It was not for me. So I traveled instead, did some contract research and, by the end of the 
year, found myself back where I had left off. I wrote the board exam. But after nearly four 
years as a military psychologist, addictions counsellor and university lecturer, the same 
questions were still unanswered. How „relevant‟ was my work in a majority black country 
where eighty percent of psychologists could only speak English or Afrikaans – the languages 
of white privilege? How „relevant‟ could a profession hope to be that charged the kind of 
hourly rate that most South Africans would never be able to afford?  And how „relevant‟ was 
this discipline – beavering away at the southernmost tip of Africa – that saw little wrong in 
importing most of its university textbooks from the United States of America? Rather than 
deregister for a second time, I thought I had a good-enough reason to register for doctoral 
studies. Soon enough, „relevance‟ started taking on a life of its own. I quickly realized that 
the answers to my questions would not involve anything close to what I had hoped for, 
namely, the obvious and uncomplicated exchange of „irrelevance‟ for „relevance‟. What 
emerged instead from my early readings was the fact that psychologists around the world had 
been thinking about „relevance‟ for quite some time – the problem was that they did not seem 
to agree on what it actually meant or if it was even necessary. 
THE DISPUTED ‘RELEVANCE’ OF SOUTH AFRICAN PSYCHOLOGY 
In the last years of apartheid rule, critical psychologists slammed the discipline‟s indifference 
to the human rights abuses of the day, accusing it of lacking „relevance‟. After nineteen years 
of democracy, however, questions persist about the „relevance‟ of psychology for the lives of 
the majority of South Africans (Ahmed & Pillay, 2004; C. Macleod, 2004; Mayekiso, 
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Strydom, Jithoo, & Katz, 2004; Pillay & Siyothula, 2008). Claims of professional 
„irrelevance‟ are substantiated by referring variously to the skewed racial demographics of 
the country‟s registered psychologists and counselors (Pillay & Siyothula, 2008), the dearth 
of qualified professionals that speak indigenous African languages (Ahmed & Pillay, 2004), 
biased selection criteria for admission into professional training programs (Stevens, 2001) 
and the uneven racial composition of selection panels (Mayekiso et al., 2004).  
Academic psychology is also deemed to have come up short on the „relevance‟ index. 
Since the 1970s, the argument has been made repeatedly that psychological theories remain 
beholden to Euro-American models of human functioning (Holdstock, 1981a; Turton, 1986) 
– the more radical version is that the paradigmatic inclinations of psychology are in keeping 
with “the worldview of the coloniser” (Ahmed & Pillay, 2004, p. 631). Others object to what 
they imagine as the implied alternative, namely, the reification of culture and the relegation 
of class – known otherwise as the apartheid-era discourse of cultural difference (Nell, 1990; 
Seedat & Nell, 1990; Swartz, 1991; Turton, 1986). 1  And on the research front, one 
encounters allegations of continuing disinterest in the socio-political affairs of the country – 
as in, for example, an analysis of papers published in the South African Journal of 
Psychology (SAJP) between 1999 and 2003, according to which a mere two percent of 
articles dealt with the issue of HIV / AIDS while a further two percent handled that of „race‟ 
(C. Macleod, 2004).  
DEFINING ‘RELEVANCE’ 
The ubiquity of „relevance‟ is such that, when undergraduate psychology students unfamiliar 
with the nuances of the debate comment matter-of-factly on their chosen field of study‟s 
unsuitability for the national life, some modicum of explanation is required to account for the 
recalcitrance of „relevance‟ talk. It may be that the conceptual plasticity of „relevance‟ – the 
precise meaning of the term has never been determined – explains its enduring pertinence. In 
South African psychology it functions as little more than an adjective: disciplinary trends are 
either lauded as „relevant‟ or dismissed as „irrelevant‟. The adjectival form of „relevance‟, 
however, obscures an historical significance that is enabled through a focus on its nominal 
usage. „Relevance‟ is then transformed into a concept that, like any other, is the bearer of its 
own history.  
                                                                    
1 The marginality of Afrocentric psychology has led at least one commentator to conclude that 
psychologists in South Africa do not have a psychology (Ratele, 2004). 
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Whatever the surrounding lack of consensus, „relevance‟ – as will become clear in 
this study – evokes invariably the troubled antinomy inhabited by science and society,2 
reminding one that the notion of „science for its own sake‟ is nowadays difficult to entertain 
(Harding, 1991). The virtuousness of science is no longer an assumed truth: contingent upon 
social formations, science over the centuries has had different things asked of it (Hessels, van 
Lente, & Smits, 2009). The production of knowledge has been associated with values and 
institutions for at least the past four hundred years and has been „nationalized‟ to an ever-
increasing degree over the last one-and-a-half centuries (Pestre, 2003). Science is a 
fundamentally social exercise: as an intellectual practice, research is located within a wider, 
rule-bound community of practice immersed in hegemonic social configurations. 
Over the years, South African psychologists have understood „relevance‟ to mean 
different things, complicating the task of definition (Biesheuvel, 1991; Dawes, 1986). This 
study takes the position that, despite the word not always being used by interlocutors, 
„relevance‟ as a concept is invoked whenever a particular relationship between psychology 
and society is being advocated. One such articulation – social relevance – expresses the view 
that the discipline must contribute to human welfare by ensuring the psychological wellbeing 
of the citizenry (Nell, 1990). According to another version – it is, strictly speaking, a subset 
of „social relevance‟ – cultural relevance holds that psychology should be Afrocentric in 
order to meet the mental health needs of the country‟s black African majority (Holdstock, 
1981a). A third reading – market relevance – encourages psychological research and practice 
that address the imperatives of state and industry. Whereas appeals for „social‟ and „cultural 
relevance‟ were especially prominent during the 1980s when resistance to apartheid rule was 
at its peak, „market relevance‟ has become important in the post-apartheid era, when 
dwindling state support has forced institutions of higher education to adopt marketplace 
behaviors. However, since all three renderings tend to assume that applied psychology is the 
only path to „relevance‟, they are to be distinguished from a fourth strand known as 
theoretical relevance. 3  Here, the argument is that a fragmenting discipline‟s lack of 
universals is not helped by a focus on context-driven research at the expense of hypotheses 
constructed from basic theory. Moreover, “special psychologies” are unable to produce their 
own universals because their projects are designed in ways that do not permit the generation 
of law-like statements (Biesheuvel, 1991, p. 137). Whether one calls it „academic freedom‟ or 
                                                                    
2 Although this study considers the blanket term ‘society’ to be something of an abstraction, debates 
about ‘relevance’ treat it as a given. 
3 Instead of social, market and theoretical ‘relevance’, Biesheuvel (1991) writes of ‘communal’, ‘utilitarian’ 
and ‘sapiential relevance’ respectively. 
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„ivory tower syndrome‟, „theoretical relevance‟ cannot be dispensed with in the pursuit of 
„social‟, „cultural‟ or „market relevance‟. 
Underlying talk of „relevance‟ is the notion of a „public good‟ – “unendingly 
contestable, dangerous in the extreme, inevitably manipulated by elites” (Mansbridge, 1998, 
p. 3). Two points are of importance here. First, the philosophical meaning of the „public 
good‟ is historically variable and therefore unfinalizable.4 Second, the political meaning of 
„public‟ is equivocal: the „public‟ is neither unitary nor homogeneous, while the multiple 
communities that comprise it are constituted historically and discursively (Calhoun, 1998). 
As a result, petitions in the name of the „public good‟ – and, by implication, „relevance‟ – are 
subject to several constraints. First, in any given situation, it is impossible to determine with 
absolute certainty what the „public good‟ is. Second, despite the concept‟s open-endedness, 
dominant social groupings retain the advantage of defining the „public good‟ in their 
interests. And third, promoting the „public good‟ by appealing to altruism – „love‟ and „duty‟ 
are the latter‟s foremost incarnations – “opens the door to demagoguery” (Mansbridge, 1998, 
p. 4).  
Accordingly, this thesis does not assume that the achievement of „relevance‟ in 
psychology represents a desirable state of affairs. Its guiding principle, rather, is to 
demonstrate how the concept has been summoned in contradictory ways and for differing 
ends. And yet the thesis is not beyond politics. Not only is there no such thing as 
„positionlessness‟, some would view that idea as dishonoring the sacrifices many South 
African psychologists made in pursuit of a „relevant‟ psychology. Indeed, by its end, the 
thesis will have declared its politics – that the idiom of „relevance‟ has outlived its usefulness. 
THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis illustrates how, over a sixty-year period spanning the years 1950 to 2011, appeals 
for „relevance‟ in South African psychology were advanced by politically conservative, 
progressive and radical psychologists alike. „Relevance‟, therefore, is not a politically neutral 
construct but imbibes the ideological currents of the day. Correspondingly, the thesis traces 
the concatenation of politics, knowledge production and calls for „relevance‟ in South 
                                                                    
4 For example, whereas Plato claimed that what was good for the public was good for the individual, 
Adam Smith argued the opposite in his treatise on ‘invisible hand’ economics. Their shared position on 
the compatibility of private and public goods, meanwhile, contradicts a third perspective that developed 
out of medieval Christian theology. As for contemporary meanings of the ‘public good’, these include 1) 
the aggregate of individual private goods; 2) the outcome of a process (e.g. a democratic process); and 3) 
that which accrues to a collective rather than to the individuals that constitute the collective (Mansbridge, 
1998). 
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African psychology and beyond, chronicling the journey in which „relevance‟ came to be 
emptied of its emancipatory potential.  
Chapter 2 sets the scene by taking the reader on an international tour of „relevance‟, 
passing through the United States, Europe and the so-called „Third World‟, revealing how 
demands for „relevance‟ emerged during distinct times of crisis in national conversations 
around the world. The chapter recounts how conditions of social unrest – be it the war in 
Vietnam, totalitarian governance or the colonial aftermath – afforded fertile breeding grounds 
for advocates of „relevance‟. In the context of a then internationalizing discipline, it is also 
observed how concerns about „relevance‟ arose at moments when psychological knowledge 
and expertise started „traveling‟ beyond its traditional homelands.  
Chapter 3 theorizes in more formal terms this preponderance of „relevance‟ discourse 
in the worldwide psychological community. Towards this end, it revisits the discipline‟s 
struggle to define its subject matter, the relationship between its pure and applied branches, 
and its difficulty accommodating the social world, arguing that psychology is constitutionally 
predisposed to being charged with „irrelevance‟. The chapter considers also the rhetorical 
quality of „relevance‟ and details how it feeds into an unsolvable discourse–materiality 
binary. Thereafter, the chapter outlines the study‟s theoretical framework and concludes with 
its rationale and research questions. 
Chapter 4 is primarily about method. It tells of the initial difficulty involved in the 
„operationalization‟ of „relevance‟ before providing a description of the data corpus, which 
consists of presidential, keynote and opening addresses delivered at national South African 
psychology congresses between 1950 and 2011. The chapter proceeds to situate the 
investigation of „relevance‟ in the rhetoric of inquiry, leading to a comprehensive account of 
the analytic methods of choice – rhetorical and discourse analysis – as set out in the works of 
Michael Billig, Robert Connors, Edward Corbett, Norman Fairclough, Jonathan Potter and 
Margaret Wetherell. It examines the problem of epistemological relativism in discourse 
analysis as well as the question of ethics, and concludes with a few general remarks regarding 
the study‟s significance. 
The next six chapters contain the results of the analysis. Chapter 5 presents the 
findings of a thematic analysis that is intended to furnish the reader with a synopsis of the 
data set‟s contents. Chapter 6 focuses on two addresses delivered in 1962, the year in which 
Afrikaner psychologists withdrew from the South African Psychological Association (SAPA) 
to form the Psychological Institute of the Republic of South Africa (PIRSA). Whereas 
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Chapter 7 explores the preceding years (1950–1961) by analyzing the addresses leading up to 
the split, Chapter 8 analyzes addresses delivered in the aftermath of the break (1963–1977). 
Chapter 9 analyzes the addresses of a transitional period (1978–1993) during which PIRSA 
and SAPA were reunited and other politically progressive and radical psychological 
associations were established. Chapter 10 analyzes addresses of the post-apartheid period 
(1996–2011). 
 Chapter 11 provides a summary of the analytic chapters‟ key findings, an account of 
the study‟s limitations and recommendations for future research. Emphasis is laid on a 
newfangled rendering of „relevance‟ that has arisen in recent years, in which market 
considerations have displaced a once emancipatory agenda. Since its liberationist heyday in 
the 1980s, „relevance‟ has been reduced to little more than a catch-phrase in funding 
applications and mission statements. What is indispensable, therefore, is a critical awareness 
of the discipline‟s discursive practices, which, in turn, can lay the groundwork for a new 
language of resistance. 
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CHAPTER 2: A HISTORY OF ‘RELEVANCE’ 
 
When ideas go unexamined and unchallenged for a long enough time, certain things happen. They become 
mythological, and they become very, very, powerful. (E.L. Doctorow) 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter traces the appearance of the „relevance‟ question in psychology to the social 
unrest of the 1960s. It describes how the turbulence of those years precipitated calls for the 
transformation of knowledge-producing institutions, which were taken up subsequently in 
discipline-specific debates about „social relevance‟. In psychology, the American demand for 
„social relevance‟ was fueled by protests against racial inequality and an unpopular war in 
Vietnam; in Europe, totalitarian rule was one of several reference points informing 
allegations of „social irrelevance‟; and all over the postcolonial Third World, an „irrelevant‟ 
discipline was berated repeatedly. Meanwhile, American and European attempts to 
internationalize social psychology by means of „vertical‟ research collaborations contributed 
to the worldwide traction of „relevance‟ discourse. 
THE WORLDWIDE ‘IRRELEVANCE’ OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
Demands for „relevance‟ are confined neither to psychology nor to South Africa. A case in 
point is the international call of the 1960s for educational „relevance‟, made first by 
disaffected university students and taken up subsequently by their teachers (Rotenstreich, 
1972). On both sides of the Atlantic, emancipatory anti-capitalist sentiments demanded 
reforms in knowledge production, finding resonance especially among the social sciences. 
Unusually, the inner circles of student activists were distinctly bourgeois (Boudon, 1971). 
The young people that railed against the „irrelevance‟ of their educations were not the 
working-class victims of epistemic violence but, rather, a well-to-do generation scandalized 
by what they saw as the moral hypocrisy of preceding ones. Student protesters the world over 
were, in effect, sympathizing with those they deemed less privileged than themselves and, in 
an ironic reversal, began rubbishing the same institutions that had served their interests. In the 
rarefied atmosphere of higher learning, they had come to the conclusion that there was little 
on offer that could steel them for entry into a society traumatized by racism and war 
(Sampson, 1970).  
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Originating in the late fifties, a discourse of social relevance started to make headway 
on a handful of university campuses around America.5 For a vocal minority of conscientized 
students, the college experience had impacted negligibly on their values (Jacob, 1957). The 
curriculum had not changed in half a century while methods of instruction harked back to 
medieval times – the direct results of an institutional climate that rewarded faculty for 
participation in non-teaching activities (Axelrod et al., 1969). Students rebelled against the 
conception of education as steady-accumulation-of-facts-and-uptake-of-skills as well as their 
perceived exclusion from decision-making processes in the university – a state of affairs that, 
in their reckoning, amounted to the preparation of human inputs for the machineries of 
graduate schools and industry. The natural subversiveness of the academy had been 
overtaken by “its technical, applied social service functions” – an inevitable consequence of 
life in the administered society (Sampson, 1970, p. 2).  
The dominant culture of vocationalism had come under attack: an interest in 
interdisciplinary studies started to emerge along with a hope for a deeper understanding of the 
human condition. 1950s‟ privatism – “the expectations of college students of finding 
contentment in their own personal careers and family life and… their relative unconcern with 
larger national and international issues” (Axelrod et al., 1969, p. 90) – was now seen as 
contemptible. Unlike their parents – who had lived through the Depression years – these 
students knew nothing of deprivation or, indeed, early 1950s‟ McCarthyism; this made it 
somewhat easier for them to criticize what they interpreted as their parents‟ social and 
occupational conformism. They knew all too well about the military draft, too, and at a time 
when the Supreme Court was making significant rulings against segregation and censorship, 
dissident politics had become a manifest possibility. Drawn disproportionately from the upper 
middle-class and committed to the goals of a liberal education, American student activists 
viewed themselves as the voice of the oppressed.6 
 In Europe, their German doppelgängers were similarly “the first generation that 
[knew] no economic insecurity and relative poverty [yet] openly perceive[d] the 
disproportion between the potential wealth and potential gratification of an industrially 
developed society, and the actual life of the masses in that society” (Habermas, 1971, p. 24). 
Just as a clutch of American universities were forced into a reflexive rethinking of their 
                                                                    
5 In 1958, the iconic campus political party SLATE was established at the University of California, 
Berkeley, initiating the new era of student activism. 
6 Nonetheless, the activist population was anything but doctrinally consistent, reflecting perhaps its 
distrust of organized belief systems. Moreover, because of a noticeable predilection for individualistic 
values – and its being lumped with the politically disenchanted “Pot Left” – it invited charges of anarchy, 
irrationality, barbarism and ego-litarianism (Axelrod, Freedman, Hatch, Katz, & Sanford, 1969, p. 206). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
9 
 
modus operandi, European student protests in connection with a host of social issues – 
totalitarian governance, nuclear proliferation, environmental degradation, homophobia and 
the like – brought about analogous but more thoroughgoing consequences. Young radicals 
committed to a transdisciplinary agenda of social and academic transformation found 
inspiration in critical theory and the Frankfurt School – despite the School‟s own misgivings. 
For the latter, mobilization had become an end in itself, risking its own undoing through the 
privatization of “alternativeness” and an aimless “new actionism” (Habermas, 1971, p. 26).7  
In the Third World, meanwhile, critics insisted that the „colonial aftermath‟ was a 
contradiction in terms on the grounds that postcoloniality was located at the onset – not the 
termination – of colonial rule (Gandhi, 1998). Newly liberated societal energies were 
sublimated in the euphoria of independence, the groundswell of anti-western nationalism, the 
twin imperatives of development and change, popular uprisings against political oppression 
and more general social contradictions, and coincided with discerning calls for the 
decolonization of everyday consciousness (Fanon, 2008), knowledge institutions (al-Attas, 
1985; al-Faruqi, 1982) and the educated class (Mazrui, 1978). Within the academy this revolt 
against “cultural dependency” (ibid., p. 13) – Fanon (2008) called it “imitativeness” – was 
taken up in the form of discipline-specific debates about „relevance‟. For some, what was 
required was the indigenization of these disciplines. For others, the disciplinary order itself 
was “a particular manifestation of… how western civilization [saw] its problems [and had] no 
real meaning for non-western cultures” (Sardar, 2005, p. 200). Questions about „relevance‟ 
were consequently difficult to resolve.  
THE ‘IRRELEVANCE’ OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY 
Against this backdrop of international appeals for educational „relevance‟, on September 1st, 
1969, the president of the American Psychological Association (APA), George Miller, was 
introduced at the Association‟s annual convention. The theme for that year‟s congress had 
been titled Psychology and the Problems of Society and Miller‟s (1969) imminent address 
would itself become a watershed moment in American psychology‟s debate on „relevance‟.8 
But before he could deliver his talk, a group of students emerged from the audience and 
                                                                    
7 The rapid dissolution of the student movement would seem to vindicate this skepticism. Another 
perspective is that a corporatist assimilation of May 1968 values (Pestre, 2003) ensured that the 
students’ main legacy would be one of “libertarianism which came to be appropriated by a Right eager to 
dismantle bureaucracies and the welfare state” (Müller, 2002, p. 33). 
8 Although Miller’s address is cited frequently in discussions about the ‘social relevance’ of psychology, his 
contribution was not the first. Earlier examples from the sixties include Maslow (1961), Lirtzman (1964), 
MacLeod (1965), Ring (1967) and King Jr. (1968). 
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approached the stage. Gary Simkins, national chairman of the Black Students Psychological 
Association, requested that the student organization be permitted to present a list of demands, 
the following day, to the APA Council of Representatives (Simpkins & Raphael, 1970). As it 
turned out, the Council eventually endorsed the list after six hours of debate, validating a 
five-pronged proposal that demanded equitable selection procedures for entrance into 
professional psychology training programs, aggressive recruitment of black academics into 
psychology departments, financial assistance for black students, practical community 
experience for black trainees and terminal programs at all degree levels. In varying degrees of 
explicitness, each of the demands was predicated on the felt „irrelevance‟ of psychology for 
black America. 
On another front altogether, artifact and ethics crises in psychological 
experimentation had undermined the real-world applicability of social psychological theory 
(Baumrind, 1964; Orne, 1962; Rosenthal, 1966), inaugurating “the age of relevance in social 
psychology” (Rosnow, 1981, p. 78). In an influential paper, Kenneth Ring (1967) framed the 
corrupting and aimless flamboyance of experimental social psychology as a defensive 
posturing against the a priori vacuousness of the field. The “frivolity” of it all could only be 
countered by, among other things, initiating research of broad human importance; what Ring 
hoped for was a return to Lewinian values according to which science and society could 
progress simultaneously. In a similarly devastating indictment, Kenneth Gergen‟s (1973) 
central thesis was that social psychological facts were mostly unrepeatable and that the 
preeminent experimental method was, therefore, entirely inadequate as a method of enquiry. 
Gergen argued that the relationship between psychological science and society was 
characterized by a “feedback loop”; this was the result of, variously, prescriptive bias in 
psychological theory, the non-existence of naïve subjects and the influence of western 
cultural values on subjectivity (specifically, freedom and individuality). The upshot was that 
“social psychology alters the behavior it seeks to study” (p. 314) – that is, social 
psychological theory invalidated itself precisely because of its relationship with society. 
Gergen added that society in any event changed across time and place, thwarting in 
perpetuity all efforts “to build general laws of social behavior” (p. 316): at any given point in 
time, social psychological theory could never be more than contemporary theory. The 
implication was that pure science – with its canonical focus on timeless universals that tended 
to be of passing significance anyway – had to make way for the investigation of „socially 
relevant‟, applied, albeit time-bound hypotheses. 
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Then again, the equating of „social relevance‟ with applied research or, more 
pointedly, „the promotion of human welfare‟ simplified matters to a fault. Miller, for one, 
reminded his audience that “human welfare has never been operationally defined as a social 
concept” (1969, p. 1064). Furthermore, whereas Ring‟s (1967) version of „social relevance‟ 
was concerned mostly with what to study, William McGuire‟s (1967) focus was on where to 
conduct the study. The latter would also observe that the demand for „social relevance‟ 
deflected attention away from another, more troubling matter: the „socially relevant‟ 
hypothesis was based typically on a linear model of causality and so did nothing to address 
the fundamental shortcomings of the experimental method itself (McGuire, 1973). The 
“relevance of relevance” was now in doubt: the real problem appeared to be “a basic 
inadequacy of methodology rather than direction” resulting from “a persistent, slavish 
obsession to fit the study of behavior into existent models of other experimental sciences” 
(Silverman, 1971, p. 583). „Social relevance‟ – and, by implication, social change – seemed 
inconceivable in an ahistorical psychology that, for decades, had dedicated itself to a 
mechanistic understanding of human action. 
THE ‘IRRELEVANCE’ OF EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY 
Contemporaneous with these developments, a kindred zeitgeist took hold in Western Europe. 
Inspired by the Frankfurt School‟s insistence on the interestedness of all knowledge, the 
student revolution of 1968 fostered a crisis of „social relevance‟ among European social 
psychologists who stood accused of methodological fetishism (Moscovici, 1972). The 
discipline had imported wholesale the American “social psychology of the nice person” (p. 
18) while inoculating itself against European social verities. And since the American research 
agenda was apparently in thrall to economic and political stakeholders (Parker, 1989), the 
implication was that its European hangers-on had “done no more than to operationalize 
questions and answers which were imagined elsewhere” (Moscovici, 1972, pp. 31-32). To 
worsen matters, the theoretical impoverishment of European social psychology – a 
consequence of positivistic epistemology, aversion for philosophical speculation and 
methodological tensions – confounded any desire to generate locally „relevant‟ questions and 
answers. The outcome was a “psychology of well-tried aphorisms” (p. 37) and an associated 
charge of triviality. In contrast to Ring‟s argument, experimental research was not irrelevant 
because it was fundamental rather than applied; what made it irrelevant was “due to the social 
psychologists having often taken the wrong decision as to what kind of homo their discipline 
is concerned with: „biological‟, „psychological‟ or „sociopsychological‟” (Tajfel, 1972a, p. 
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71). The triteness of social psychological knowledge derived from an ill-conceived attempt to 
explain social phenomena at the level of the individual. Or, to rephrase Moscovici‟s (1972) 
provocative question, there was nothing social about social psychology. 
Harré and Secord‟s (1972) analogous argument drew a line under many of the same 
themes. The banality of experimental research in social psychology was a direct consequence 
of the prevailing behaviorist hegemony. The assumption that complex behavior was the 
uncomplicated aggregate of simple behaviors made the laboratory experiment inadequate for 
understanding real-world behavior – but suitable for making sense of “a kind of never-never 
land of behavior” (p. 49). An information-processing model of human beings, conceptual 
simple-mindedness, the confusion of scientific with human variables, and the “special kind of 
society” (p. 46) that was generated by the psychological laboratory were all implicated in a 
corresponding loss of “verisimilitude.” Theory and method were mutually „irrelevant‟, a 
scheme of near axiomatic proportions that could only be salvaged by a dramaturgical model 
of behavior at the center of which stood a capable and conscious actor preoccupied with 
presentation, monitoring and control. 
THE ‘IRRELEVANCE’ OF THIRD WORLD PSYCHOLOGY 
It was not long before the „relevance‟ crisis gained purchase in the disciplinary hinterland. 
Beginning in the mid-1960s and spreading rapidly over the following decade, a sustained 
critique of both American and European pre-eminence emerged and proliferated among 
psychology communities throughout the Third World (Abbott & Durie, 1987; Abdi, 1975; 
Ardila, 1982; Ching, 1984; Holdstock, 1979, 1981a; Khaleefa, 1997; Naidoo & Kagee, 2009; 
D. Sinha, 1984).  This was less a matter of „social relevance‟ contradicting itself to become 
an instance of Fanonian imitativeness than of inevitable questions being asked about the 
Third World applicability of an imported Euro-American “ready-made intellectual package” 
(Nandy, 1974, p. 7). Psychologists from developing countries naturally assumed a problem-
oriented approach “so that the data provided through psychological research [could] be of 
some use in dealing with myriads of [sic] pressing demands connected with national 
development” (D. Sinha, 1975, p. 10). These critical calls for „social relevance‟ formed the 
intellectual starting-points for positive attempts at indigenizing the discipline, which focused 
variously on “structural” (resource-driven), “substantive” (content-driven) and “theoretic” 
(concept-driven) aspects (Kumar, 1979, pp. 104-105 quoted in Atal, 2004, pp. 105-106).  
For newly independent countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa, the end of 
colonialism generated powerful imperatives for socio-economic and technological 
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development that had taken centuries to accomplish elsewhere. Systematic planning was 
required not only to effect the necessary changes but also to overcome any attendant 
resistances, which was to be achieved by revisiting the core ideals of their knowledge-making 
industries. A shift in the balance was inevitable: „research for prestige‟ needed to be tempered 
in favor of „research for policy‟. In research circles throughout the Third World, „social 
relevance‟ became the new mantra, counterposing itself against the “immorality of 
irrelevance” (Baumrin, 1970 quoted in D. Sinha, 1973, p. 5). Several significant calls for 
„relevance‟ – along with the attempts at substantive and theoretic indigenization they 
encouraged – are described below. 
INDIAN ‘RELEVANCE’ 
The Indian search for a „macro-psychology‟ is a prime example of substantive indigenization 
(D. Sinha, 1985). During the pre-independence years, Indian research in psychology was at 
best imitative of Euro-American trends. The situation changed slightly after independence, 
although topics popular in Western psychology continued to predominate and related only 
peripherally to the requirements of Indian society. In the early sixties, however, a definitively 
problem-oriented stance emerged: Indian psychologists became increasingly concerned with 
practical problems involving national development and social change, and began to direct 
their research efforts accordingly (D. Sinha, 1986). There was also a growing awareness that 
theories and methods borrowed from Western sources could not be applied indiscriminately. 
Jai Sinha, for example, not only discovered that high need for achievement (nACH) 
individuals were unable to maximize their individual outputs in contexts defined by limited 
resources but also came to the realization that he would have to make a choice between an 
exploration of “real-life issues” or a commitment to a “straight-jacketed methodology” (J. B. 
P. Sinha, 1997, p. 79). By the mid-sixties, propelled by a now strident critique of the patent 
„foreignness‟ of Indian psychology, attempts to indigenize the discipline were under way.  
As it happened, Indian psychology‟s indigenizing mission yielded mixed results. The 
psychology of the mid-seventies was deemed “not merely imitative and subservient but also 
dull and replicative” (Nandy, 1974, p. 5); even the call for „relevance‟ was considered 
imitative and therefore constituted little more than a „gambit.‟ At the turn of the decade, there 
were “signs of growing crisis in psychology” (Pareek, 1980 quoted in D. Sinha, 1986, p. 64). 
By the nineties, in spite of a now stronger indigenizing trend that encouraged the selection of 
„socially relevant‟ research topics and variables, Indian psychology – marooned in Nandy‟s 
“recipient culture of science” (1974, p. 1) and its own endemic parochialism – was failing to 
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reap the benefits of multidisciplinarity. It was not as if no gains had been made at all – rather, 
it was that “[m]any psychologists, even in India, are finding it difficult to cast off the 
microcosmic and individualistic orientation acquired in the West; they are bound by the 
prevailing disciplinary ethos, are critical about this [indigenizing] tendency, and doubt the 
distinctive identity of psychology in India” (D. Sinha, 1993, p. 40). 
CHINESE ‘RELEVANCE’ 
While strikingly similar to the Indian example, the development of the discipline in mainland 
China differs markedly in other respects. 9  Between the establishment of the Chinese 
Psychological Society (CPS) in 1921 and the founding of the People‟s Republic in 1949, 
Chinese psychology was unmistakably Western. However, with the coming to power of the 
Communist Party, Western psychology was repudiated in favor of Soviet psychology: 
reductionist Pavlovianism and a studied avoidance of social problems were now the defining 
features of psychology in China. But by the late fifties, a rising tide of ultra-leftism resulted 
in a critique of what were seen to be the bourgeois underpinnings of psychology per se: 
“biologization” and “abstractionism” (Executive Committee of the Chinese Psychological 
Society, 1983, p. 170). The Twelve-Year-Plan of 1958 – according to which psychology was 
defined as a basic science – made the discipline a target for the Anti-Rightist Movement, 
which emerged in reaction to Mao Zedong‟s liberal Hundred Flowers Campaign. The two-
pronged criticism was that the use of Pavlovian theory to explain the contingencies of human 
behavior undermined the assumptions of socialist education, while the dry experimentalism 
of the discipline relied on variables that did not obtain in the real world. In the context of a 
developing country with industrial, technological and scientific ambitions, psychology 
seemed little more than a „luxury‟ science (Ching, 1984). The effect of the so-called 
„Criticism Movement‟ was to force progressively more psychologists to familiarize 
themselves with Marxist and Maoist thought, after which they developed a dialectical 
materialist understanding of the discipline. Nonetheless, the mounting skepticism of the 
discipline was realized to devastating effect on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. In 1965, 
Yao Wenyuan – the Communist Party‟s propaganda chief and one of the notorious Gang of 
Four – wrote an article under the pseudonym Ge Mingren („The Revolutionist‟) that 
dismissed psychology as bourgeois gobbledygook and led to its eventual banning (Petzold, 
1987). In the ensuing “ten years of calamity”, psychologists were routinely harassed and 
                                                                    
9 China, of course, is not a Third World country. It is included here as an elaboration of the Asian call for 
‘relevance’. 
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imprisoned (Executive Committee of the Chinese Psychological Society, 1983, p. 171); it 
was only at the 1978 Baoding meeting of the CPS that the discipline‟s standing was restored.  
The remarkable collapse of psychology in the face of the Cultural Revolution has 
been attributed to the discipline‟s susceptibility to political influence (Ridley, 1976 cited in 
Petzold, 1987). This may explain why Chinese psychologists later cautioned against the 
wholesale renunciation of Western psychology so that, “[u]nder the guidance of the Four 
Fundamental Principles, on the basis of scientific research… a hundred flowers [may] 
blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend” (Executive Committee of the Chinese 
Psychological Society, 1983, p. 185). Before any thought could be given to the potential 
contribution of psychology to the advancement of Chinese society, the significance of the 
basic science had to be appreciated. After all, the fallout from the Cultural Revolution 
resulted from “the inability to distinguish between political and academic problems” (ibid., p. 
184) – hence the importance of distinguishing “between popular and vulgar, scientific and not 
scientific” (ibid., p. 183). 
Chinese psychology continues to tread an awkward path in its attempt “to establish a 
psychological system possessing our national features and meeting the demands of our 
socialist construction” (ibid., p. 187). Having experienced a traumatic crisis of „relevance‟ 
between the mid-fifties and mid-seventies, it finds itself in the curious position of wanting “to 
prevent interference from both left and right, inspire enthusiasm, stride proudly ahead, work 
wholeheartedly for the cause of psychology, in order to contribute to the magnificent cause of 
socialist modernization” (ibid., pp. 186-187). Sustained talk of „relevance‟ appears to be a 
thing of the past, but outside mainland China – in Taiwan, for instance – the problematics of 
yanghua (literally, Westernized) psychology remain firmly on the agenda (Yang, 1997). 
FILIPINO ‘RELEVANCE’ 
Of all the Asian countries, the indigenization project has proven most successful in the 
Philippines (D. Sinha, 1997). Initially a Spanish colony for more than 300 years, the 
Philippines eventually achieved independence from the United States in 1946. By then 
psychology – which was introduced as a subject at the University of the Philippines in 1908 – 
was thoroughly American (Montiel & Teh, 2004). With Filipino nationalism in the 
ascendancy during the early years of independence, however, psychologists began directing 
their attention towards the study of Filipino national identity and personality (Lagmay, 1984). 
By the 1960s, the general ill-suitedness of American psychology to the Filipino context was 
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widely acknowledged; with much problematizing and little theorizing, what was lacking was 
a coherent alternative (Pe-Pua & Protacio-Marcelino, 2000). 
The Philippines was deeply affected by the worldwide student protests of the late 
sixties and early seventies (Lagmay, 1984). The lingering imperialism of American culture 
was the shared object of disenchantment; there was a growing feeling that the dominance of 
the English language in education – in psychology, for example – needed to be challenged by 
installing the national language as the medium of instruction. Nationwide teach-ins, 
demonstrations and violence culminated in the imposition of martial law in September 1972. 
By then, Virgilio Enriquez had just returned to the country after completing his PhD in social 
psychology at Northwestern University. If anything, his American education made him even 
more Filipino-centered in his teaching and research, and he set about establishing the 
Philippine Psychology Research House. In 1975, he chaired the First National Conference of 
Filipino Psychology at which the guiding principles of Sikolohiyang Pilipino (Filipino 
Psychology) were officially enunciated (Pe-Pua & Protacio-Marcelino, 2000). In January 
1976, Enriquez founded the National Association for Filipino Psychology (Lagmay, 1984). 
The association sought deliberately to expand its membership beyond psychology, opening 
its doors to anthropologists, sociologists, historians, philosophers and others besides, 
consonant with Enriquez‟s adage, “Psychology is too important to be left to the psychologists 
alone” (Pe-Pua & Protacio-Marcelino, 2000, p. 54).  
Sikolohiyang Pilipino is essentially a site of protest against “a psychology that 
perpetuates the colonial status of the Filipino mind, the exploitation of the masses, and the 
imposition of psychologies developed in industrialized countries” (Church & Katigbak, 2002, 
p. 131). It is constellated around four core themes, namely, an understanding of identity and 
national consciousness with a social psychological focus on an indigenous conceptualization 
of the psyche; an awareness of and involvement in social issues; attention to national and 
ethnic languages and cultures; and the development of psychological practices appropriate for 
the Filipino context (Enriquez, 1993). Notwithstanding the „social‟ and „cultural irrelevance‟ 
of its parent discipline, Sikolohiyang Pilipino does not promote the outright rejection of 
Western psychology: it encourages – in some versions – an etic-emic hybridism, which 
Enriquez (1979 cited in Church & Katigbak, 2002) championed by distinguishing between 
„indigenization from within‟ (utilizing native psychology) and „indigenization from without‟ 
(adapting foreign psychology). 
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LATIN AMERICAN ‘RELEVANCE’ 
On three separate occasions, Ruben Ardila asserts that “science is not a cultural value in Latin 
America” (1982, pp. 105, 112 & 120). He emphasizes the heterogeneity of the region and its 
psychological traditions, and concludes that “there is no such thing as „Latin American 
psychology‟” (ibid., p. 103). Influenced broadly by psychoanalysis, „French‟ psychology and 
Skinnerian behaviorism, psychologists in Central and South America have tended historically 
to apply themselves to the specific problems of their countries – by the 1920s, in fact, the 
discipline was already an established part of public life (Pickren & Rutherford, 2010).  
When popular movements against economic oppression sprung up in the 1950s and 
1960s, the social sciences proved especially receptive, articulating critical perspectives 
committed to social justice. In psychology, the Liberation Social Psychology (LSP) 
movement was launched and drew on ideas from – among other strands – liberation theology 
and critical pedagogy (Burton & Kagan, 2005). Apart from the service orientation of Latin 
American psychology, the emergence of LSP was made possible through an autonomously 
functioning intellectual culture that distanced itself from state interests (Jiménez, 1990 cited 
in Burton & Kagan, 2005). The term pscicología de la liberación was first used in print form 
in 1976, before gaining widespread currency through the works of the assassinated Jesuit 
priest and Spanish social psychologist, Ignacío Martín-Baró, and the Venezuelan social 
psychologist, Maritza Montero. Forged amid the maelstrom of Argentina‟s Dirty War, the 
Chilean coup of 1973, the Salvadoran Civil War and the experiences of subjugated 
communities in Venezuela, Puerto Rico, Costa Rica and Brazil, the birth of LSP challenged 
the „social irrelevance‟, universalistic pretentiousness and moral apathy of empirical social 
psychology (Burton & Kagan, 2005). 
Yet Martín-Baró‟s terms of reference went beyond social psychology: he argued that 
“psychology as a whole: theoretical and applied, individual and social, clinical and 
educational… has not only remained servilely dependent when it has needed to lay out 
problems and seek solutions, but has stayed on the sidelines of the great movements and 
away from the distresses of the peoples of Latin America” (Martín-Baró, 1996, p. 17). The 
stakes were high indeed: Martín-Baró is on record as having said to a North American 
colleague, “In your country, it‟s publish or perish. In ours, it‟s publish and perish” (Aron & 
Corne, 1996, p. 2, original emphasis). For Martín-Baró, the “historical misery” of Latin 
American psychology was the product of, firstly, a “scientistic mimicry” through which the 
discipline hoped to secure a status comparable to its North American progenitor (Martín-
Baró, 1996, p. 20); secondly, a deficient epistemology that canonized positivism, 
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individualism, hedonism, homeostasis and ahistoricism; and thirdly, an unhelpful dogmatism 
founded on false binaries. He advocated, instead, a new disciplinary horizon supportive of 
liberation, the perspective of the oppressed and a praxis unashamed of its politics. 
ISLAMIC ‘RELEVANCE’ 
A significant but underemphasized intellectual movement of the 20th century is the 
Islamization of Knowledge (IOK) project. After World War II, most Muslim countries had 
attained independence from their erstwhile colonial masters. But by the late 1960s, a new 
milieu arose, which, exemplified by this political autonomy, the sudden advent of „black 
gold‟ nouveaux riches and widespread agreement regarding the failures of capitalism and 
socialism, hastened calls for the development of „Islamic‟ solutions to the social problems of 
Muslim countries (Haneef, 2005). The ummah (worldwide Muslim community) was in a state 
of „malaise‟ epitomized by political disunity, economic underdevelopment and religio-
cultural alienation – and the root cause of the malady was considered to be the knowledge 
enterprise itself. For the Palestinian-American philosopher, Ismail al-Faruqi, the Muslim 
world had committed the error of embracing a “bifurcated” educational system that 
differentiated between religious and secular knowledge (1988, p. 16). The result of this 
distinction was that the non-religious sciences – including the social sciences and humanities 
– were imported mindlessly from the West. By contrast, the Malaysian philosopher, Syed 
Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, reasoned that the principal cause of Muslim backwardness was 
the “loss of adab” of Muslims themselves (1985, p. 99). Because of this loss of discipline 
“that assures the recognition and acknowledgement of one‟s proper place in relation to one‟s 
self, society and Community” (ibid.), Muslims were no longer able to discriminate between 
categories of knowledge.  
Although al-Attas “is credited for laying the theoretical foundation of the IOK… 
while [al-]Faruqi‟s contribution is more on the methodological side” (Haque & Masuan, 
2002, p. 279), the chief implication of their respective positions was the same: knowledge 
was not neutral. Two things needed to be done: first, the IOK project had to be adequately 
defined, rationalized and theorized; second, the disciplines themselves were to be subjected to 
its processes. International conferences were held in Saudi Arabia in 1976 and 1977, with 
economics and education the first disciplines considered for Islamization (Haneef, 2005). In 
the case of education – the logic applied to all disciplines – it was argued that “[t]he foreign 
elements and disease [would] have first to be drawn out and neutralized before the body of 
knowledge [could] be remolded in the crucible of Islam” (al-Attas, 1979, p. 44). By 1979, 
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psychology had become a candidate for Islamization. In his celebrated The Dilemma of 
Muslim Psychologists, the Sudanese psychologist, Malik Badri (1979), argued that in their 
eagerness to locate themselves beneath the aegis of science Muslim psychologists had 
parroted Western psychological theories and practices that were inapplicable in Muslim 
countries. For Badri, the dilemma involved a tension between the psychological theories of 
pre-modern Muslim scholars and those of contemporary mainstream psychology (Haque & 
Masuan, 2002).  
A direct result of the 1977 education conference was the establishment of „Islamic 
universities‟ in Islamabad and Kuala Lumpur in the early 1980s (Haneef, 2005). Muslim 
social scientists from around the world joined Kuala Lumpur‟s International Islamic 
University Malaysia (IIUM), eager to immerse themselves in the IOK project. Badri himself 
joined IIUM‟s Department of Psychology in 1992 and became the first faculty member to 
introduce an undergraduate course on Islam and psychology. Despite his relocation to al-
Attas‟ International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) – a research 
institute of IIUM – he continued to publish in the area of psychology and religion. Other 
international figures from Algeria, Iraq, India and the Sudan subsequently taught Islamic 
psychology at the university (Haque & Masuan, 2002). 
Attempts at fashioning a bona fide Islamic psychology have taken one of three forms 
(Malkawi, 1998): a critical revision of Western psychology, an elaboration of the classical 
Islamic legacy and a textual analysis of Quranic references to the word nafs (soul / psyche). 
A theocentric-individualistic outlook marks all three strands and is evident in a landmark 
special issue on Islamic psychology in the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences. 
Badri (1998), for example, juxtaposes the West‟s failed campaigns against drug abuse with 
an Islamic treatment approach based on religious observances; Alawneh (1998) defines 
human motivation in largely spiritual terms; for Shehu (1998), human development is always 
subject to God‟s Will; while, for Achoui (1998), psychology has intrinsic religious, 
philosophical and moral dimensions. The theocentric individualism of these accounts 
emulates a similar penchant in a well-known earlier attempt at articulating a framework for 
an Islamic psychology (al-Attas, 1990). Outwardly asocial, contemporary formulations of 
Islamic psychology problematize the „cultural relevance‟ of Western psychology. 
AFRICAN ‘RELEVANCE’ 
Psychology came to Africa during colonial times in the form of ethnopsychology, when 
nineteenth century writers, philosophers and anthropologists set about reifying a world of 
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newfound curiosities (Nell, 1990). In fact, until the 1960s the discipline comprised little more 
than a motley collection of ex-colonists, expatriates, visiting scholars and, in the case of 
South Africa, white psychologists (Abdi, 1975). Even then, foreign researchers in cross-
cultural psychology were more interested in theoretical questions than „socially relevant‟ 
issues on the agendas of developing countries; in time, their expeditions on the continent 
would be viewed with no small measure of suspicion (Jahoda, 1973). The lack of African 
involvement was such that, by the early nineties, “the average black African is likely to 
declare that he has never heard of the term „Psychology‟ in his life, or if he has heard of it, he 
is most likely to swear that he does not understand what it means” (Eze, 1991, p. 28). 
In 1962 – with the exception of South African universities – not a single department 
of psychology existed in sub-Saharan Africa (Peltzer & Bless, 1989 cited in Nsamenang, 
1995). It was only in the late sixties and increasingly during the seventies that African 
researchers in psychology started to emerge – at the same time that their colleagues in the 
West were becoming more reflexive about their own practices (Wober, 1975). Until then, 
psychological research in Africa had occupied itself primarily with the resolution of Euro-
American disciplinary impasses – with the subtext of “mak[ing] more effective the African‟s 
exploitation [and] advancing a „science‟ of dubious relevance to African reality” (Bulhan, 
1981, p. 27). Lucien Lévy-Bruhl‟s (1923) oft-cited Primitive Mentality, for example, in 
which he presented his thesis on the „prelogical mentality‟ of „uncivilized communities‟, 
became a seminal work that would inspire psychological research in Africa for decades. This 
line of theorizing was taken up by, among others, John Carothers (1951 cited in Richards, 
1997), according to whom Africans did not use their frontal lobes, Carl Jung (1961 cited in 
Nell, 1990), in whose reckoning the African mind featured as something infantile and largely 
unconscious, and Octave Mannoni (1968 cited in Bulhan, 1981), who dismissed the struggle 
for independence as a reaction formation against the underlying „dependency complex‟ of the 
African personality.  
Psychological expertise was employed in the service of state and industry – both of 
which were ill-disposed to African interests. Although occupational psychology had 
developed two approaches in the study of adaptation to industrialization – one focusing on 
worker efficiency, the other on worker satisfaction – in Africa, more studies accorded with 
the first approach (Wober, 1975). Employed usually by industrialists, psychologists tended to 
endorse an economic outlook consistent with dehumanizing attitudes towards workers. In 
South Africa, “for the most part, psychological practice [was] a matter of treating individuals 
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as objects of political or management decisions not made by themselves” (J. Louw & 
Danziger, 2000, p. 59). Elsewhere – in Nigeria, the Cameroons, South West Africa and 
Ghana – it was surmised that Africans preferred the overcrowded living conditions that 
obtained in worker compounds (Wober, 1975).  
Despite improvements in the post-independence years, neo-colonial designs remained. 
With the perfection of the means of production, crude racism grew more refined and “no 
longer dare[d] appear without disguise” (Fanon, 2006, p. 23). By the eighties – there were 
now twenty psychology departments in Africa (Serpell, 1984 cited in Nsamenang, 1992) – 
black psychologists trained in the Euro-American tradition continued to conduct the kind of 
research that had “long served as a bulwark of rationalisation for oppression” (Bulhan, 1981, 
p. 25). In the mid-nineties, a survey of twelve East and Southern African countries revealed 
that the orientation of their psychological services was still more Western than African 
(Mpofu, Zindi, Oakland, & Peresuh, 1997 cited in Mpofu, 2002). Psychological theories 
remained individuocentric, failing to capture the purported sociocentrism of African societies 
(Mpofu, 2002). At its inaugural meeting in July 2000, the Working Group on the 
Development of the African Psychological Society noted the lack of African participation at 
the International Congress of Psychology and concluded that “[e]ither we are marginalized, 
or not taken seriously at all” (Mpofu, 2002, p. 180). 
Justifications for the „irrelevance‟ of psychology in Africa are varied. Political 
instability (Nsamenang, 1995), overseas training (Mpofu et al., 1997 cited in Mpofu, 2002), 
an exodus of intellectual capital (Nsamenang, 1992 cited in Nsamenang, 1995), antagonistic 
peer relationships (Nsamenang, 1995), poor communication networks across the continent 
and beyond (Abdi, 1975), language barriers (Mpofu, 2002), methodological enigmas (Abdi, 
1975), the Westocentrism of the discipline (Abdi, 1975) and, inevitably, the „social 
irrelevance‟ of a “luxury oriented” discipline at odds with the prevailing conditions of 
hunger, disease and economic backwardness (Abdi, 1975, p. 230) – all have been advanced 
as explanatory factors.10 
SOUTH AFRICAN ‘RELEVANCE’ 
Psychology in South Africa developed rapidly in the 1920s when John Dunston – a British 
psychiatrist and the country‟s first Commissioner for Mental Hygiene – returned from an 
official tour of England, Europe and the United States. Having learnt that mental health care 
                                                                    
10 In response to some of these reasons, a group of psychologists started to develop an indigenous African 
psychology in the mid-eighties – despite the allegedly open resentment of “white-washed” colleagues 
(Eze, 1991, p. 36). 
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extended beyond the provision of custodial services, Dunston introduced a series of 
interventions that included the appointment of psychologists and the standardization of 
intelligence tests for South African conditions (Minde, 1975). His views on African 
intelligence, significantly, were unflattering: Dunston believed that Africans were 
appreciably less intelligent than whites, were short on initiative, did not learn from 
experience and lacked not only the reasoning skills but also the requisite number of brain 
cells for becoming paranoid (Dunston, 1923 cited in Seedat & MacKenzie, 2008). These 
notions dovetailed seamlessly with the concept of a „hierarchy of races‟, advocated in 1920 
by the Eugenics and Genetics Standing Committee of the South African Association for the 
Advancement of Science. In need of scientific validation, here was a challenge tailor-made 
for the ministrations of psychological expertise (Louw, 1997 cited in Seedat & MacKenzie, 
2008).  
Yet the discipline‟s most noteworthy achievement during the interwar years stemmed 
from its involvement in the Carnegie Commission‟s Poor White Study. The so-called „poor 
white problem‟ had raised concerns about sexual relations across the color line, which, it was 
speculated, resulted from the social equality of poor whites and “the great mass of non-
Europeans…. This impairs the tradition which counteracts miscegenation, and the social 
colour divisions are noticeably weakening” (Grosskopf, 1932, p. xx). The poor white problem 
afforded psychologists the opportunity of demonstrating the usefulness of psychometric 
techniques in investigating such problems, which they accomplished with extraordinary 
success (J. Louw, 1986b). On the other hand, South African psychology had aligned itself 
from its inception with the precepts of scientific racism, which served, in turn, the mission of 
apartheid capitalism (Seedat & MacKenzie, 2008). 
The post-war period saw the institutionalization of Afrikaner apartheid rule and the 
increasing isolation of the South African academy from continental Europe and Britain. The 
National Institute for Personnel Research (NIPR) – established in 1946 and staffed initially 
by air force psychologists that had made important contributions to the mobilization effort – 
was instrumental in generating knowledge concerning the adaptability of African labor. 
Funded by state and industry, the NIPR‟s unwritten mandate was to discover “how white-
owned industries could best expropriate and exploit the labour of the African workforce” 
(Seedat & MacKenzie, 2008, p. 80). In the 1970s, however, psychologists were called upon 
increasingly to defuse a rising working-class militancy. A discernible shift in political 
momentum was afoot, epitomized by the failure of Calvinist individualism, mounting local 
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and international condemnation of the wide-ranging depredations of apartheid policy and, in 
psychology, a looming revolt against an Afrikaner-led profession. The promulgation in 1974 
of the Afrikaans Medium Decree contributed significantly to what would become the Soweto 
riots of 1976, followed in 1977 by the death-in-detention of the Black Consciousness leader, 
Steve Biko. Along with the not inconsiderable regional turmoil of those years – particularly 
in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia – from the mid-seventies onwards the apartheid state 
lurched from one crisis to the next in a steady trajectory of terminal decline. 
By the late 1970s, South Africa‟s first black psychologist, Chabani Manganyi, had 
been writing about the black experience of political oppression for some years (see, for 
example, Manganyi, 1973). Manganyi‟s early contributions were made during the apogee of 
apartheid rule, yet it was only with the writing already on the wall that developments in the 
professional mainstream started reflecting what was going on in the country and beyond. 
From 1978, the Afrikaner whites-only psychology association, the Psychological Institute of 
the Republic of South Africa (PIRSA), intimating a growing rapprochement with its rival 
association, backtracked on its founding ethos of racial separatism by holding joint 
conferences with the racially integrated South African Psychological Association (SAPA). 
Although the two societies buried their hatchet in 1982 to form the Psychological Association 
of South Africa (PASA), the new association failed to convince many progressive 
psychologists who interpreted the merger as a pragmatic gesture aimed at consolidating 
statutory recognition of the profession. In 1983, the Institute of Family and Marital Therapy 
hosted an international conference at Sun City – a gambling and entertainment centre in a 
Bantustan “setting which is responsible for the break-up of thousands of [black] families” 
(Vogelman, 1987, p. 24). In protest, an ad hoc committee of disenchanted mental health 
professionals and students formed the Organisation for Appropriate Social Services in South 
Africa (OASSSA), which dedicated itself “to work only with those who are the victims of 
oppression” (Anonymous, n.d., p. 2). In the same year, the critical psychology journal 
Psychology in Society was launched to “contribut[e] to serious debate and understanding of a 
psychology which is clearly at a cross-roads [and] is being torn apart by its inability to 
contribute meaningfully to a South African society increasingly in the throes of a deep 
structural crisis” (The Editor, 1983, p. 1). But by the late 1980s, the white-run OASSSA was 
deemed not radical enough by black psychologists who founded the Psychology and 
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Apartheid Committee instead.11 With the state apparatus unraveling and political violence 
escalating, critical psychologists condemned the discipline for its „social irrelevance‟, 
claiming that it was culturally insensitive (Holdstock, 1979, 1981a, 1981b), bourgeois 
(Turton, 1986), politically indifferent (Anonymous, 1986; Dawes, 1985; Liddell & Kvalsvig, 
1990; Mauer, Marais, & Prinsloo, 1991; Strümpfer, 1981), economically inaccessible (Berger 
& Lazarus, 1987; Vogelman, 1987) and theoretically impoverished (A. Gilbert, 1989).  
Almost a generation later, the debate about „social relevance‟ continues unabated 
(Ruane, 2010). Accusations of „irrelevance‟ refer currently to the racial profile of the 
country‟s psychologists as well as the discipline‟s response to post-apartheid policy 
directives.12 Regarding the former, it is not that „race‟ per se is taken as problematic – it is 
that racial identity overlaps with language proficiency, which has implications for a 
profession built on a „talking cure‟. In a situation where forty percent of the population 
speaks either isiXhosa or isiZulu as a home language and eighty percent of psychologists are 
able to speak only English and/or Afrikaans, some have gone as far as to cast the mismatch as 
a human rights issue (Ahmed & Pillay, 2004), asking whether it is all mere “rhetoric” 
(Freeman, 1991, p. 141) and “political correctness” (Pillay & Siyothula, 2008, p. 734). 
Although an increasing number of black African psychologists has been trained in the 
first decade of the post-apartheid era, there has been no corresponding decrease in the number 
of white trainees – it is the colored and Indian trainee numbers that appear to be on the 
decline (Mayekiso et al., 2004). Despite a resolution adopted in 2000 by the Professional 
Board of Psychology recommending the equal intake of white and black students for 
professional training programs, the situation is nowhere near parity (Pillay et al., 2008). 
Selection criteria have been criticized for being skewed in favor of educationally advantaged 
– i.e. white – applicants (Stevens, 2001), while selection panels are noticeably white-
dominated (Mayekiso et al., 2004). Uneven racial distributions are plain to see in the 
„registered counselor‟ practice category, which is also disproportionately white (Abel & 
Louw, 2009). Indeed, when the category was introduced in 2003, it was with the 
understanding that an earlier exit point in professional training would increase the number of 
skilled professionals on the ground, making basic counseling services more available to 
                                                                    
11 The outcome was that psychology’s resistance to apartheid was organized mostly along racial lines 
(Foster, 2008; Suffla, Stevens, & Seedat, 2001; Yen, 2008). 
12 By the end of 2006, in a country with a black African majority of eighty percent, less than fifteen 
percent of registered psychologists were black African (Pillay, Bundhoo, & Ngcobo, 2008). 
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economically disadvantaged communities throughout South Africa (Stevens, 2001). 13  By 
2013, however, most universities had discontinued their registered counselor programs – for a 
variety of reasons – in spite of evidence that primary level psychological services were sorely 
needed across the country (Petersen, 2004). 
If these are some of the indicators of „relevance‟, why does South African psychology 
still struggle to affirm its „relevance‟ credentials? The explanations are numerous. Some cite 
the legacy of apartheid-era practices, the norms of training institutions and the generally slow 
rate of transformation within the discipline (Pillay et al., 2008). Others advocate the view that 
psychology is incompatible with African ways of being, that indigenous healers are the 
designated „psychologists‟ in African society, that rural Africans prefer visiting traditional 
healers and that black students are attracted to more lucrative professions (Ahmed & Pillay, 
2004; Pillay & Kramers, 2003). Another perspective is that psychology‟s indifference to 
black working-class problems has alienated black students from the discipline (Mama, 1995; 
Pillay & Kramers, 2003). For example, the non-issue of poverty in clinical psychology 
literature – despite its links with two of the biggest social problems facing the country, 
namely, violence and the HIV/AIDS pandemic – is understood to be consistent with the 
profession‟s pattern of aligning itself with the well-resourced (Ahmed & Pillay, 2004). 
DISCUSSION 
The foregoing cases reveal how concerns about „social‟ and „cultural relevance‟ emerged 
during periods of social unrest. In the American example, opposition to the Vietnam War and 
domestic racism had peaked; in Europe, students were rallying around a host of political 
causes; in China, a new regime proceeded to repress anything it deemed „bourgeois‟; in Latin 
America, economic exploitation had occasioned a populist revolt; while in India, the 
Philippines, Africa and the Muslim world, struggles with postcolonial realities endured. 
 „Relevance‟ discourse, that is, did not emerge in a social vacuum. In the American 
case, disciplinary concerns about experimentalism had existed for many years, yet it was only 
in the sixties that these anxieties precipitated „the age of relevance‟. A cocktail of Wundtian 
dualism, the Clever Hans phenomenon, the Hawthorne effect and the insights of Luther 
Bernard and Saul Rosenzweig in the thirties and Edgar Vinacke in the mid-fifties should have 
been enough to trigger a call for „relevance‟. The reason it did not, had a great deal to do with 
the zeitgeist: by the late sixties and early seventies, a tipping point had been reached, brought 
                                                                    
13 Registered counselor training takes four years while clinical psychology training lasts a minimum of six 
years. 
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on by an accumulation of political crises. Domestic wiretapping, the Watergate scandal and 
the American public‟s growing knowledge of the excesses of biomedical research resonated 
with underlying themes of invasion of privacy, distrust of authority and scientific 
accountability (Rosnow, 1981).  
In the non-American appeals for „relevance‟, however, a second factor must be 
considered. The international call for „relevance‟ depended as much on an „ecological 
niche‟14 as it did on ill-conceived attempts to internationalize the discipline. Hiroshi Azuma‟s 
(1984) historical analysis of the development of Japanese psychology illustrates this latter 
point. He writes of an initial „pioneer period‟ characterized by recognition of the discipline‟s 
potential that led to its basic introduction at textbook level. Then, in the „introductory period‟, 
increased academic regard encouraged the intellectual elite to train overseas. In the ensuing 
„translation and modeling period‟, student and researcher numbers multiplied while theories 
and research practice were modeled on those of the developed world; applications were as yet 
only successful in culture-free areas. An „indigenization period‟ followed wherein culturally 
sensitive theories were developed and applied. An „integration period‟ marked the final stage 
in the discipline‟s trajectory in which a synthesis of Western and Japanese theories and 
practices was effected. 
With varying degrees of fitness, Azuma‟s model can be superimposed on almost all of 
the foregoing national and regional histories of psychology. Concerns about „social 
relevance‟, that is, presented during the end-stages of „translation periods‟ around the world 
when national and regional aspirations seemed to have been short-changed by a foreign 
disciplinary logic. Yet it was not the translation periods themselves that kick-started a series 
of „indigenization periods‟: it was because psychological knowledge had been made to 
„travel‟ beyond its political, cultural and intellectual center that it now appeared „socially 
irrelevant‟ and in need of indigenization.15 
It is due arguably to the strong association between conditions of social change and 
calls for „relevance‟ that the latter presented most frequently in social psychology. After 
World War II, American preeminence in the field was inevitable: it was American money – 
tied to "a prescriptive model of what science should be" (Moscovici & Markova, 2006, p. 
xiii) – that had rebuilt European institutions. At the end of the 1950s, a rudimentary alliance 
                                                                    
14 Ian Hacking (1998) coined the term to explain the phenomenon of ‘transient mental illnesses’, which 
flourish in accommodating environments but disappear as soon as their surroundings become 
inhospitable. 
15 A similar process of indigenization occurred when the discipline first ‘traveled’ from Europe to its 
future heartland: the United States (Pickren, 2009). 
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existed between American and European social psychologists, mirroring the broader efforts 
of the International Social Science Council to coordinate social sciences internationally. By 
the early 1960s, however, the Americans encountered a problem: social psychology‟s links 
with sociology and cultural anthropology were fueling questions about its status as an 
independent area of study.  
One solution was to promote the field internationally. In 1964, the Committee on 
Transnational Social Psychology was formed. With Leon Festinger playing a leading role, the 
Transnational Committee‟s founding premise was to generate a universally valid body of 
social psychological knowledge by encouraging colleagues around the world to conduct 
investigations in their own countries. Favoring the exploration of real-world phenomena, the 
Transnational Committee risked alienating itself from an American mainstream that had 
distanced itself increasingly from applied work (Moscovici & Markova, 2006). On the other 
hand, its assumption that internationalization involved the dissemination – and not the 
advancement – of knowledge threatened to alienate its international partners. Indeed, after 
several networking conferences and training seminars in Europe, Latin America and Africa, 
collaborative arrangements remained more „vertical‟ than „horizontal‟ (Gergen, Gulerce, 
Lock, & Misra, 1996; Jahoda, 1973, 1975). On balance, the social needs of developing 
nations took a backseat to the theoretical preoccupations of American researchers (Tajfel, 
1966). Because of unidirectional economic and intellectual sponsorship, the policy of 
cooperative cross-cultural research proved useful neither for developing nations nor for the 
„organic‟ development of social psychology in those countries (Tajfel, 1968).16 
By the 1970s, appeals for „social relevance‟ had taken root in Western Europe (Israel 
& Tajfel, 1972), Latin America (Martín-Baró, 1996), Asia (D. Sinha, 1973) and Africa (Abdi, 
1975). Driven by political crises and a push for internationalization that resembled 
“intellectual imperialism” (Moscovici & Markova, 2006, p. 186), a situation arose in which a 
debate begun by American psychologists had taken on intercontinental proportions 
(Moghaddam, 1987). The internationalization of the „relevance‟ question represented not 
only an interrogation of disciplinary authority but a broader questioning of political authority. 
In psychology as much as in politics, American and European models were seen as 
ineffectual in other parts of the world.  
                                                                    
16 The involvement of social psychologists in the expansion of cross-cultural psychology cannot be 
ascribed wholly to their pursuit of a universal social psychology. There was also a desire to understand 
the shared traumas of World War II, a Cold War preoccupation with international relations (Segall, 
Lonner, & Berry, 1998) and a concern – paternalistic or not – with the challenges that accompanied 
political independence in the Third World (Jahoda, 2009). 
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And yet psychologists had been preoccupied with „social relevance‟ since as far back 
as both World Wars and the Great Depression (Burr, 2003; O'Donnell, 1979; Rosnow, 1981). 
Even the 1936 founding of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) 
was in part a reaction against the perceived „social irrelevance‟ of a psychological science 
that, until then, had failed to deliver on what the APA‟s second president, George Trumbull 
Ladd, had imagined for the discipline – “that it is able and destined to contribute greatly to 
the welfare of mankind” (1894, p. 19). The dangers of origin-diving notwithstanding, it is no 
exaggeration to state that a history of „social relevance‟ corresponds to a history of the 
discipline itself. In the chapter that follows, an attempt is made to explain this durability of 
debates about psychology‟s „relevance‟. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORIZING ‘RELEVANCE’ 
 
“Everything which if of use to mankind is honourable. I only understand one word: useful! You can snigger as 
much as you like, but that‟s so!” (Andrey Semyonovitch Lebeziatnikov, from Crime and Punishment) 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents three perspectives from which to understand the persistence of the 
„relevance‟ question in psychology. First, it describes how disagreements about psychology‟s 
cognitive interest – and subject matter – created an environment in which accusations of 
„irrelevance‟ could flourish. Second, it asserts that applied psychology‟s reliance on basic 
psychology for its scientific authority made debates about „relevance‟ unavoidable. And 
third, it claims that the discipline‟s longstanding antithesis to the social domain left it 
vulnerable to these debates particularly in recent decades of rapid social change. The chapter 
then proceeds to a discussion of the rhetorical significance of „relevance‟, leading to a 
lengthy consideration of the discourse–materiality antinomy. It concludes with a formulation 
of the study‟s theoretical framework and research questions. 
PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS SUBJECT MATTER 
In Knowledge and Human Interests, Jürgen Habermas (1972) describes three modes of 
scientific enquiry, each of which produces „interested‟ knowledge. First, in the empirical-
analytic (i.e. natural) sciences, hypotheses are tested via observation and measurement in 
order to generate nomological facts. Considered value-free, this type of predictive knowledge 
aids technical mastery of the environment. Second, in the historical-hermeneutic (i.e. social) 
sciences, the assumption is that human action – enabled by consciousness – is inherently 
meaningful to self and others. “Access to the facts is provided by the understanding of 
meaning, not observation” (ibid., p. 309), which occurs through acts of interpretation. The 
investigator‟s situatedness is acknowledged in that “[t]he world of traditional meaning 
discloses itself to the interpreter only to the extent that his own world becomes clarified at the 
same time” (ibid., pp. 309-310). Knowledge obtained hermeneutically has a practical – rather 
than technical – cognitive interest in a “possible consensus among actors in the framework of 
a self-understanding derived from tradition” (ibid., p. 310). And third, in the sciences of 
social action, law-obeying knowledge is also sought, although an attempt is made to produce 
a reflective consciousness in “those whom the laws are about” (ibid.). Here, the cognitive 
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interest is emancipatory and seeks liberation from “ideologically frozen relations of 
dependence” (ibid.). 
Psychology has the unusual distinction of belonging to all three knowledge traditions. 
The discipline‟s tardiness in demarcating its boundaries – its most enduring controversy has 
to do with the scope of its subject matter – encouraged the development of an astonishing 
array of fields and sub-fields. On the other hand, it also bequeathed a legacy of turf wars 
exemplified by incessant calls for „relevance‟. For, despite „the individual‟ being identified as 
the discipline‟s proper focus of attention, its meaning was overextended to the point of 
promoting either a dilettantism of sorts or the fullest culmination of human disciplining yet. 
Sensation, perception, will, habits, consciousness, mind, brain, the unconscious, behavior, 
cognition, being, personality, attitudes, sociality, subjectivity, discourse and community were 
all advanced as the discipline‟s proper starting point. The lack of consensus fueled one 
„revolution‟ after another: a behaviorist revolution ended introspectionism, a cognitive 
revolution ended the „irrelevance‟ of „rat psychology‟, a discursive revolution (Harré, 2001) 
was touted as the answer to cognitivist reductionism at the same time that a dialogical 
revolution was expected to remedy the shortcomings of this second cognitive revolution 
(Shotter, 2001). But underpinning these disagreements about questions and methods was a 
basic dispute about the discipline‟s legitimate cognitive interest.17 Committed variously to the 
interests of control, understanding and critique, psychology never managed to resolve this 
fundamental debate – which Kuhn (1962) took as evidence of its „pre-paradigmatic‟ status.  
Even if psychologists were to agree on a single subject matter and on how best to 
study it, appeals for „relevance‟ would not subside. As historical constructions, psychological 
categories are not naturally occurring phenomena – they only appear that way because “the 
network of categories... has been adopted from the broader language community to which 
psychologists belong” (Danziger, 2010, p. 55). Standard historiography in the discipline 
formalizes this appearance by virtue of a tacit commitment to “a timeless human nature” 
(ibid., p. 56), sanctioning thereby the use of natural scientific methods in its investigation. 
Nonetheless, psychological categories are „human kinds‟, which, because they permeate 
social life, are value-laden and able to operate upon their human carriers, altering continually 
the „things‟ to which they refer (Hacking, 1995). A constantly evolving subject matter would 
                                                                    
17 For example, in South African psychology, accusations of ‘social irrelevance’ have emphasized the 
incongruity of the discipline’s scientistic predilections within investigative and applied contexts of 
institutionalized inequality. This amounts to a clash between technical and emancipatory cognitive 
interests. 
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only lead to further disagreements about questions and methods – and a return to debates 
about „relevance‟. 
PURE AND APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 
There are two requirements for establishing a discipline: forming cooperative partnerships 
and producing socially useful knowledge (Danziger, 1987). In order to build effective 
alliances, new knowledge producers must prove their credentials to established producers. 
Knowledge must be created in forms that are deemed valuable and via techniques that are 
considered reputable – “even though such rituals may have more in common with magic than 
with science” (ibid., p. 2). In addition, knowledge products must address the interests of 
influential social groupings, failing which important sources of sponsorship can be lost. 
Subject to changing exigencies, the founding of a discipline is a politicized endeavor: 
practitioners must “accommodate themselves to the specific opportunities offered by a 
particular historical context” (ibid., p. 3). 
 In the early days of modern psychology, these mutually dependent but contradictory 
demands – the discipline-bound pursuit of scientific res ectability on the one hand and the 
marketing of psychological products for public consumption on the other – regulated the 
activities of its practitioners.18 By exploiting “the mystique of the laboratory and the mystique 
of numbers” (ibid., p. 7), „pure‟ research conferred upon the products of „applied‟ research a 
scientific authority analogous to a competitive edge, which validated the important role the 
basic science played in the creation of expert knowledge. 19  Then again, competing 
disciplinary pursuits also aggravated tensions between pure and applied research. 
Psychological applications were of two kinds: grand applications that had implications for 
social policy and localized applications with circumscribed possibilities. What told them 
apart was the distance between the setting in which the research was conducted („context of 
investigation‟) and the setting in which its findings were to be applied („context of 
application‟). Grand applications were characterized by a sizeable gap between the two 
contexts that could only “be bridged by a host of unproven and often unspoken assumptions” 
(ibid.); for localized applications, it was considerably narrower. The problem was that the 
rhetoric of universalist science demanded the magnification of the gap, whereas the 
                                                                    
18 In South Africa – as in the United States – both demands were met by producing quantitative 
knowledge for use in educational and military settings. 
19 Applied psychology tended to operate relatively autonomously, however, while pure psychology 
borrowed liberally from its practices. The two-step model functioned more as a rhetorical device that 
buttressed the scientific integrity of the discipline (Danziger, 1990). 
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discipline‟s predictive accuracy depended on its minimization. The net effect was to 
concretize a somewhat false opposition between pure and applied psychology – with the 
latter ostensibly the stronger performer on the „relevance‟ index (Danziger, 2010).  
 Danziger‟s description of the origins of modern psychology delivers two important 
insights about the „relevance‟ concept. First, it suggests that the history of „relevance‟ is 
central to the history of psychology itself. The abiding interest in a „relevant‟ psychology is 
symptomatic of an oversimplified distinction between its pure and applied versions. 
Psychology could not have established itself without addressing the social management 
priorities of bureaucratic elites: by making itself „relevant‟, it secured a vital source of 
patronage. But it needed an „irrelevant‟, apparently asocial foil whose scientific 
disinterestedness would underwrite the authority of its knowledge claims. The discipline, that 
is, traverses a polarity of „relevance‟ that cannot be dissolved: the accusation of „irrelevance‟ 
is the price it must pay for the preservation of its scientific eminence. Second, Danziger‟s 
account anticipates the remarkable internationalization of the „relevance‟ question: the fact 
that modern psychology‟s development was constrained by the requirements of a particular 
social matrix dictated that its later introduction in societies that did not share those 
contingencies had to be experienced as jarring, alienating and therefore „irrelevant‟. Western 
liberal democratic polities, in which displays of naked power were unfeasible, required an 
alternative „government of the soul‟ for which psychology‟s expert technologies proved well-
suited (Rose, 1990). In countries with dissimilar social histories, however, the „irrelevance‟ of 
an imported psychology was inevitable. 
PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
It has long been observed that psychological theory struggles to explain social change. 
Gustav Jahoda noted that the issues psychology was accused of neglecting – he mentioned 
„race‟ relations, violence and environmental degradation – were "mainly accompaniments or 
consequences of rapid social change" (1973, p. 466). Its theories lacked „social relevance‟, 
which precipitated “talk of a crisis” (ibid.). Because the discipline‟s research methods were 
elaborated on the assumption that the individual – rather than broader social arrangements – 
was its proper subject matter, psychology was incapable from the outset of theorizing change. 
Having appropriated those methods from the natural sciences, it became ensnared in the 
quagmire of ahistoricity. The result was a lasting difficulty convincing newly independent 
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countries – most of whose developmental challenges were related to social change – of its 
„social relevance‟ credentials.20  
In developed countries, a similar problem arose: rates of social change had 
accelerated to the point where “the over-all framework can no longer be taken for granted, 
and also because psychology is being challenged to cope with problems that are new or have 
become intolerable in the present climate of opinion” (ibid.). The methods that had proven 
successful in the study of the individual were devised in an era of socio-economic stability 
such that factors beyond the individual were not considered important. Faced now with the 
social turmoil that fueled both the political radicalism of the late sixties and early seventies as 
well as the postcolonial moment that was reverberating throughout the Third World, the field 
to which everyone turned for answers – social psychology – was not up to the task. Reckoned 
not social enough (Moscovici, 1972), its perceived failure to explain and intervene in the 
goings-on of the real world took on „crisis‟ proportions while questions about „social 
relevance‟ preponderated. During periods of relative prosperity, psychology had been able to 
survive with its metatheoretical inadequacies concealed. In times of discontent, this was no 
longer possible. 
‘RELEVANCE’ AS RHETORIC 
These explanations for the endemic presence of „relevance‟ debates in psychology implicate 
the discipline‟s relationship with materiality: should psychology engage with the „real world‟ 
– and for what ends? What such questions overlook, however, is the nature of the 
engagement. The seeming inevitability of „relevance‟ – which arises out of the seeming 
inevitability of materiality – obscures the fact that „relevance‟ and materiality are approached, 
represented, constructed and transmitted discursively (Pujol & Montenegro, 1999). This is 
why deliberations on „relevance‟ defy consensus: language permits the description of a single 
phenomenon in multiple ways (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), entrenching the term‟s indexicality 
(Hessels et al., 2009; Kâğitҫibaşi, 1984). Whereas Dawes (1986), for example, attempts a 
synthesis of research, theoretical, practical and political „relevance‟, Biesheuvel (1991) 
distinguishes between its „communal‟, „utilitarian‟ and „sapiential‟ aspects, while 
Moghaddam and Taylor list the key characteristics of an „appropriate psychology‟ as “(1) 
self-reliance, (2) needs responsiveness, (3) cultural compatibility, (4) institutional feasibility, 
(5) economic suitability, (6) political practicality” (1986, p. 256). In the absence of an 
                                                                    
20 Conversely, the production of ‘socially relevant’ research in Africa, for example, was also seen as “a 
sophisticated blueprint for intellectual neo-colonialism by showing Western scholars a way to survive in 
Africa by serving the needs of the new ruling class” (van den Berghe, 1970, p. 334). 
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authoritative definition, how does one assess the merits of a term that vacillates between 
over-inclusive catchall and empty signifier? 
As stated earlier, the purpose of this thesis is not to determine the working parameters 
of a genuinely „relevant‟ psychology but to analyze accounts of „relevance‟ – discourses – as 
articulated by psychologists themselves. It is the variability of these accounts – and the 
unending disputes they set in motion – that is of analytic interest. The credentialing of 
„relevance‟ is achieved rhetorically, consisting of a series of persuasive acts seeking to 
convince an interested audience of “the expected value [disciplinary activities] will have for 
society” (Hessels et al., 2009, p. 388) – and therein lies the problem. „Value‟ and „society‟ are 
abstractions, while the „expected‟ timeframe is no more definite. In the interim, various 
appeals are made to history, posterity, the present, the public good and common sense – all 
tendentious concepts themselves. Talk of „relevance‟, that is, generates a rhetorical space in 
which competing arguments are constructed and dismantled without relent. Whether it is 
Biesheuvel (1987) insisting that the worth of knowledge transcends utility, European social 
psychologists refusing to abandon the traditions of experimentalism (Tajfel, 1972b) or 
McGuire arguing that the elevation of application-based research above theory-driven 
investigation is “as inelegant as trying to push a piece of cooked spaghetti across the table 
from the back end” (1965, p. 139), „relevance‟ provokes dissent.  
„Social relevance‟, in particular, innervates this discursive world of contestation. 
Taking as fact a social hierarchy in which it makes sense to speak of human welfare in the 
first instance, „social relevance‟ is a cause célèbre in divided societies. And just as South 
African intelligence testers set about proving the „social relevance‟ of psychology by alleging 
the mental inferiority of black Africans in order to justify allegedly well-meaning policies of 
racial segregation, „social relevance‟ is caught up in the web of power. There is little about it 
– or „relevance‟ in general – that can be taken for granted: it functions as a rhetorical trope 
that legitimates, disqualifies and attempts to arrogate to itself the final word. After all, who 
can argue for the desirability of „irrelevance‟? 
 ‘RELEVANCE’, REALISM AND RELATIVISM 
A self-perpetuating rhetorical “imperative to establish the claims of some versions over 
others” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 68) implies for many a maddening ontological 
relativism. Others may be offended at the suggestion that „relevance‟ is more rhetorical than 
material. For many of apartheid South Africa‟s critical psychologists, the international 
academic boycott of their white colleagues during the apartheid years – on the grounds that 
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the latter‟s work was „irrelevant‟ – contributed meaningfully to the regime‟s downfall. 
„Relevance‟ was more than „just‟ rhetorical: it revealed itself tangibly when real people were 
really turned away at real conferences on account of real material concerns. To claim that 
discourses “systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1976, p. 49) and 
that “there is nothing outside of the text” (Derrida, 1976, p. 158 quoted in Burr, 2003, p. 88) 
is to invite ridicule. Yet the position advanced by many social constructionists is not that the 
world beyond language is unreal but that the representation of that world through language is 
inevitable. The result is neither naïve realism nor unbridled relativism but a critical realism 
that is epistemologically relativist but ontologically realist. Discourse and reality, as it were, 
do not pass like ships in the night – but there is not a fully overlapping degree of 
correspondence either (Burr, 2003).  
Like Parker (1992) before her, Willig aligns herself with this circumscribed 
relativism, distancing herself from the unrestrained relativism of “the postmodernist position 
[that] so easily slides into political conservatism” (1998, p. 96). By contrast, Collier commits 
himself to a stronger form of critical realism: despite its performative capacity, “[l]anguage 
can only be learnt by reference to reality. That indicates that there are other, prior means of 
access to reality. Not only is there no one privileged means of access to reality, language is 
not even the first runner” (1998, p. 48). Whether one speaks of consciousness, experience, 
practice or language, each of these is always about something: the pre-existing real world. 
For Collier, epistemological relativism means that “in a sense no one can be wrong about 
anything” (ibid., p. 56). A certain dogmatism arises that refuses to adjust itself even when 
practices in the world require it: not even “reality hit[ting] them in the face” can persuade 
non-realist pragmatists otherwise (ibid., p. 51). 
It is a formidable argument in debates about „relevance‟ that “bottom line” – i.e. 
material – issues are at stake (Edwards, Ashmore, & Potter, 1995, p. 26). In the Third World, 
for example, the „relevance‟ movement signified a postcolonial uprising against the material 
injustices of racism, militarism, socio-economic backwardness, undemocratic politics and, in 
turns, American and Western cultural imperialism. Nonetheless, it cannot be ignored that 
realist bottom lines must be presented rhetorically in the shape of „Death‟ moves: “misery, 
genocide, poverty, power – the reality that should not be denied” (ibid., original emphasis).  
Death moves create a moral universe comprising two prohibitions: “the Good that 
must not be undermined” and “the Bad that should not be justified” (ibid., p. 33). The Good 
kind avoids easy detection because it operates as the unstated corollary of the Bad kind – 
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according to which bad things really happen and relativist denials will only result in other 
bad things really happening too. The relativist rejoinder, however, is that despite “the 
overwhelming majority of the world‟s politico-moral disputes [being] conducted exclusively 
by realists” (ibid.), it has not prevented the bad things from happening anyway. In fact, realist 
tropes that assume a pre-determined external reality can fuel “rhetoric for inaction” (ibid., p. 
34). 
When Death moves are contradicted, realists resort to „Furniture‟ moves (pounding 
tables, pointing at trees etc.) that affirm the reality of the concrete world. Such appeals lay 
bare the innermost sanctum of the realist bastion: they are a last resort, an attempt to win the 
debate by moving it „beyond‟ rhetoric. Vanquished “vulgar” relativists are rehabilitated as 
“methodological relativists, moderate constructivists, pragmatic pragmatists” (ibid., original 
emphases). And yet, for radical relativists, the persuasiveness of Furniture moves does not 
invalidate what they are, namely, moves. Petitioning furniture is not above rhetoric: it is a 
rhetorical device whose purpose is to state what cannot be denied (ibid.). Such “undeniability 
devices” construct a rhetorical arena in which potential rebuttals undermine themselves by 
being “long-winded and over-elaborate in comparison with the compactness and brevity of 
the devices themselves” (ibid., p. 28). The deployment of Furniture moves does not represent 
the triumph of realism but a concession that Death moves are not incontestable. In any event, 
the Furniture device (take, for example, the case of table-thumping) is not beyond refutation, 
falling foul of metonymy (thumped parts of tables stand for whole tables), mistaking 
individual instances for general categories (one table is the same as all tables) and confusing 
individual for collective experience (the experiences of all table-thumpers are equivalent). 
As for relativists, they are accused of championing a bottom line reality of their own: 
the text itself. For Edwards and colleagues, this is a misconstrual of the constructionist 
position: “We do not claim that texts have an out-there meaning, any more than furniture has” 
(ibid., p. 32). The relativist objective is not to arrive at a “definitive reading” of the text “but 
to engage with consensus and argument” (ibid., pp. 31-32). Another criticism is that, since 
relativism assumes the equivalence of accounts, it does not support any politico-moral 
narrative – but in privileging this stance, it adopts a position nevertheless and becomes 
internally inconsistent. Relativists counter that this is a common misunderstanding:  
There is no contradiction between being a relativist and being somebody, a member of a 
particular culture, having commitments, beliefs, and a common-sense notion of reality. These 
are the very things to be argued for, questioned, defended, decided, without the comfort of just 
being, already and before thought, real and true. (ibid., pp. 35-36, original emphasis)  
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Relativism does not glorify moral nihilism (Burr, 1998): it is morally courageous by insisting 
that claims about right and wrong be defended, taking issue only with those aspects of 
realism that are presented theologically in order to discourage argumentation (Edwards et al., 
1995). Potter explains:  
No! Please! How many times does it have to be repeated that „anything goes‟ is a realist slur 
on relativism… Anything goes is an extraordinarily realist claim, which no relativist has any 
business espousing. It is a fundamental, timeless, contextless statement about the nature of 
causal relations, not all that dissimilar from the laws of physics or psychology. (1998, p. 34, 
original emphasis)  
To chastise relativists for offering no guidance on how to choose between alternatives is to 
miss the larger point that there are no rules. Perspectives do not become hegemonic because 
they are „true‟ but because they have been argued for convincingly. A belief in algorithms 
that can settle moral dilemmas reflects the realist assumption of a stable and knowable world. 
For radical relativists, it is a rhetorical achievement of note when realist morality 
escapes detection as an account in the first place. They view realism as a sleight-of-hand 
rhetoric that pretends not to be: it is “the rhetoric of no rhetoric” (Edwards, Ashmore & 
Potter, 1995, p. 35), “a kind of magic… the signified without the signifier” (ibid., p. 37). 
Realism neglects the claim that „the real‟ cannot avoid representation, becoming vulnerable 
to interrogation at the moment of its discursive enactment. Like science and magic, realist 
arguments attempt to divorce results from methods, creating the impression that the former is 
self-generating. By contrast, relativism places itself squarely in the sights of its own potential 
repudiation. As such, it does not stand in opposition to realism specifically but involves a 
meta-level critique of “realism and relativism alike, viewed as rhetorical practices” (ibid., p. 
41, original emphasis). Unlike realists – who have selective recourse to relativist tools – 
relativists apply their tools reflexively and to the fullest degree.21 
 It was not by accident that debates about realism, relativism and „relevance‟ emerged 
simultaneously in the early seventies in the form of intersecting social psychological crises 
(Foster, 1998). The realist–relativist dichotomy raises troubling questions about agency and 
change (Burr, 1998) – standout terms in the vernacular of „social relevance‟. For relativists, 
agency is a discursive effect proceeding from occidentalist understandings of the self-
contained individual – but, since discourse analysis asserts that the world can be other than 
what it is (Willig, 1998), the relativist undertaking starts to unravel. Moderate relativists end 
up eschewing radical relativism for “fear of losing our critical edge on important social 
                                                                    
21 Still, the realist-relativist divide is somewhat contrived: the two camps disagree on the meaning of 
‘reality’, while misconceptions regarding relativism abound (Burr, 1998). See Elder-Vass (2012) for a 
comprehensive discussion of the bottom line controversy. 
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phenomena” (Burr, 1998, p. 15). To succumb to what Parker calls “the slide into relativism” 
(1992, p. 22) hastens supposedly the descent into „social irrelevance‟, whereas critical realism 
is believed to facilitate engagement with „socially relevant‟ issues in the world wie es 
eigentlich gewesen.  
 Leaving aside ontology, what does epistemological relativism – shared by relativists 
and critical realists alike – mean for a history of „relevance‟? If history “relies on someone 
else‟s eyes and voice” (Jenkins, 2003b, p. 14), amounts to nothing but “the labour of 
historians” (ibid., p. 8) and represents no more than “the history of historians‟ minds” (ibid., 
p. 57), why bother with it at all? Not only is it impossible to „enter‟ the mind of someone 
from the past – never mind the present – even if it were achievable, the actual rendering of 
that mind would still be subject to filtering processes involving contemporary categories of 
understanding. Historians draw on a range of epistemological, methodological, ideological 
and practical tools without which they are barely capable of thinking historically at all. In the 
end, the nonstarter that is empathetic historiography suggests that “all history is 
contemporary history” (Croce, 1941 quoted ibid., p. 48). 
 According to the relativist appraisal of history, it is never for its own sake: history is 
“constantly being re-worked and re-ordered by all those who are variously affected by power 
relationships” (Jenkins, 2003b, p. 21). Historical texts – as collections of statements – are 
aesthetic, narrative, political works that are as much imaginations as representations of „the 
past‟.22 There exists “a politics with regard to the statement, and... the text is the result of this 
politics (Ankersmit, 1990, p. 277 quoted in Jenkins, 2003a, p. 48, original emphases). 
„History‟ – being no more than an account of „the past‟ – is an empty signifier whose 
meaning depends on its “filling up... by those with the power to do so” (Jenkins, 2003a, pp. 
35-36). Equating it with „the truth‟ “is already to figure that which has merely occurred 
before now into a shape, a form, a unity and, quite often, a content, a direction and a 
significance” (ibid., p. 35). Foucault‟s argument is similar: “truth isn‟t outside power... [it] is 
a thing of this world... to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, 
regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements” (1980a, pp. 131-133).  
                                                                    
22 ‘The facts’ do not speak for themselves – hence the commonplace of a single set of historical sources 
generating a plethora of divergent historical accounts. For example, were the 1960s “a decade of trauma 
or years of banality? Or Joy? Or was it really a lazy decade, a sort of snoozy-doozy decade, or was it, really, 
the Swinging Sixties” (Jenkins, 2003a, p. 51, original emphases)? ‘Facts’ by themselves are meaningless, 
acquiring significance only after interpretation and interpolation into the body of a narrative structure – 
and the interpretative act, by definition, is never positionless. 
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For relativists, history still matters. Its purpose is not to be definitive but to celebrate 
failure. Derridean infidelity towards the historical text – in other words, getting it deliberately 
„wrong‟ – is necessary “so [that you can] open it up beyond its own attempted closures so as 
to make it yours” (Jenkins, 2003a, p. 26). Besides, nonaction is only a special kind of action. 
The past is something to be claimed – “epistemological frailties” (Jenkins, 2003b, p. 13) 
notwithstanding – because “we as human agents find ourselves within a context in which 
things are always already going on or being done” (Willig, 1998, p. 96). To leave the past to 
its own devices is to allow someone else to claim it unchallenged; as with anything in life, the 
past is “to be argued for, questioned, defended, decided” (Edwards et al., 1995, pp. 35-36). 
The “mystifying amnesia of the colonial aftermath” is to be avoided, a “will-to-forget” that 
has its roots in a felt need for renewal (Gandhi, 1998, p. 4). Indeed, since accounts of 
„relevance‟ in South African psychology lack a meaningful sense of historical consciousness 
(see Brock, 2006), the study‟s attentiveness to history is justified. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The question of „relevance‟ evokes a longstanding controversy regarding the relationship 
between discourse and materiality. In particular, this chapter has presented two positions that 
can be summarized as follows: 1) a micro social constructionism that is radically relativist 
and favored by discursive psychologists, and 2) a macro social constructionism that is 
moderately relativist but preferred by critical realists. The former is concerned with the use of 
language in interpersonal contexts, while the latter addresses issues of practice, materiality, 
historicity and subjectivity (Willig, 2008). Both perspectives are epistemologically relativist, 
although critical realists insist on a realist ontology. Since the dispute is internally insoluble, 
only two solutions are possible, namely, outright rejection of the terms of reference or a 
synthesis of the poles. For Michael (1999 cited in Burr, 2003), the realist-relativist dichotomy 
– like other dualisms – is representative of forms of analysis favored in patriarchal societies. 
But for Wetherell and Potter (1992), the way out is to draw together „top down‟ (Marxist-
Foucauldian) and „bottom up‟ (interpretative repertoire) approaches.23 
This thesis adopts the compromise position. Taking its cue from Wetherell and Potter 
(1992), it considers ways of speaking about „relevance‟ as being inseparable from wider 
social practices. Although discourses about „relevance‟ call into being a range of subjects and 
objects – „politically progressive psychologists‟, „black Africans‟ and so on – these 
                                                                    
23 Wetherell and Potter justify the combination of Foucauldian genealogy with Marxist ideology on the 
grounds that, in a Foucauldian approach, "[t]oo much seems to be lost when the subjects of history are 
replaced with of power" (1992, p. 86), while a Marxist reading ignores "the mobility of discourse" (ibid.). 
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discourses are rooted in a world where subjects and objects already exist. Consequently, the 
analytic chapters are concerned as much with the construction of „relevance‟ discourses as 
with the particular historical milieux that coincided with the emergence of those discourses. 
But this distinction between the discursive and non-discursive realms should not be 
interpreted as suggesting a realist bottom line. The distinction is made for analytical – not 
empirical – reasons, while it makes no sense among discourse analysts to argue that one 
domain is „more real‟ than another (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). In fact, the theoretical 
framework approaches radical relativism with its contention that the „real‟ world does not 
disclose itself other than through its discursive representations. Ultimately, however, the 
study shelves the ontological question. A definitive statement on the existence of a bottom 
line reality is not an essential requirement for this thesis – notwithstanding the fact that scores 
of discourse analysts have been unable to resolve the conundrum in a universally satisfying 
manner.  
And yet judgmental relativism is disavowed. The discursive spaces within which 
reality is represented already possess criteria for the acceptance or rejection of statements 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). What the repudiation of judgmental relativism symbolizes is 
the unattainability of positionlessness, which implies that the merits of „relevance‟ and 
„irrelevance‟ are “the very things to be argued for” (Edwards et al., 1995, p. 35, added 
emphasis). A „relevant‟ South African psychology is not inherently preferable to an 
„irrelevant‟ one, nor is „irrelevance‟ inherently superior to „relevance‟. Assumptions such as 
these present themselves as incontestable – with potentially „ideological‟ consequences – 
apart from endorsing a Whiggish conception of history „going somewhere‟, of it having „a 
mind‟, of it progressing – or regressing, in the Marxist course of events – towards an 
immutable end.  
RATIONALE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis locates itself within the field of critical psychology. Its purpose is to investigate 
the charge of „irrelevance‟ that has hounded South African psychology since at least the late 
1970s. Conventional accounts point to a Euro-American bias in theories of human 
functioning, professional indifference towards the life experiences of the black majority, and 
skewed racial representation of academics, practitioners and students of psychology in the 
country. What is lacking in these reviews, however, is an appreciation of socio-historical and 
discursive practices. In order to remedy these omissions, the preceding chapters have 
attempted to historicize – and thereby theorize – the notion of „relevance‟ within the context 
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of an international and internationalizing discipline. What the coming chapters will provide is 
an analysis of the fluctuating discursive quality of „relevance‟, along with an account of how 
this „floating signifier‟ (Laclau, 1990) intersects with shifting socio-political conditions. Of 
course, it may be asked what a thesis of this kind has to do with psychology at all. To this one 
would answer: the question of „relevance‟ influences directly the kind of psychology that is 
done and is not done (K. Danziger, personal communication, March 8, 2012). Accordingly, 
the research questions for the study are as follows: 
1. What are the terms of debate within South African psychology concerning its 
„relevance‟? 
2. How have these changed over time? 
3. How is „relevance‟ articulated currently within the discipline? 
4. And how can changes in South African psychology‟s discourses about „relevance‟ 
be understood? 
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CHAPTER 4: METHOD 
 
There is no substitute for good scholarship. (Don Foster) 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The chapter begins with a discussion regarding the „operationalization‟ of „relevance‟. It 
provides a description of the data corpus, which consists of presidential, keynote and opening 
addresses delivered at annual national congresses of South African psychological associations 
between 1950 and 2011. It details the methods employed in analyzing the data set, namely, 
textual/rhetorical, discourse and social analysis, which form the components of Norman 
Fairclough‟s three-dimensional model for critical discourse analysis. Epistemological and 
ethical issues specific to discourse analysis are presented along with several comments on the 
study‟s significance. 
INVESTIGATING ‘RELEVANCE’ 
Where does one begin to collect data on „relevance‟? Two possibilities suggest themselves 
immediately: 1) interview psychologists of different backgrounds and generations, and 2) 
assemble journal articles that speak directly or implicitly to the issue. In the first scenario, the 
problem that arises is that most psychologists from the 1960s and earlier are either very old or 
have passed on. As for journal articles, the first issue of the SAJP appeared only in 1970. 
Although monographs that speak to the question of „relevance‟ can be used to supplement the 
data corpus, these are at a premium. Either way, the formative decades of South African 
psychology will be unaccounted for. 
 On the other hand, it is beyond the scope of this study to explore „relevance‟ discourse 
dating back to South African psychology‟s beginnings in the 1910s. In any event, documents 
corresponding to that period in the history of the discipline are rare and difficult to locate. 
This presents a third option: examining the annual congress proceedings of South African 
psychological associations. The earliest of these – the South African Psychological 
Association (SAPA) – was formed in 1948, the year in which the National Party (NP) won 
the elections and set about establishing an apartheid state. Indeed, 1948 is an analytically 
useful point at which to begin this study because it marked the dawn of a totalizing political 
rationality that would saturate the social fabric. In circumstances such as these, the 
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„relevance‟ of psychology – understood as “the expected value [disciplinary activities] will 
have for society” (Hessels et al., 2009, p. 388) – becomes, understandably, especially salient. 
But will the congresses of national psychological associations have anything useful to 
say about „relevance‟? In answering this question, it is helpful to reflect on the reason these 
societies are established in the first place. Whether one views a psychological association as 
an assemblage of random psychologists or an agenda-setting guild, developments in such 
fields as rhetoric of inquiry make present-day claims of scientific disinterestedness seem 
more anachronistic than ever. A psychological society functions as a barometer not only of a 
given social milieu, but also of the discipline‟s response to it. The founding of the APA is a 
fitting example. Fernberger contends that “seven men met and decided that it was worth 
while [sic] to form an association for the discussion of psychological matters” (1932, p. 3), 
creating the impression that the APA came straight from the minds of seven people. By 
contrast, the historian Michael Sokal submits that the APA “emerged at a particular time, in a 
unique social and institutional environment, and as the result of actions of specific 
individuals” (1992, p. 111). The APA itself acknowledges the role played by “[t]he 
progressive movement in politics” and other academic disciplines in the course of its 
founding (American Psychological Association, 2012, paras. 5 & 6). In fact, psychology has 
always depended on the patronage of powerful interest groups (Danziger, 1987), while 
national psychological associations – as keepers of the discipline – cannot disregard the needs 
of those groups. One can foresee, therefore, that concerns about „relevance‟ – which end up 
determining the priorities of the discipline – will form an integral part of associational life.  
DATA CORPUS 
The empirical material for this study consisted of presidential, opening and keynote addresses 
delivered at annual national psychology congresses in South Africa for the period 1950 to 
2011.24 Since no records for SAPA‟s 1948 and 1949 conference proceedings could be traced, 
the earliest collected address was from 1950, while the latest was delivered at the most recent 
national congress of the Psychological Society of South Africa (PsySSA). In total, sixty-four 
speeches were collected. Of these, twenty-six were presidential addresses, seventeen were 
opening addresses, eighteen were keynote addresses and three were guest addresses.  
Speeches were gathered from a number of sources: the National Library of South 
Africa (both its Cape Town and Pretoria branches), the Raubenheimer archive at Stellenbosch 
                                                                    
24 In contrast to ordinary conference papers that recount the research activities of their presenters, one 
would expect presidential, opening and keynote addresses to speak to broader issues of public interest. 
Discourses about ‘relevance’ should feature in such addresses. 
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University, the Mayibuye archive at the University of the Western Cape, the Pretoria branch 
library of the University of South Africa, the PsySSA archive, directly from the speakers in 
question or, in cases where the latter had passed on, from their surviving colleagues and 
acquaintances. 
Not all of the collected addresses were selected for analysis. A handful of speeches 
amounted to no more than summaries of the speaker‟s research activities and were considered 
to be of limited analytic interest. Other addresses delivered by non-South Africans were 
excluded automatically on the assumption that only locally-based speakers would be able to 
speak authoritatively on the state of the discipline in South Africa. The result of these two 
exclusionary criteria was that the analytic data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006) consisted of forty-
five addresses delivered by thirty speakers.25 These differed in length from being as brief as 
one page (e.g. van der Merwe, 1961) to as long as twenty-five pages (e.g. du Toit, 1975). In 
view of the fact that addresses were delivered by a range of prominent personalities both 
within and beyond psychology, it was expected that their reflections on the „relevance‟ 
question would populate a range of positions in the debate. It was anticipated further that, 
because such addresses are not ordinarily subject to the academic review process, they would 
also bypass the latter‟s homogenizing tendencies and possess a measure of discursive 
variability that might otherwise have been dif icult to attain.26 Figure 1 provides a tabular 
overview of the data set, by association and sub-period: 
Sub-period SAPA PIRSA SAPA 
& 
PIRSA 
PASA OASSSA Psychology 
and 
Apartheid 
PsySSA 
1950-1961 7 - - - - - - 
1962-1977 1 14 - - - - - 
1978-1981 - - 4 - - - - 
1982-1993 - - - 7 3 0 - 
1994-2011 - - - - - - 9 
Figure 1. Number of addresses analyzed, by association and sub-period27 
                                                                    
25 The discrepancy is due to the fact that some speakers served multiple presidential terms while others 
were invited to give keynote addresses at more than one congress. 
26 Variability of accounts is an important consideration in discourse analytic studies (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987). 
27 Two keynote addresses from Psychology and Apartheid Committee congresses were located but were 
excluded from the data set on the grounds that they were delivered by non-South Africans. 
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The division of the analytic period under consideration (1950 – 2011) into sub-periods 
corresponds to the founding dates of South Africa‟s various psychological associations.28 It 
was in 1962 that SAPA split on the „race‟ question pertaining to its membership, resulting in 
the establishment of the whites-only, Afrikaner-dominated Psychological Institute of the 
Republic of South Africa (PIRSA). Until then, SAPA‟s Afrikaner cabal had felt for years like 
“strangers”29 in an organization it understood to be run by English-speaking colleagues. But 
the declaration of a republic in 1961 and South Africa‟s departure from the Commonwealth 
infused the Afrikaner faction with renewed purpose. The National Party may have been 
running the country since 1948, but because it had won that year‟s elections on a minority of 
votes, it was forced to temper its actual expression of apartheid ideology. Now, however, 
with the country no longer beholden to the British Empire, the NP gave progressively freer 
rein to the articulation of its political philosophy – a change of strategy that, it will later be 
seen, filtered through the contents of PIRSA presidential addresses.  
By the mid-seventies, the pendulum had swung in the opposite direction: with the 
creation in 1974 of the first Professional Board for Psychology, the existence of two national 
associations for psychologists was no longer tenable. Moreover, a concatenation of local 
unrest, international condemnation of apartheid rule and several regional civil wars created 
new pressures for the white Afrikaner government that precipitated a softening of PIRSA‟s 
position on racial segregation. Starting in 1978, it began holding joint congresses with SAPA 
with which it merged in 1982 to form the Psychological Association of South Africa (PASA). 
In the following year, the Organisation for Appropriate Social Services in South Africa 
(OASSSA) was founded by progressive health care workers in protest against the hosting of a 
family therapy conference in the then independent homeland – or so-called Bantustan – of 
Bophuthatswana. The more radical Psychology and Apartheid Committee was established 
shortly thereafter with a predominantly black membership. By 1994 – the year of South 
Africa‟s first democratic elections – PASA, OASSSA and the Psychology and Apartheid 
Committee had disbanded and a new body was established to represent the interests of the 
country‟s psychologists: PsySSA. 
                                                                    
28 This scheme also anticipates the arrangement of the analytic chapters to follow. 
29 Interview with P.M. Robbertse, former PIRSA president, May 12, 1982, p. 14. Accessed December 22, 
2010 from the Raubenheimer archive, Special Collections, J.S. Gericke Library, Stellenbosch University. All 
interviews cited in the study were drawn from this archive. Professor Naas Raubenheimer, a former 
PIRSA president himself, donated a collection of audiocassettes and transcripts of interviews with 
important figures in South African psychology to Stellenbosch University. I am indebted to Mimi Seyffert 
(Special Collections) and Desmond Painter (Department of Psychology) for facilitating my access to this 
material. 
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RHETORIC OF INQUIRY 
From its classical beginnings, rhetoric was vilified as “a shabby little weasel word in most 
circles” (Harris, 1991, p. 282), “the refuge of... the demagogue” (Nel, 1998, p. 105). 
Philosophers today have not forgotten the Kantian admonition either – that rhetoric “is not 
worthy of any respect at all” (Kant, 2000, p. 205). Nonetheless, since the 1950s, rhetoric has 
undergone something of a revival. When Nietzsche and Heidegger questioned the Cartesian 
distinction between subject and object, they could not have imagined their brand of 
epistemological relativism being taken up by later generations of rhetoricians who would 
make the case that their traditional stomping grounds of law and politics could be extended to 
science itself (Gross, 1990; J. S. Nelson, Megill, & McCloskey, 1987). Since rhetoric was an 
essential ingredient of any discipline, science was in no position to demur (Gross, 1990). 
When Kuhn (1962) announced the irrationality of science‟s paradigm shifts and, later, 
Feyerabend (1975) gainsaid the unity of scientific method, philosophy – the archenemy of 
rhetoric – had contrived to put the rhetors back in business. Soon enough, fields as disparate 
as architecture, biology, economics (J. S. Nelson et al., 1987) and even mathematics (Davis & 
Hersh, 1987) would be subjected to rhetorical examination.  
Rhetoric of inquiry insists that, despite the splintering of the academy into myriad 
fields, these remain united in their shared dependence on argumentation. Rhetorical moves – 
appeals to common sense, authority or metaphor, to name a few – are part and parcel of the 
academic life. On the other hand, “[e]very field is defined by its own special devices and 
patterns of rhetoric – by existence theorems, arguments from invisible hands, and appeals to 
textual probabilities or archives – themselves textures of rhetoric” (J. S. Nelson et al., 1987, 
pp. 4-5). Scientific knowledge and „the facts‟ are not one and the same thing: the former is a 
“product of professional conversation” (Gross, 1990, p. 4, added emphasis) that is shaped in 
laboratories, conferences, publications and countless other rendezvous. To produce scientific 
knowledge, one must answer three questions: Is the selected problem worth studying? How is 
it to be studied? And what do the findings mean (Gross, 1990; Nel, 1998)? The first and last 
of these questions are intrinsically rhetorical – especially arguments about worth, which 
approximate a rhetoric of „relevance‟.30 Hence, when interlocutors set about delimiting the 
parameters of „relevance‟, they are reinforcing the edifice of science itself. Science without 
„relevance‟ loses its rationale and ceases to be science at all. 
                                                                    
30 It is worth restating the study’s general understanding of ‘relevance’, namely, “the expected value 
[disciplinary activities] will have for society” (Hessels et al., 2009, p. 388). 
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What is meant by rhetoric of science, then, is “the study of the role of discourse in 
science, particularly in its more clearly suasive functions – galvanizing, resolving, or 
avoiding disputation” (Harris, 1991, p. 287). Rhetoric of science augments social 
constructionism‟s central insight of discourse as constitutive by drawing attention to a 
particular kind of discourse – the persuasive kind – and to the concept of audience that 
persuasion implies (Nel, 1998). Accordingly, the purpose of a rhetorical analysis of scientific 
discourse is to illuminate those textual features that attempt to convince an audience of a 
particular knowledge claim‟s veracity. These means of persuasion (pisteis) are thought to be a 
function of the speaker‟s authority (ethos), the audience‟s emotional vocabulary (pathos) 
and/or the argument‟s actual contents (logos). 
Ethos is attained by acknowledging what has gone before – as in the literature review, 
for example – which anoints the speaker as someone worth listening to.31 Publishing in a 
respected journal or coming from a venerated research institution accomplishes the same. 
Pathos looms large in the world of science when one considers heated policy disputes and 
caustic peer review comments – embarrassing to science but not entirely surprising if one 
views “the objectivity of scientific prose [as] a carefully crafted rhetorical invention, a 
nonrational appeal to the authority of reason… the disciplined denial of emotion in science… 
a tribute to our passionate investment in its methods and goals” (Gross, 1990, p. 15). Logos 
involves common topoi – e.g. definition, comparison and cause – that are suitable for any 
kind of argument and special topoi – e.g. justice, virtue and worth – that are specific to 
particular kinds of argument. The special topics mentioned, correspond to forensic, 
deliberative and epideictic oratorical genres respectively. For example, when a scientific text 
presents previous science in a manner supportive of its claims, it is engaging in forensic 
oratory. When it attempts to recommend a future research direction, it functions as 
deliberative oratory. And when it attests to the soundness of its methods, it is epideictic 
(celebratory) oratory that is in evidence. 
Science is accustomed to describing its facts and theories as discoveries – and 
therefore as unrhetorical, timeless and eternally true. In rhetoric, scientific verities are recast 
as inventions, reminding one of the impermanence of scientific assertions. Scientists also 
make use of stasis theory – an aspect of invention and typical of forensic oratory (Corbett & 
Connors, 1999) – that assists them in asking the kinds of orienting questions that can lead to 
convincing responses. First, does a certain entity exist (an sit)? Second, if it does, what is its 
                                                                    
31 Parenthetically, this obscures authority’s complicated relationship with innovation – that hallmark of 
‘good science’ necessary for the transmission of eminence. 
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nature (quid sit)? Third, by what laws is this entity governed (quale sit)? Stasis theory also 
considers the issue of jurisdiction: the independence of science in relation to broader society. 
Because different scientific texts privilege different stases, different conceptions of science 
are produced – as, for example, in the cases of Aristotle and Newton (Gross, 1990). But since 
stases can be said to „predate‟ science, scientific interpretation becomes the stuff of rhetoric 
rather than science. 
A final concept that merits attention is style, which is described in critical discourse 
analysis via terms such as „grammar‟ and „transitivity‟ (Fairclough, 1992). Elements of style 
include linguistic parsimony, the passive voice and the third person narrative, which create an 
impression of „facts‟ speaking for themselves. Here scientific prose denies itself the very 
mode in which it must express itself – as if language were nothing but an unwilling, self-
effacing conduit. 
The South African debate about „relevance‟ is receptive to rhetorical analysis. In 
terms of stasis theory, for example, Biesheuvel problematizes the existence (an sit) of 
„relevance‟: “[i]t is a relative concept, contingent upon a number of often contradictory 
circumstances…. What is relevant to what needs to be done or said today may no longer 
apply tomorrow” (1991, p. 133). Conversely, for Anonymous, “[a]n important criterion for 
the relevantizing of psychology in South Africa would be the degree to which the behaviour 
of especially the majority is studied within the context of racial capitalism” (1986, p. 82). 
Anonymous takes the existence of „relevance‟ for granted and proceeds directly to the issue 
of definition (quid sit). Dawes (1986), meanwhile, answers a different question entirely by 
linking the „irrelevance‟ of South African psychology to the political conservatism of the 
discipline (quale sit). For his part, the then National Minister of Education, Kader Asmal, 
confronts the matter of jurisdiction by threatening his audience that, “if the [profession‟s 
racial demographic] targets are not met and if there are any indications that this is due to a 
resistance to changing practices, especially selection practices in higher education, then I will 
not hesitate in introducing quotas” (2001, p. 4). When the „relevance‟ debate is taken up by 
people interested in different aspects of the problem, consensus is unattainable. 
Indeed, at a disciplinary level, rhetoric is closely related to psychology: not only does 
it have its own psychology, the reverse is equally true (Carlston, 1987). In raising concerns 
about methodology in psychology, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note that “[t]he theory of 
argumentation which, with the aid of discourse, aims at securing an efficient action on minds 
might have been treated as a branch of psychology” (1969, p. 9). On the other hand, 
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psychology intersects with rhetoric in three respects: semantically, psychological terminology 
can be imprecise in ways that encourage inaccurate inferences; in its not infrequent recourse 
to metaphor, the psychological narrative can breed factual embellishment; while, in respect of 
argumentation, psychological accounts are as beholden to the IMRAD blueprint32 as natural 
scientific ones (Carlston, 1987). Psychologists are no less rhetorically skilled than 
professional rhetoricians themselves. 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
Rhetoric of inquiry took off in the 1970s with the increasing number of radical sociological 
studies of science. Before Kuhn (1962), sociologists of science had tended to believe that 
scientific knowledge reflected objective truths about the world. Because there was no need to 
understand how scientists came to believe what they took to be true, they restricted 
themselves to analyzing the social factors that led scientists to propound false theories about 
the world (Wooffitt, 2005). In the seventies, sociology of science took a new direction. 
Sociologists began realizing that the study of failed scientific projects did not question the 
prevailing scientific hegemony. Besides, the history of science was a history of fallen truths: 
there was nothing to suggest that current scientific knowledge would prove any different and 
stand the test of time. These sociologists embraced a relativist methodology in order to study 
aspects of knowledge production that were considered beyond the traditional ambit of 
sociological investigation, while a shared interest in the accreditation of scientific claims 
united the numerous approaches to sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Scientific 
disputes, in particular, became focal points because “the social processes which underpinned 
knowledge production were still in operation” and were therefore amenable to scrutiny (ibid., 
p. 14). 
A seminal SSK study is Gilbert and Mulkay‟s (1984) account of a controversy that 
erupted in an area of biochemistry known as „oxidative phosphorylation‟. What they 
discovered – they called it „Pandora‟s Box‟ – was not that the world of scientific facts was 
shaped disproportionately by non-scientific influences. They stumbled upon a methodological 
anomaly: the presence of multiple, equally plausible versions made it impossible to produce a 
univocal sociological account in which “[p]articipants are allowed to speak through the 
author‟s text only when they appear to endorse his story” (ibid., p. 2). Opening Pandora‟s 
Box was not about revealing the „truth‟ but about “setting free the multitude of divergent and 
                                                                    
32 The suasive power of the IMRAD ritual – Introduction, Methods, Results And Discussion – cannot be 
underestimated: the textual organization of scientific papers functions rhetorically to suggest a naturally 
unfolding and therefore incontestable logic of discovery (Woolgar, 1980). 
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conflicting voices with which scientists speak” (ibid.). For Gilbert and Mulkay, the variability 
of accounts was not methodological noise but warranted study in itself. It suggested that the 
conventional belief in a perfect correspondence between language and reality was untenable 
and, further, that discursive practices were context-dependent, which strengthened their case 
for “the methodological priority of analysis of participants‟ discourse” (ibid., p. 9). Much the 
same as rhetoric of inquiry, discourse analysis emerged from SSK as an alternative account 
of scientific knowledge production (Wooffitt, 2005).  
Within social psychology, the discourse-rhetoric connexion is well established. In 
large part due to the work of the Discourse and Rhetoric Group at Loughborough University, 
rhetorical studies have advanced alongside discursive psychology – the latter an approach to 
discourse analysis developed by critical social psychologists to investigate the rhetorical 
organization of texts (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Similar to rhetoric, which “has 
traditionally been concerned with those instances of formal, premeditated, sustained 
monologue in which a person seeks to exert an effect on an audience” (Corbett & Connors, 
1999, p. 1), discursive psychology is interested in the action orientation of language. The 
unity of the field breaks down, however, on the question of agency (Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2002). In the poststructuralist scheme – which comes close to reifying discourse (Foucault, 
1976; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) – the focus is on the discursive construction of identities and 
its social consequences. Broad social and cultural processes are of analytic interest rather than 
the use of language in interpersonal contexts. By contrast, an interactionist perspective 
drawing on conversation analysis and ethnomethodology concentrates on “the action 
orientation of text and talk in social interaction” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 105). Unlike 
poststructuralist discourse analyses – which treat discourses as totalizing forces that prescribe 
the available forms of talk – the interactionist outlook acknowledges the variability of talk 
across changing interactional settings. As a result, a third, integrationist strand seeks a 
compromise and is interested in the discursive constitution of subjects and objects as well as 
the interpretative repertoires that people draw on flexibly in their everyday social 
transactions (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Wetherell, 1998). The approach here is to “pursue 
post-structuralist questions with the analytic fervour of social psychologists, but in a domain 
of materials which have been most thoroughly explored by ethnomethodologists and 
conversation analysts” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 89). 
Like other discourse analytic approaches, the discursive psychological tradition 
stresses the constitutive qualities of discourse vis-à-vis the social world (Jørgensen & 
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Phillips, 2002). As for the relationship between discursive and non-discursive realms, 
however, its position is more difficult to determine. Although it acknowledges the 
constitutedness of discourse, in comparison with Fairclough‟s (1995b) critical discourse 
analysis (CDA), 33  discursive psychology under-theorizes on aggregate the historical and 
social embeddedness of discursive practices.34 For Fairclough, when discourse analysis is 
focused exclusively on the text, it must be inadequate. In his three-dimensional model, he 
delineates a trio of separate yet interconnected levels of analysis for every instance of 
language use (Fairclough, 1992). First, an analysis of what he terms a discursive event must 
focus on its linguistic features. These include, for example, grammatical properties, 
metaphors and politeness strategies encountered at the level of the text. Second, at the level of 
discursive practice, the analysis should account for how discourses and genres are implicated 
in the production and consumption of that text. And third, at the level of social practice, the 
analysis must illuminate the social matrix within which the discursive event is located.35 
Here, non-discursive logics (e.g. economic, political, cultural) must be clarified via social 
analysis. The order of discourse should also be explicated, consisting of all the discourses 
and genres (e.g. advertising, news, interviews) circulating in a given social field (e.g. the 
media, the health service, universities). Antagonistic discourses within this order compete for 
hegemonic control over what Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 111) have called the field of 
discursivity – that is, the aggregate of meanings excluded by a dominant discourse. The 
presence of a floating signifier (Laclau, 1990, p. 28) – a discursive element that is subject to 
inconsistent ascriptions of meaning – is one indicator for the existence of a discursive order. 
Discursive psychology succeeds in laying bare the contradictoriness of social talk 
whereas CDA attempts to unveil the ideological effects of discursive practices that create and 
perpetuate unequal power relations in society. In terms of the data set, both approaches offer 
analytical advantages. Discursive psychology is well placed to comment on the historical 
variability of discursive practices in South African psychology that have tended to mirror the 
vicissitudes of the national life – but given its attention to socio-cultural processes, CDA is 
better suited for making sense of extra-discursive phenomena. CDA is recommended also for 
                                                                    
33 There are several competing understandings of CDA, some incompatible with others. In this study, CDA 
refers specifically to Fairclough’s model. 
34 Wetherell and Potter (1992) is a notable exception. 
35 Instead of discursive practices, social practices and discursive events, Fairclough refers elsewhere to 
“discourse practices”, “sociocultural practices” and “communicative events” (e.g. 1995b, pp. 16 & 35). 
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the analysis of official texts and speeches (Antaki, 2009) and is able to validate its findings – 
unlike discursive psychology – through linguistic analysis (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).36 
In contrast to other CDA schools that place emphasis on social reproduction 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), Fairclough (1992) is concerned with the phenomenon of 
change in both its discursive and social forms. This is of value to the present study because it 
attempts to link evolving discursive practices to their social correlates over the course of 
nearly three generations. According to Fairclough, discursive change is motivated by “the 
problematization of conventions for producers or interpreters [of texts]” (ibid., p. 96). 
Manifesting as contradictions, these problematizations “have their social conditions in 
structural contradictions and struggle at the institutional and societal levels” (ibid., pp. 96-
97). Discursive events either reflect these social contradictions or challenge and resolve them 
through innovation – that is, discursive change – by using discourses and genres in novel 
ways or by importing them from other orders of discourse. At the level of the text, discursive 
change reveals itself as a temporary “patchwork effect” (ibid., p. 97) that acquires a certain 
seamlessness with the consolidation of the new discursive hegemony. Although the 
reconstellated order of discourse is but “the specifically discoursal organisational logic of a 
[Bourdieusian] field” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 114),37 the text ends up reworking 
earlier ones “and in so doing helps to make history and contributes to wider processes of 
change” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 102). Fairclough introduces Julia Kristeva‟s concept of 
intertextuality to account for this quality of texts, namely, that they inherit past texts and 
shape future ones. Intertextuality implies, in the words of Kristeva, “the insertion of history 
(society) into a text and of this text into history” (1986, p. 39 quoted ibid.). Or, to quote 
Barthes, in speech one is “both master and slave” (1982, p. 461). 
Laclau‟s (1990) notion of a floating signifier is also analytically useful for this study 
as it captures the indexicality of the term „relevance‟. While he uses the example of 
„democracy‟, Laclau‟s line of reasoning is just as applicable to the signifier „relevance‟. 
Transposing his argument about „democracy‟, then, „relevance‟ becomes  
… ambiguous by dint of its widespread political circulation: it acquires one possible meaning 
when articulated with [„scientific independence‟] and a completely different one when 
                                                                    
36 Since interpretative repertoires “are pre-eminently a way of understanding the content of discourse 
and how that content is organized”, discursive psychology does not have a linguistic focus (Wetherell & 
Potter, 1992, p. 90, original emphasis). 
37 For Bourdieu, a field is highly determining of the kinds of positions that can be taken up in it. For 
example, a field such as the university “imposes its specific determinations upon all those who enter it. 
Thus she who wants to succeed as a scientist has no choice but to acquire the minimal scientific capital 
required and to abide by the mores and regulations enforced by the scientific milieu of that time and 
place” (Wacquant, 2008, p. 268). 
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articulated with [„civic responsibility‟]. To „hegemonize‟ a content would therefore amount to 
fixing its meaning around a nodal point. The field of the [„relevance‟ question] could thus be 
regarded as a trench war in which different political projects [science included] strive to 
articulate a greater number of [„relevance‟] signifiers around themselves. The open nature of 
the [„relevance‟ question] would stem from the impossibility of managing a total fixity. 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 28, original emphasis) 
This passage accounts succinctly for the endless iterations of the „relevance‟ debate. 
Temporary hegemonies are established only to be supplanted when the balance of power 
shifts during periods of “organic crisis” (ibid.). Meanwhile, the fluctuating order of discourse 
is reflective of broader political currents, which Fairclough theorizes at the level of social 
practice. 
A detailed discussion of discourse is now in order. Some wonder provocatively 
whether discourse is a “noun, verb or social practice” (Potter, Wetherell, Gill, & Edwards, 
1990, p. 205). Its meaning is difficult to fix, shifting with virtually every crossing of a 
disciplinary boundary. Discourse means one thing in linguistics, for example, but something 
quite different in poststructuralist social theory. Laclau and Mouffe commence their discourse 
theory by describing  
… articulation [as] any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their 
identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting 
from the articulatory practice, we will call discourse. The differential positions, insofar as 
they appear articulated within a discourse, we will call moments. By contrast, we will call 
element any difference that is not discursively articulated. (1985, p. 105, original emphases) 
On the other hand, conversation analysis (CA) assumes the existence of “often tacit reasoning 
procedures and socio-linguistic competencies underlying the production and interpretation of 
talk in organized sequences of interaction” (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998, p. 12). It takes as 
given the speaker‟s agency – implied in concepts such as turn-taking, repair and preference – 
in creating structure within talk. Whereas poststructuralism reifies discourse, in conversation 
analysis „discourse‟ suggests infinite flexibility and fails to account for the determining 
influence of the macro context. 
The concept of an interpretative repertoire attempts to “take a more integrated stance 
towards traditions such as conversation analysis and post-structuralism” (Wetherell, 1998, p. 
395). Wetherell and Potter (1992), for example, concede the constitutedness of „discourse‟ by 
underscoring the importance of social theory to discourse analysis. They forego the term, 
however, in favor of „interpretative repertoires‟ – defined as “broadly discernible clusters of 
terms, descriptions and figures of speech often assembled around metaphors or vivid images” 
(ibid., p. 90) – on the grounds that, unlike „discourse‟, the idea of an interpretative repertoire 
suggests “that there is an available choreography of interpretative moves – like the moves of 
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an ice dancer, say – from which particular ones can be selected in a way that fits most 
effectively in the context” (ibid., p. 92). 
Although he retains usage of the word „discourse‟ and includes in his model a more 
fine-grained linguistic analysis of textual features, Fairclough‟s understanding of discourse is 
broadly consonant with that of Wetherell and Potter (1992): 
In using the term „discourse‟, I am proposing to regard language use as a form of social 
practice, rather than a purely individual activity or a reflex of situational variables. This has 
various implications. Firstly, it implies that discourse is a mode of action, one form in which 
people may act upon the world and especially upon each other, as well as a mode of 
representation. Secondly, it implies that there is a dialectical relationship between discourse 
and social structure, there being more generally such a relationship between social practice 
and social structure: the latter is both a condition for, and an effect of, the former. On the one 
hand, discourse is shaped and constrained by social structure in the widest sense and at all 
levels…. On the other hand, discourse is socially constitutive…. Discourse contributes to the 
constitution of all those dimensions of social structure which directly or indirectly shape and 
constrain it. (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 63-64)  
With varying degrees of success, the shared merit of Fairclough‟s and Wetherell and Potter‟s 
outlook resides in their having reconciled „top-down‟ Foucauldian discourse analysis where 
“the subjects of history are replaced with rituals of power” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 86) 
with „bottom-up‟ CA-style analysis “in which people are the active users of language” (Wood 
& Kroger, 2000, p. 24). Both approaches succeed in viewing people as “simultaneously the 
products and the producers of discourse” (Edley & Wetherell, 1997, p. 206, original 
emphasis). The paradoxical quality of language-use is not paralyzing but edifying – indeed, 
“the paradox is more convincing than its theoretical dissolution” (Billig, 1991, p. 9). 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
Since it draws on an assortment of rhetorical, discourse analytical and historical resources, 
the methodological framework for this study is best described as multiperspectival, which is 
consistent with the inherent “perspectivism” of social constructionism (Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2002, p. 155). The analytic frame, moreover, has precedent in Fairclough‟s three-dimensional 
CDA model. Accordingly, the study defines discourse in the comprehensive sense set out by 
Fairclough (1992; 1995b) and Wetherell and Potter (1992) and understands by discourse 
analysis “an attempt to show systematic links between texts, discourse practices, and 
sociocultural practices” (Fairclough, 1995b, pp. 16-17).  
At the level of the text, extensive use will be made of Billig‟s (1996) and Corbett and 
Connors‟ (1999) contributions to rhetorical theory, which focuses on the gestures that 
“mobilize” discourse (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 105). Among other aspects, oratorical 
genres and means of persuasion are identified along with schemes and tropes pertaining to 
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rhetorical style. Attention is given also to grammatical properties such as transitivity and 
modality in addition to other textual features, including wording, metaphors and politeness 
strategies.38  
At the level of discourse practice, the study‟s objective is to focus on the production 
of the text rather than its distribution or consumption (Fairclough, 1992). 39  The study 
identifies discourses pertaining to „relevance‟ that are drawn on in the data set as well as 
pertinent instances of intertextuality in which a given text references other texts either 
explicitly or implicitly. In keeping with Wetherell and Potter‟s (1992) description of 
interpretative repertoires, the analysis seeks also to illustrate the flexibility of speakers‟ 
discursive moves in changing rhetorical and social contexts.  
At the level of social practice, the study describes the orders of discourse generated by 
discursive practices. It takes stock of non-discursive practices – social analyses are based on 
an intensive reading of the history of South African politics and psychology – by elaborating 
the social matrix within which these discourse practices are constellated. Wetherell and Potter 
(1992) emphasize the importance of placing discourse in its proper context. Citing the work 
of the sociologist, John Thompson, they observe that “the analysis of ideology should involve 
three stages: first, the social scientist must describe the social field, history and social 
relations relevant to the area of investigation; then engage in some systematic linguistic 
analysis of the pattern of discourse; and finally, in an interpretative or hermeneutic act, 
connect the latter with the former” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 105).40  
Awkward questions arise from this methodological framework. How does one prove 
that discursive and social practices stand in dialectical relationship to one another? Where 
does one draw the line between the discursive and non-discursive realms? And how does one 
analyze what is „outside‟ discourse? The first question stems from the observation that CDA 
studies typically present social matrices as “the background for the discursive practices” 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 89, original emphasis), which makes it difficult to envision 
                                                                    
38 See Fairclough (1992, pp. 234-7) for a description of the relevant features of a textual analysis. 
Transitivity attends to indicators of agency, causality and responsibility such as nominalization of 
processes and the use of voice (active or passive). The analysis of modality focuses on the expressed 
“degree of affinity” (p. 236) with propositions, such as when they are stated as subjective opinions or 
objective facts. 
39 See Fairclough (1992, pp. 232-4) for a summary of the three dimensions of discourse practice: text 
production, distribution and consumption. 
40 Although the three levels of analysis are presented separately here, the analytic chapters are not always 
structured in this manner – in fact, it is customary in CDA research to integrate the textual, discourse and 
social analyses (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Moreover, the levels of analysis are not treated evenly for 
each address as it would have been impossible to provide an exhaustive textual/rhetorical, discourse and 
social analysis for every speech. 
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how change is actually possible. There are two reasons for this tendency. First, it is not 
uncommon for discourse analytic studies to describe methodological procedures in one 
manner only to execute them quite differently – this has contributed to the perception that 
„anything goes‟ in discourse analysis. And second, part of the problem is that CDA analyses 
are limited frequently to single texts. This study addresses both shortcomings through its 
commitment to accountable research practice 41  and its selection of a large, temporally 
dispersed data set. It is, theoretically, in a position to elucidate the dynamic relationship 
between social and discursive practices. 
As for the demarcating line between the discursive and non-discursive – and the 
related matter of how one analyzes the extra-discursive – the study treats the distinction as 
analytical rather than empirical (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). The question itself is an 
imperfect one as it suggests – wrongly – that because Fairclough distinguishes between 
discourse and non-discourse, he advocates a realist ontology. While it can be argued that 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) prefer the critical realist combination of relativist 
epistemology and realist ontology – the apparent evidence is their rejection of “judgemental 
relativism” (ibid., p. 136) – their actual position remains “a matter of interpretation” 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 197). From a social constructionist standpoint, the 
circumscription of relativism is difficult to justify. When Chouliaraki and Fairclough dismiss 
the proposition that “all discourses are equally good or bad constructions of reality” (1999, p. 
136), it is not because they ascribe to a bottom line reality against which such constructions 
can be measured, but because “the comparative strengths and limitations of different 
discourses are constantly being judged in the course of practice” (ibid., added emphasis). 
That is, reality must be represented discursively within spaces that possess “already a set of 
criteria for what is accepted as a true statement” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 197). Claims 
about reality do not suggest themselves but are “the very things to be argued for, questioned, 
defended, decided” (Edwards et al., 1995, pp. 35-36). It makes no sense within any of the 
discourse analytic traditions – be it Laclau and Mouffe‟s discourse theory, Wetherell and 
Potter‟s discursive psychology or Fairclough‟s CDA – to suggest that the extra-discursive is 
„more‟ real than the discursive (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). While each of these approaches 
differs in its understanding of the relationship between discourse and non-discourse, none of 
them imply a hierarchical relationship between the two. 
                                                                    
41 See the discussion of Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) ‘transparency’ criterion, below (p. 58). 
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This study has taken special care in ensuring the epistemological and methodological 
compatibility of the various approaches that constitute its overarching research framework. 
Despite its multiperspectivism, it does not espouse anti-methodological eclecticism but 
attempts to bring together the strengths of several approaches in a theoretically principled 
manner in order to illuminate what has become a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon. The 
study seeks to imbibe the reflexive spirit integral to rhetoric of inquiry in which nothing – not 
even something as „obviously‟ desirable as „relevance‟ – is considered beyond interrogation. 
Yet its epistemological relativism remains in the service of an emancipatory agenda – and in 
this there is no contradiction either (see Edwards et al., 1995). 
EVALUATING KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS 
Since the data set deals with instances of „naturally occurring‟ talk, the researcher‟s influence 
on the material is somewhat diminished. Still, that is no guarantee for the validity of any 
subsequent finding. In attempting to bring about positive change in the world by stressing the 
notion of contingency (Willig, 1998), discourse analysts are committed to value systems that 
are as interrogable as the next person‟s. The study‟s emancipatory interest cannot be 
„positionless‟ nor does it afford a privileged take on „the truth‟. Within social constructionist 
epistemology, “[s]cientific [including social constructionist] knowledge is seen as productive. 
As with all other discourses, scientific knowledge produces knowledge, social relations and 
identities” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 116, original emphasis). But in relativist 
epistemology, the question arises of how a defense or critique of any given knowledge 
product is to proceed at all. With its insistence on a thoroughgoing reflexivity, the social 
constructionist research enterprise is not immune to the scrutiny of its own theories.  
This matter has been dealt with to some extent in the previous chapter, although it 
warrants revisiting. There are two levels to the discussion that require clarification, which 
Jørgensen and Phillips have termed the “level of principle” (2002, p. 204) and the “grounded, 
concrete level” (ibid., p. 205). The former entails the open acknowledgement that there is no 
such thing as an epistemological high ground, which facilitates the democratization of 
knowledge practices. Nonetheless, “neither life nor research takes place on this level of 
principle in which everything is contingent” (ibid.). Positions must be taken on what is 
considered true and what is not as it is impossible to inhabit a space that is not governed by a 
discursive logic. Accordingly, the thesis does not advocate circumscribed relativism but 
views scientific knowledge as a “truth that can be discussed” (ibid., p. 206, original 
emphasis).  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
58 
 
What makes this study scientific is its commitment to an explicit set of rules, 
adherence to which distinguishes better representations of reality from poorer ones. In their 
discussion of the validity of discourse analytic research, Potter and Wetherell (1987) 
introduce the criterion of transparency, which is an important arbiter of the discussable truth. 
In writing up a research report, transparency requires, first, the provision of representative 
examples from the data set along with detailed explanations that connect these extracts to the 
analytic claims made. Second, textual features that contradict the study‟s findings must be 
presented and accounted for. And third, transparency demands that the methodological rules 
of the study be stipulated clearly. This study has made a deliberate effort to implement these 
criteria by declaring its theoretical, methodological and moral commitments. 
At this point, the topic of ethics arises. Authoritative books on discourse analysis 
habitually lack an entry for “ethics” in their indexes (e.g. Fairclough, 1992; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell, Yates, & Taylor, 2001). It has become a commonplace in much 
discourse analytic and archival research that, since it frequently does not require interaction 
with human participants, there are no ethical considerations to report. Then again, the absence 
of the human element can also mean that the investigator – having no longer to reflect on the 
unequal distribution of power between researcher and informant – has one less corrective 
constraining the analytic process. Besides, a „naturally occurring‟ text in which the facts 
„speak for themselves‟ is less likely to provoke the kind of circumspection that messy human 
contact does. Under such conditions, a reflexive stance that adheres stubbornly to the 
criterion of transparency becomes doubly important. Human participation is not a 
requirement for the perpetration of „epistemological violence‟. Even the activities of 
discourse analysts and archival researchers – who are knowledge-makers first-and-foremost – 
are not without their social consequences.  
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Painter and van Ommen remark that “[t]oo often the year 1994, the advent of democracy [in 
South Africa], is treated as the end of history in Psychology” (2008, p. 440). This study is an 
attempt to buck the trend. Its data set has never been assembled before42 and amounts to no 
less than an institutional memory of psychology in South Africa. Some of the speeches were 
provided at considerable inconvenience to their owners, having to be dug out from boxes 
relegated to the forgotten corners of dusty garages, retrieved from hard drives no longer in 
                                                                    
42 This is an improbable circumstance when one considers that full-text presidential addresses of APA 
conventions dating back to 1893 are available on the Internet. 
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use or posted from remote parts of the world. On other occasions the news was less positive: 
potential key informants had died, speeches had been misplaced or, regrettably, discarded. So 
although the study does its best to trace the trajectory of associational life in South African 
psychology, there are the inevitable gaps. 
Unusually, one of these gaps extends over recent years. It is as if the discipline has 
grown increasingly less concerned about questions of history – seeing that it has „ended‟ – in 
“a neo-liberal depoliticized present” (Painter & van Ommen, 2008, p. 440). Nowadays, ever 
more career politicians are delivering keynote and opening addresses at PsySSA congresses 
and “[t]he debate about relevance in South African Psychology during the 1980s… continues, 
but „relevance‟ today is more closely linked to the discourse of marketing than that of 
politics” (ibid., p. 441). In late capitalist society, this widening influence of the market over 
public institutions has led to what Fairclough calls “the marketization of public discourse” 
(1993, p. 142). This development has had major ramifications for the people that work in 
these spaces – such as universities – and affects the nature of their “activities, social relations, 
and social and professional identities” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 6). With its focus on discursive-
historical processes, this study can shed light on issues of stake that “are typically not 
transparent for the people involved” (ibid., p. 9).  
Social constructionist research sets as its goal the unveiling of taken-for-granted 
knowledge (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Indeed, the idea that knowledge – psychological or 
otherwise – should be „relevant‟ has been naturalized to the point that its contingent quality 
has been forgotten and replaced with a seeming objectivity representing “nothing but the 
sedimented form of power, in other words a power whose traces have been erased” (Laclau, 
1990, p. 60). This study‟s analysis of „relevance‟ is about “showing the terrain of the… 
violence, of the power relation through which that instituting act took [and continues to take] 
place” (ibid., p. 34).  It is akin in spirit to a Foucauldian genealogy – a „history of the present‟ 
– that attempts to show how “the present is just as strange as the past” (Kendall & Wickham, 
1999, p. 4).  
Yet the study renounces the judgmental relativism that is often attributed to the 
Foucauldian project. In clarifying the intransigence of the „relevance‟ question in South 
African psychology, the study hopes to address the lingering perception among the populace 
that psychologists “are too far removed from the community to be of assistance to black 
people” (Ruane, 2010, p. 220). While the thesis does not constitute, strictly speaking, an 
explanatory critique of „relevance‟ (Bhaskar, 1986 quoted in Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 
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1999, p. 33), it remains „critical‟ in seeking “to reveal the role of discursive practice in the 
maintenance of the social world, including those social relations that involve unequal 
relations of power” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 63). A fledgling attempt will be made to 
resolve the „relevance‟ debate, centering on the cultivation of a “critical language awareness” 
in which the interlocutors of „relevance‟ become more conscious of their discursive practices 
(Fairclough, 1992, pp. 239-40). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
61 
 
CHAPTER 5: THEMATIC ANALYSIS 
 
… poorly demarcated and rarely acknowledged, yet widely used… (Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke) 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
As an interlude to the discourse analytic chapters that follow, the purpose of this chapter is to 
familiarize the reader with the contents of the data set. Towards this end, it presents the 
results of a thematic analysis of the empirical material that yielded three overlapping themes. 
The first theme describes the relationship between psychology and South African society and 
the widespread belief that the discipline has failed its social mandate. The second theme 
identifies an individual–social antinomy that manifests through speakers‟ contrasting 
prioritizations of individual wellbeing and social welfare. The final theme sheds light on the 
antagonistic relationship that obtains between the science and profession of psychology in 
South Africa. The chapter ends with the provocative suggestion that the debate about 
„relevance‟ – at least during the apartheid years – may have represented an iteration of 
English-Afrikaner hostilities rather than a concern for the psychological health of all South 
Africans. 
USING THEMATIC ANALYSIS 
When working with large data sets, it is customary to employ the analytic preliminary of a 
coding process (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Thematic analysis is one such possibility as it 
permits a thorough description of analytic material (Gomm, 2004). It differs from a 
straightforward content analysis because it is more attentive to the qualitative aspects of the 
data (Joffe & Yardley, 2004). Moreover, because it focuses on what is said, thematic analysis 
is an appropriate foil for discourse analysis, which is more interested in how things are said. 
Theoretically and epistemologically robust, the use of thematic analysis in this study is 
methodologically sound.  
 Braun and Clarke‟s (2006) six-stage model of analysis was applied to the data set: 1) 
speeches were read repeatedly; 2) extracts were coded; 3–5) broader themes were identified, 
reviewed and named; and 6) the thematic map was written up. Although an effort was made 
to theorize the latent significances of the identified themes, coding was performed for the 
most part at a semantic level.  The analysis involved a combination of both deductive („top 
down‟) and inductive („bottom up‟) procedures in which themes were informed by the 
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research questions but were grounded also in the data.  Indeed, the distinction between the 
two modes of reasoning is didactic more than anything (Gomm, 2004; O'Leary, 2004): 
“researchers cannot free themselves of their theoretical and epistemological commitments, 
and data are not coded in an epistemological vacuum” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 84).  
 An important criticism of thematic analysis concerns an apparent lack of 
accountability (Gomm, 2004). Owing to limitations of space, it is not possible to present in its 
entirety the evidence that substantiates the final thematic map. Instead, what are provided 
below are representative examples of the identified themes. In particular, the analysis yielded 
three interconnecting themes: the first pertains to the relationship between psychology and 
broader South African society, the second to the discipline‟s individual–social antinomy, and 
the third to the distinction between psychology as science and profession. Each of these is 
explored in turn. 
THEME 1: PSYCHOLOGY AND SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY 
In the West, psychology is highly regarded, the result of a disciplinary tendency towards the 
solution of practical, societal problems. In historical terms, this inclination was of such an 
order that it did not take long for practical psychology to supersede in scope the marginally 
older academic psychology (Jansz, 2004). The development of psychology in South Africa 
was no different when one thinks of the achievements of psychologists in the Poor White 
study, during mobilization efforts and in the disciplining of black labor (Seedat & 
MacKenzie, 2008). Accordingly, invocations of the psychology–society dialectic represent a 
dominant theme in the data set that for reasons of simplification is divided presently into two 
sub-themes. The first deals with normative conceptions of the psychology–society 
relationship while the second comprises evaluations of the actual form that relationship is 
perceived to have taken. 
THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Addresses spanning the entire range of the data set were replete with references to the role of 
the discipline in society and the latter‟s reciprocal demand for psychological services. Here is 
an excerpt from the opening address delivered at the 1953 SAPA congress: 
Here in South Africa we are fond of stressing the immense complexity of the problems which 
face us as a multi-racial society. If we, as psychologists, are to play our proper constructive 
role in their solution, we cannot afford to spend much time on theoretical controversy, 
however much intellectual fun and stimulus we may undoubtedly derive from it. The problems 
which face us are indeed urgent, and it behoves us to be both liberal-minded and pragmatic in 
our approach to them. (Pratt-Yule, 1953, p. 9) 
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At the 1977 PIRSA congress, the president remarked: 
We do not need only basic and even applied research, but also the development of research to 
the point where it attains practical value. And where necessary, the requisite help must also 
be extended for the implementation of the results. In short, we are not responsible only for the 
development of psychology as science, but also for psychology as profession, which must 
deliver a service to the community. (Langenhoven, 1977, p. 13)43 
After decades of political turmoil, the same problem-centered sentiments of responsibility 
and urgency were expressed in this keynote address at the 2002 PsySSA congress: 
We simply must not take our young democracy for granted for there is much yet to be done to 
make it work for all our fellow citizens. In the challenges that face us as a country, and as 
higher education academics and administrators and as professional psychologists, we must be 
able to respond, heads held high… (Badat, 2002, p. 15) 
THE FAILURE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Regardless of the milieu, the sense of mission in the foregoing extracts is palpable. Yet that 
mission was – and is – frequently said to have failed. Criticisms of the discipline – its 
research tradition especially – predominate in addresses delivered during the fifties, sixties 
and seventies while denunciations of the profession are prominent from the 1980s onwards.44 
In 1969, for instance, the PIRSA president had this to say: 
An analysis of current research projects in South African psychology leaves a person without 
any doubts. Too much of these bear no relationship to our national needs and the findings are 
frequently of such a nature that they hold no meaning for anyone other than the researcher. 
Research is frequently of a fragmentary nature, seldom forming aspects of a central topic. 
Research on a topic such as the sexual life of a scorpion is clearly a waste of manpower, 
especially when our country‟s many human problems are taken into account. (Robbertse, 
1969, p. 8)45 
On another occasion – this time at the opening ceremony of the 1983 PASA congress – it was 
observed that 
[t]he relation between South African psychology and our society is complex… [U]nless we 
become aware of the ideology affecting our discipline and its applications we will be unable 
to be useful in the new society which is undoubtedly to come; our knowledge and not only our 
skills may be found to be inappropriate for solving the problems which will present themselves 
and which we may not even perceive. (Albino, 1983, pp. 1-2) 
A generation later, a stinging attack was visited on the profession at the opening of the 2007 
PsySSA congress: 
This country has a bag full of apartheid wounds as revealed during the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. No active follow-up was ever done to bring about true 
reconciliation and healing so that there would be closure to some of the gruesome revelations 
                                                                    
43 This passage was translated from the original Afrikaans. 
44 Psychology as a profession was only recognized statutorily in 1974 with the establishment of the first 
Professional Board for Psychology. 
45 This passage was translated from the original Afrikaans. 
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that our nation was exposed to. And so if you asked me, what is the state of the discipline, I 
would say, it is a quiet or silent discipline in the face of an evident national cry for oral and 
emotional catharsis. (B. Mkhize, 2007, pp. 5-6) 
 Regardless of the psychological association in question, psychology as science and 
profession is considered to have failed its social mandate. One explanation is that the 
discipline‟s „social irrelevance‟ is a necessary consequence of its overriding concern for the 
wellbeing of the individual. Moreover, psychological theory has tended to conceptualize the 
relationship between the individual and the social in oppositional terms, making it difficult to 
imagine sociality as representing anything more than an aggregate of individual factors. It is 
this individual–social dualism that epitomizes the data set‟s second major theme. 
THEME 2: THE INDIVIDUAL–SOCIAL ANTINOMY 
Despite South African psychology‟s apparent lack of „relevance‟, it has never been 
indifferent to context. Granted, it may not have responded to that context in the manner its 
critics hoped it would – but it did respond. In particular, the second theme reveals how 
speakers‟ opposing preoccupations with „the individual‟ and „the social‟ were referenced by 
local and international political developments. During the sixties and early seventies, „the 
individual‟ was understood to be under siege whereas, from the late seventies onwards, „the 
social‟ became cause for concern. Apartheid rule was coming undone at the seams while 
resistance at home and abroad gathered pace. As it happened, it was mainly Afrikaner 
conservatives that sought to defend „the individual‟ by focusing their research on what they 
thought were appropriate topics. On the other hand, speakers concerned with the state of the 
broader South African society turned to systems theory for answers. This theme, then, 
describes the resulting individual–social antinomy by means of two contrasting sub-themes, 
comprising, respectively, a protest against the eclipse of individualism and a preference for 
systems thinking. 
IN DEFENSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
In 1962, SAPA split acrimoniously on the question of „race‟ membership. Apartheid law 
demanded – so the argument went – different psychological associations for different „races‟, 
which led to the founding of the whites-only PIRSA. For PIRSA conservatives, SAPA‟s 
proposed „leveling‟ of the racial hierarchy reflected the machinations of “a worldwide, 
hysterical mass movement” (la Grange, 1962, p. 7), whereas SAPA progressives viewed the 
perpetuation of that hierarchy as an affirmation of the “tyranny of the group” (Schlebusch, 
1963, p. 8). At both ends of the political spectrum, a monolithic group mentality was 
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constructed as problematic. For PIRSA, that group was the international community, while, 
for SAPA, it was none other than PIRSA itself and, by extension, the Afrikaner government.  
 From this point on, PIRSA presidents started to lament the loss of individuality that 
they attributed to the “robotism” (Robbertse, 1968, p. 2) of a worldwide social order 
committed variously to capitalism, communism and scientism. In his 1963 address on gifted 
children, A.J. la Grange disapproved of the communist position where “all forms of 
separation of pupils according to giftedness, even within a class or school, are condemned as 
unethical or undemocratic” (1964, p. 3).46 He took issue also with capitalists for whom the 
question of giftedness was purely utilitarian, being “mainly a matter of the extraction and 
exploitation of the available human material in such a manner that it can serve to the greatest 
advantage of the nation or the state as well as in the economic and the political terrain[s]” (p. 
5). He then censured the middle position – “liberalistic socialism” – whose “highest ideal is 
the realization of a classless… community in which all people can live together happily on 
the basis of perfect equality, despite differences in descent, heredity, giftedness, etc.” (p. 7). 
By 1968, another PIRSA president was describing the situation with Orwellian horror: 
It is indeed as if we can speak of a process of disintegration that is occurring in the Western 
world and that is largely attributable to the progress made in the field of technology and its 
ultimate expression in the splitting of the atom. The process of natural-scientification did not, 
as expected, make man freer, but on the contrary bound him tighter in slave chains so that he 
was eventually delivered up to his own handiwork. It‟s no wonder that Schubart claims that 
the West has given to mankind the most well-considered forms of technology, state and 
commerce, but that it has robbed him of his soul…. Man as a utilitarian being in the great 
machine of Robotism becomes an efficiency being that can be replaced by a new part if he is 
worn out. (Robbertse, 1968, p. 2)47 
The association‟s response to the perceived assault on „the individual‟ was to 
encourage research on individual differences in areas such as giftedness (la Grange, 1964), 
creativity (Krige, 1973; Robbertse, 1964), the religious personality (Robbertse, 1968; van der 
Merwe, 1974) and, notoriously, racial difference (Robbertse, 1967). Yet it was not an 
unspecified individual but the Afrikaner individual that was at stake. For la Grange, the 
neglect of giftedness endangered “on a large scale the foundations of our continued national 
existence” (1962, p. 17). In the same way, Robbertse advocated research on racial difference 
“because it involves the scientific basis of separate development and it touches on the root of 
our survival” (1967, p. 11). 
 
                                                                    
46 All excerpts from this address were translated from the original Afrikaans. 
47 This passage was translated from the original Afrikaans. 
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THE RISE OF SYSTEMS THINKING  
From the mid-seventies onwards, the winds of change swept through South Africa‟s political 
establishment. The 1974 promulgation of the ill-fated Afrikaans Medium Decree precipitated 
the 1976 Soweto riots, completely unanticipated events that turned the course of South 
African history on its head. Fueled by mounting condemnation of the wide-ranging 
depredations of apartheid policy, the political momentum shifted irrevocably. The country 
suffered a succession of international, regional and local setbacks that filtered through to 
Afrikaner institutions. In a sign that it was starting to lose its ideological moorings, PIRSA 
entered negotiations with SAPA and abandoned its founding philosophy of racial exclusivity. 
Meanwhile, the state – faced with the accumulating victories of mass political movements 
such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) – resorted to violent repression. In July 1985, a 
partial state of emergency was declared that was extended to the whole country in June 1986.  
 These were the bloodiest years of apartheid rule. Inside psychology, the leadership 
was split three ways between the conservative-leaning PASA, the progressive OASSSA and 
the radical Psychology and Apartheid Committee. Capitalism was still the enemy. The 
evolving Afrikaner constituency, however, meant that anti-capitalist sentiments were being 
expressed by anti-apartheid campaigners. In OASSSA circles, apartheid was explicitly linked 
to capitalism and its deleterious social consequences while privatization of mental health care 
was vigorously opposed (Coovadia, 1987; Vogelman, 1986). The victim was no longer „the 
individual‟ but „the people‟. The shift in focus from „the individual‟ to „the social‟ echoed the 
changing political situation in the country. Explaining the necessity of involving professional 
associations in mass mobilization, the opening speaker warned the 1987 OASSSA 
conference: 
Twentieth century capitalism is a totally different creature: sophisticated, sure of itself and 
enormously powerful. Its influence has been shown to extend far beyond the factory, the mine 
and the mechanised farm. Indeed, its ideology is widely pervasive. Education, health, welfare, 
housing, transport, communication, political representation, and in fact, virtually every sector 
of society, is influenced to a greater or lesser extent, if not indirectly controlled, by capitalism. 
The baneful influence of this new form of capitalism therefore, creates contradictions for a 
wide array of people, thus directly creating the conditions for the mobilisation toward 
opposition by all classes. (Coovadia, 1987, pp. 16-17)48 
                                                                    
48 In the post-apartheid years, anti-capitalist fervor fell by the wayside, the result of the South African 
academy’s cooption into the global knowledge-making apparatus. (This claim will be substantiated in 
Chapter 10, which contains the analysis of addresses delivered during the post-apartheid era.) Yet, this 
did not prevent the occasional anti-capitalist reproach – as when the keynote speaker at the 2002 PsySSA 
congress observed that the future of higher education in the country depended on “… [t]he extent to 
which various fields, disciplines and programmes, and the humanities and social sciences overall, are not 
sacrificed at the altar of ‘market relevance’ and ‘market needs’… [and w]hether there will be adequate 
government funding to sustain a future landscape with high quality public higher education institutions 
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 The rising significance of „the social‟ coincided with increasing references to systems 
theory as in this excerpt from the 1979 SAPA presidential address: 
Psychology is the study of human development and behaviour in a variety of contexts and in 
interaction with many systems of which the individual is a part. The major systems are: the 
family, the educational and knowledge systems, the social and ideological systems, the 
economic and occupational systems, the environmental, health and recreational systems… 
The psychologist has a place in all these areas of human development. (Gerdes, 1979, p. 3) 
On the occasion of the reunification of SAPA and PIRSA in 1982, the first PASA president 
remarked that 
Interpersonal relationships has aptly been chosen as the central theme for this congress: not 
only does it refer to the socio-political problems which we are experiencing in our society at 
this point in time, but from the vantage point of an informed scientific community it reflects a 
singular sensitivity for the epistemological shift which we are currently experiencing in our 
discipline… and I am obviously referring to the advent and development of general systems 
theory. (Rademeyer, 1982, p. 2, original emphases) 
Mental health was no longer theorized with reference to individual-specific factors, but in 
relation to broader social phenomena, as in this excerpt from the opening address at 
OASSSA‟s first national conference: 
To summarise: That mental health must be located within a political context. Politics is 
primarily responsible for the nature of our society, and it is societal conditions that largely 
determine the mental health of South Africans. (Vogelman, 1986, p. 11) 
By the time of his opening address at the 1989 PASA congress, Deo Strümpfer remarked 
how, 
[p]articularly over the last decade or so, there has been an increasing awareness of 
suprasystems, collateral systems and subsystems – depending on where you start. All of these 
systems are in constant interaction. Systems thinking tells us that to exist means to be related. 
(1989, p. 1)  
 Consistent with this increasingly prominent discourse about the social determinants of 
psychological health, approaches to intervention started changing too. Catch-phrases like 
interdisciplinarity (Gerdes, 1979, pp. 11-12), community psychology (Biesheuvel, 1987, p. 
2), Afrocentric psychology (Mkhatshwa, 2000, p. 3), primary health care (Coovadia, 1987, p. 
28), prevention and promotion (Asmal, 2001, p. 4) and social change (Gerdes, 1992, p. 41) – 
each of which is indebted to systems thinking in one way or another – became and to some 
extent remain emblematic watchwords in the discipline. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
and to also ensure that there is not a wholesale marketisation and commodification of higher education” 
(Badat, 2002, p. 6). 
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THEME 3: SCIENCE VERSUS PROFESSION 
In his presidential address at the 1954 SAPA congress, Simon Biesheuvel reflected on a 
seemingly insoluble tension between pure and applied psychology: 
Our analysis appears to be leading us to the absurd conclusion that in order to carry out his 
job properly the occupational [industrial] psychologist must become a kind of scientific 
“superman” required to conquer a universe of sciences within the time of an ordinary 
professional training course. In this predicament, he could either choose to become a 
scientific dilettante, knowing the headlines but none of the contents, or accept the advice given 
by Hamlet to his mother concerning her heart, to “throw away the worser part of it, and live 
the purer with the other half”, the worse in this case presumably being the mechanistic, the 
purer the humanistic aspects of psychological application, or vice versa, according to one‟s 
background and inclinations. (Biesheuvel, 1954, p. 134) 
Thirty years later, discussions about this split within the discipline had lost none of their 
awkwardness. In the opening address of the 1983 PASA congress, it was commented that 
[i]t is only in psychology that we tend to have sharp separation between the basic researcher 
and the applied researcher. And I believe the basic researchers are to be blamed for this for 
they have, in general, been working in a natural scientific paradigm that is quite 
inappropriate for dealing with the problems found by the applied psychologists concerned 
with persons in social situations. Often they have been dismissive of what they see as the 
unscientific fumblings of the applied prac[ti]tioners. (Albino, 1983, p. 8) 
Another decade on – in the opening address at PASA‟s 1993 congress – it was claimed that 
the distinction between basic and applied psychology was best explained by reflecting on the 
differing traditions of psychology departments in English- and Afrikaans-language 
universities: 
For a long time psychology at the Afrikaans universities was characterized by a strong service 
orientation. Heavy emphasis was put on applied subdisciplines, particularly clinical, 
counselling, industrial/organizational and educational psychology – all of those that became 
registration categories when South African psychology became professionalized…. At the 
traditionally English universities there always was a heavy emphasis on basic, theoretical 
psychology and research publication has always been the norm for recognition. There was a 
certain ambivalence towards application, with clinical psychology for some time the only 
significant exception. (Strümpfer, 1993, pp. 7-8) 
 The data set is replete with such juxtapositions as the “theory” and “practice” of the 
discipline (Pratt-Yule, 1953, p. 8), the “scientific” and “applied” aspects of the subject (van 
der Merwe, 1961, p. 229), “researchers” and “professional practitioners” (Badat, 2002, p. 2), 
and “knowledge” and “skills” (H. Mkhize, 2010, p. 1). While, on some occasions, these 
references were made in passing, on others they drew attention to a “division” (Pratt-Yule, 
1953, p. 4) – a “dilemma” (Biesheuvel, 1954, p. 134) – that led to recriminations on both 
sides. First the basic science was castigated for failing to address issues of „relevance‟ (e.g. 
du Toit, 1975; Robbertse, 1969), while, later, the same charge would be levied against the 
profession (e.g. Asmal, 2001; B. Mkhize, 2007; Vogelman, 1986). But it is Strümpfer‟s 
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(1993) assertion that this fault-line in South African psychology had less to do with the 
shortcomings of science‟s two-step model than with English-Afrikaner differences that 
warrants special attention. 
 Prior to World War II, South African psychology had a Euro-British orientation. After 
the war, it acquired an American character – a consequence of Afrikaner apartheid rule and 
the South African academy‟s resulting isolation from continental Europe and Britain (Cooper 
& Nicholas, 2012; Strümpfer, 1993). 49  This explains the frequent mention in PIRSA 
addresses of trends in American research (e.g. la Grange, 1966; Robbertse, 1967; van der 
Merwe, 1974) – with Robbertse at one point appearing to forestall possible objections by 
justifying his support for the “new American illness” (1964, p. 8). 50  Despite different 
underlying philosophies, American pragmatism dovetailed seamlessly with the Afrikaner 
„service orientation‟, which revealed itself in PIRSA addresses in the form of repeated 
discussions about the professionalization of South African psychology.51  The Afrikaner-
dominated Stellenbosch University took up the gauntlet in this drive for professionalization 
(Strümpfer, 1993) – ostensibly to protect the public and gain its respect (la Grange, 1950; 
Langenhoven, 1978) – while the political impulse for statutory registration derived variously 
from the (failed) 1962 and (successful) 1966 attempts by psychiatric patients on the life of the 
Prime Minister as well as ministerial investigations into Scientology and the Wilgespruit 
Fellowship Centre (Strümpfer, 1993). 52  Steady lobbying culminated in 1974 in the 
establishment of the first Professional Board for Psychology.  
 By contrast, psychology departments at English-language universities were noted for 
their “heavy emphasis on basic, theoretical psychology and research publication” (Strümpfer, 
1993, p. 8). It was not that English-speaking liberals were indifferent to the social problems 
                                                                    
49 Language barriers played their part here too (Strümpfer, 1993). 
50 This passage was translated from the original Afrikaans. Robbertse was stating his case for American-
style research on creative abilities. 
51 Prior to the 1982 SAPA-PIRSA merger, these discussions were conducted almost exclusively by PIRSA 
presidents (du Toit, 1975; Hattingh, 1966; la Grange, 1950; la Grange, 1962; Langenhoven, 1977; 
Langenhoven, 1978; Rademeyer, 1982; Raubenheimer, 1981). The significance of this finding, however, is 
compromised by the fact that no SAPA addresses could be sourced for the period 1963 to 1978. 
Nonetheless, it has been well documented that Afrikaner psychologists dominated the vanguard of 
professionalization efforts (e.g. Cooper & Nicholas, 2012; Strümpfer, 1993). 
52 The Wilgespruit Fellowship Centre (WFC) was established in 1949 by Christian ministers and teachers 
to promote ecumenicalism and multiracialism. It provided several anti-apartheid organizations with T-
group training through what were known as Personal Relations and Organisational Development (PROD) 
programs. The WFC counted Steve Biko among its attendees and can be said to have played a role in the 
formation of the Black Consciousness Movement. In the early seventies, the WFC came under attack from 
several Afrikaner newspapers that alleged that the Centre was using psychological methods to foment a 
liberal-socialist takeover. Following a ministerial commission of inquiry, the then Prime Minister branded 
the WFC a “den of iniquity” (Vanek, 2005, p. 157). 
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of the day but that they placed their faith in science itself – that is, in “the hope that reasoned 
enquiry and patient persuasion would triumph over „ideology‟… [in] an increasingly race-
obsessed state” (Dubow, 2001, p. 116). Indeed, when a revolt against the Afrikaner-led 
profession began in the late seventies, it was these universities that affirmed their solidarity 
with the “community of the oppressed” (Strümpfer, 1993, p. 9).53 As early as the 1930s, 
psychology in South Africa had been split between conservatives partial to Afrikaner 
nationalism and liberals who either opposed racism or attempted to analyze it scientifically 
(Foster, 1993). 
DISCUSSION 
The foregoing themes intersect appreciably with one another. South African psychology‟s 
perceived failure to honor its social responsibilities (Theme 1) derives from the discipline‟s 
traditionally individualizing orientation. The antinomy thus generated between the individual 
and social worlds (Theme 2) triggers grievances against a science and profession whose 
methodological individualism cannot accommodate sociality on its own terms. In turn, the 
apparent „irrelevance‟ of psychological research and practice in relation to national 
imperatives (Theme 3) reinforces perceptions that psychology is not fulfilling its social 
obligations (Theme 1). 
 It is worth noting that early criticisms of the discipline were aimed at academic 
psychology. At the time, it was mostly PIRSA psychologists that set about slating the 
methods and topics of psychological research (e.g. du Toit, 1975; Langenhoven, 1977; 
                                                                    
53 Some of the important papers that came out of English-language psychology departments include 
Holdstock (1979; 1981a; 1981b), Dawes (1985; 1986) and Berger and Lazarus (1987). Holdstock’s series 
of papers were influential in the early days of the ‘relevance’ debate and have become popular again in 
recent years. He called attention to the “neglected potential” (1979, p. 118) of indigenous healing, citing 
the fact that “there is only one registered black clinical psychologist in the Republic of South Africa” (p. 
119). Two years later his tone was less diplomatic: “Psychology departments at Afrikaans universities,  in 
the first instance, are generally more applied than their English counterparts. Secondly, they attach 
greater importance in their clinical endeavours to the therapeutic techniques of Rogers than is the case at 
English speaking departments. The paradox to be resolved is how, in the light of adherence to certain 
Rogerian principles, Afrikaans departments have managed to remain as aloof as they have been from the 
racial issues facing the country” (Holdstock, 1981a, p. 125). As far as Holdstock was concerned, 
psychologists in South Africa needed “a crash course in the teaching of empathy” (ibid., p. 127). He argued 
elsewhere that “Psychology in South Africa is like the proverbial ostrich” (1981b, p. 7), requiring not only 
an “attitude transplant” (p. 8) but a dose of “unconditional positive regard” (p. 9) in order to realize that 
“[b]lack persons are people too” (p. 8). It should not be assumed, however, that English-speaking 
psychologists agreed on what a ‘relevant’ psychology should look like. Dawes, for example, took issue 
with what he called Holdstock’s “innocent Rogerianism” (1985, p. 57) and the latter’s elevation of cultural 
over class considerations.  
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Robbertse, 1967; Roux, 1971)54 – an area dominated by English-speaking psychologists. 
Then, just as the apartheid state was starting to unravel, the „relevance‟ of the profession was 
called into question. With accusations revolving around professional complicity with the 
apartheid regime, the roles were reversed as English-speaking psychologists now began 
fingering their Afrikaner colleagues. Consequently, if one were to think of the „relevance‟ 
debate during the apartheid years as composed of two halves – an early debate about the 
value of the basic science (prior to the 1980s) and a later one about the merits of the applied 
science (starting in the late 1970s) – it is tempting to conclude that it was no more than 
another incarnation of Anglo-Boer antagonisms, „the continuation of politics by other 
means‟. 
 This raises the possibility that the anti-apartheid quest for „social relevance‟ may not 
have been about the much-spoken-of „majority of South Africans‟ – indeed, Spivak‟s (1988) 
thesis on the impossibility of the subaltern voice would suggest as much. It is true that black 
academics contributed significantly to discussions about „social relevance‟ (e.g. Nicholas & 
Cooper, 1990; Seedat, Cloete, & Shochet, 1988), but by that stage – the latter half of the 
1980s and the early 1990s – the debate‟s parameters had already been set. Whether the 
conversation would have followed a different trajectory had black psychologists been 
involved in it from the start, is a matter of speculation. What is clear is that post-apartheid 
iterations of „relevance‟ have been dominated by black psychologists (e.g. Ahmed & Pillay, 
2004; Cooper & Nicholas, 2012; de la Rey & Ipser, 2004; N. Duncan, van Niekerk, de la 
Rey, & Seedat, 2001; Naidoo & Kagee, 2009; Pillay & Kramers, 2003) – at the same time 
that it has become “more closely linked to the discourse of marketing than that of politics” 
(Painter & van Ommen, 2008, p. 441).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
54 The weight of this finding is diminished by the fact that no SAPA addresses could be located for most of 
the sixties and seventies. Then again, SAPA addresses of the 1950s were not critical of the psychological 
research of those years. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE SAPA–PIRSA SPLIT 
 
It is my heartfelt wish that PIRSA, out of the strength of its will to live and serve, will grow into an institution 
that will earn the recognition and love not only of its own people but also of its other-raced fellow citizens… 
(Adriaan la Grange – PIRSA president, 1962) 
 [T]he great inventor and creator should not be motivated by the needs of his fellow people but by his search for 
the truth, by vision, strength and courage that springs from his own spirit. (Bob Schlebusch – SAPA president, 
1962) 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents an analysis of two presidential addresses delivered in 1962, the year 
that Afrikaner psychologists split from SAPA to form a rival association, namely, PIRSA. 
Emphasis is placed on the social and rhetorical contexts within which the two addresses 
should be situated, as well as on the rhetorical devices that are deployed in mobilizing what 
appear to be diametrically opposing positions regarding the desirability of „relevance‟ in 
psychology. Whereas the PIRSA president hints at the association‟s impending promotion of 
a discourse of volksdiens (ethnic-national service), the SAPA president endorses a discourse 
of liberal individualism that valorizes the independence of science. 
PIRSA PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1962 (A.J. LA GRANGE) 
The year 1962 marks a watershed in the associational life of South African psychology. 
SAPA‟s much-feared split had come to pass. On June 23rd, approximately two hundred 
people met at the University of South Africa to establish PIRSA (J. Louw, 1987). The matter 
of admitting blacks to SAPA ranks had been shelved for six years, first with the application 
of an Indian psychologist, Josephine Naidoo, in 1956, and again in 1960 with another Indian 
psychologist, Chanderpaul Ramphal. Naidoo had been told by Simon Biesheuvel – then 
SAPA president – to withdraw her application as he “thought it better to let sleeping dogs lie” 
(ibid., p. 342). The decision on Ramphal – who had postponed his application for three years 
because “he did not want to upset us”55 – was deferred. In the words of Council chairman 
A.B. van der Merwe, Ramphal‟s application would be revisited when “the Council has 
formulated the principle of admission, as requested yesterday at the AGM, and until it has 
been agreed to by the [next] Annual General Meeting.”56 
                                                                    
55 The words of Ronald Albino. Addendum to the minutes of the SAPA Council Meeting, Durban, July 15, 
1960, p. 6, Raubenheimer archive, Stellenbosch University. 
56 ibid., p. 7. 
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 By the time of the 1961 Stellenbosch congress, SAPA branches throughout the 
country had deliberated over and formulated responses to a number of issues pertaining to 
black membership. In turn, Council had agreed unanimously that the AGM would be asked to 
ratify two of its proposals: “that whites and non-whites be admitted to the association subject 
to membership qualifications as stipulated in the constitution” and that, “given that we have 
non-white and white members in the association, annual general meetings and branch 
meetings will be organized as in the past and that arrangements will be made, subject to local 
conditions, to accommodate all members.”57 Council appeared committed to the ideal of a 
racially integrated society, albeit “subject to local conditions.” By contrast, SAPA‟s Pretoria 
branch – while not taking as extreme a position as the association‟s Potchefstroom and 
Bloemfontein branches – wanted the constitution amended in order to facilitate its 
recommendation  
that the members of the Psychological Association consist of whites and non-whites [but] that 
the Council will consist only of whites; that the non-whites will choose three whites to 
represent their interests, namely one for Bantus, one for Asians and one for Coloreds; that the 
Council‟s powers and functions will remain as in the past; that no mixed gatherings will take 
place, namely of whites and non-white members; and that whites and non-whites will establish 
their separate branches and will conduct their congresses and annual general meetings 
separately.58 
 The Pretoria resolution was defeated by 44 votes to 5, while the Council‟s resolutions 
were passed by 31 votes to 23 (J. Louw, 1987). In an interview twenty years later, Biesheuvel 
recalled 
… Prof la Grange saying we have debated this thing, [it is a] fair decision by the majority so 
we must now just accept this and live together. That same evening, I was told, there was a 
meeting in someone‟s house in Stellenbosch where they decided to break away and then 
PIRSA was born.59 
For his part, Dreyer Kruger – who in 1960 had opposed Ramphal‟s application on the 
grounds that he had failed to follow the correct application procedures – recollected decades 
later that 
… it came to a head at the Stellenbosch congress. At that congress, the so-called Afrikaner 
nationalist-leaning psychologists convened on one side – we caucused together and decided 
that we must vote that there must be separate associations for the different population groups 
– or rather for the whites one side and the non-whites must then not become members. A 
person that took an incredibly strong position was Dr Paul Robbertse who was head of the 
Human Sciences Research Council at the time…. For him it wasn‟t just a matter of 
professional interest but he put it very clearly that for him it was about the maintenance of 
                                                                    
57 Minutes of the South African Psychological Association Council Meeting, May 27, 1961, p. 7, 
Raubenheimer archive, Stellenbosch University. This passage was translated from the original Afrikaans. 
58 ibid., p. 6. This passage was translated from the original Afrikaans. 
59 Simon Biesheuvel interview, May 14, 1982, pp. 19-20. 
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apartheid in all spheres and on all levels. So we decided beforehand that we shall vote for 
separate associations but that we would then make an appeal to the whole congress that we 
would not break away under any circumstances. How deeply that promise of not breaking 
away was meant, became clear immediately after the vote was taken where we then lost and 
then I remember very well [what] Prof la Grange said. When he said we must stick to the 
point that we must not split he actually thought that we were going to be on the winning side, 
but we ended up being on the losing side. At the last moment the opposition organized things – 
[they] brought [a] whole lot of people from [the University of] Cape Town to Stellenbosch to 
outvote us. That caucus then decided to appoint an action committee to take the matter 
further. The action committee was under the chairmanship of Robbertse…. The members 
eventually decided that we must establish a separate association and it was then decided that 
we shall hold a congress of all likeminded people and that we must not resign from SAPA but 
only make known our resignation as it were by joining a new association. And this then also 
happened early in 1961. That is how PIRSA came into being. The motivation for it was 
completely and exclusively political and the whole aim of it was to maintain apartheid in the 
profession. I believe that Dr Robbertse towed us along – some of us that sat there were too 
scared to oppose the man because we knew all too well that our posts will be in danger and 
we therefore just played safe. Many people belonged to PIRSA because they knew [this] and 
Prof Roux who was head of a big [psychology] department [at the University of South Africa] 
and Dr Robbertse and Mr Bekker [Department of Labor] said that a person that stays with 
SAPA will not get an appointment in his bureau or department and will also not get any 
promotion under any circumstances. They made it very clear that if a person did not join, they 
would do their best to force you out. So let it be said once: the whole thing was politically 
motivated, [there was] incredibly strong Broederbond60 motivation behind the whole thing. 
This is now the truth as I see it. And I was there.61 
Kruger‟s version reveals the divisions in the Afrikaner camp. There were the non-
separatists led by Adriaan la Grange, for whom a possible secession was no more than a 
gambit, and genuine separatists directed by Paul Robbertse, who fully intended breaking 
away. When asked in what manner he viewed PIRSA‟s historical significance, Robbertse 
replied: 
There was an incredible reawakening of the Afrikaner as a result of PIRSA. The old SAPA and 
the Afrikaans speaker: he wasn‟t at home there and it was actually people – Biesheuvel, 
people from Wits and Natal, English-language universities – they were the people that 
wielded the scepter. We just felt we were strangers and in an organization that actually spoke 
for South Africa. We didn‟t count – we were nowhere – this was our experience and a person 
must see it against the specific background…. Things that we accept today, with which we are 
in agreement, could simply not be [accepted] in those days. Here and there a voice would 
[protest] – it was immediately smothered and then you were also branded [as] leftist and a 
liberal and no thinking Afrikaner would at that time be keen to be seen in conversation with 
those people and be associated with them…. If a person thinks back and asks – look, from our 
perspective at the time – incredible hotheads… it took work to get Prof la Grange to join our 
ranks. He was from Stellenbosch and came up with a delegation – we put him up in the old 
Residency Hotel [in Pretoria]. La Grange was a very levelheaded, well-balanced person with 
a very unique outlook on life and – but his sympathies – [it] does not matter where his 
sympathies were – but it was a question of is it the right thing…. Prof JM du Toit from the 
south and AB van der Merwe eventually also joined our ranks and those people made a big 
contribution to the establishment and advancement of psychology under the banner of PIRSA 
– great men those – left deep imprints in psychology – but la Grange was for one or other 
reason – we felt we must also have a commander. This [is what] we saw in Prof la Grange. In 
                                                                    
60 The Broederbond was established in 1918 as a secret males-only organization concerned with the 
promotion of Afrikaner interests. 
61 Dreyer Kruger interview, April 15, 1982, pp. 1-3. Translated from the original Afrikaans. 
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his gentle, shrinking manner he eventually joined us – I think he was also our first president – 
I think of him [having] great authority.62 
For Robbertse – who had resigned his SAPA membership already in 1959 – the reason 
behind PIRSA‟s breakaway was clear: 
That time with the old SAPA – it reached a point that you can only describe as – the affair had 
now stagnated – stagnation over what then sounded strange [is] today not so strange, [but it] 
was the strange ideology – the whole color question again entered the thing – actually took 
over as it were – [I] do not really want to mention names.63 
A.S. Roux was of the same view: 
You know why we founded PIRSA: the SAPA meetings wasted an incredible amount of time 
through emotional outbursts, through lecturers at English-language universities that dragged 
politics into psychology and we later saw we were making no progress.64 
 Whereas Kruger described PIRSA‟s formation as shot through with politics, 
Robbertse and Roux insisted that whatever politicking there was, came from SAPA‟s side.65 
Robbertse, in particular, drew on the haunting Afrikaner perorati n on British persecution: 
SAPA‟s English members had thwarted Afrikaner interests once again, relegating the long-
suffering Boers to the ranks of obscurity. As for la Grange, he found himself in what must 
have been an awkward situation. Appointed as SAPA‟s first president in 1948, he was the 
patriarch of South African psychology but was also identified as possessing the necessary 
gravitas for advancing PIRSA‟s nascent mission. Notwithstanding his belief that “I am 
personally [one] hundred percent in favor of [non-whites] being admitted”, 66  he also 
                                                                    
62 P.M. Robbertse interview, May 12, 1982, pp. 14-16. Translated from the original Afrikaans. 
63 ibid., p. 14. 
64 A.S. Roux interview, May 11, 1982, p. 2. Translated from the original Afrikaans. 
65 To the neutral observer, it may seem ironic that PIRSA blamed SAPA for digging up political hot 
potatoes. Robbertse and Roux, however, were thinking in terms of the time-honored distinction between 
volkspolitiek (people politics) and partypolitiek (party politics). During the Boer rebellion of 1915, the 
(Afrikaner) volk was divided over former Boer general and then Prime Minister Louis Botha’s decision to 
call out an Afrikaner citizen force to crush the insurrection (Moodie, 1975). Accounting for ninety percent 
of Afrikaner parishioners, the Dutch Reformed Church was walking a tightrope with some ministers 
supporting Botha and others opposing him. To hold the flock together, the Church responded by creating 
a pragmatic division between volkspolitiek and partypolitiek: the idea was that the Church would involve 
itself in community issues – such as Afrikaans-medium education and Afrikaner poverty – but would not 
presume to advise its congregation on how to vote. Whether churchmen or party politicians, for 
Broederbond members in particular, this separation of church and state was to prove crucial: “the 
political unity of Afrikanerdom required conscious differentiation between the spheres of political 
activity, church affairs, and the nascent civil religion” (ibid., p. 98). Hence, for PIRSA and its 
Broederbonders, the mistake that SAPA made was to involve itself in a ‘race’ question that belonged to 
the realm of partypolitiek. Apartheid was state policy – there was no question of psychologists interfering 
with it. 
66 Addendum to the minutes of the SAPA Council Meeting, Durban, July 15, 1960, p. 4, Raubenheimer 
archive, Stellenbosch University. Translated from the original Afrikaans. 
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expressed the view that “the intention from the start was that [SAPA] is an association for 
whites”:67 
The point is just: shouldn‟t we take our time. There are other people that think otherwise. In 
light of such a division, then, we must not be hasty. If we are hasty, we run a risk of causing a 
rift. We agree about the merits of the matter, but for me there remains the problem of the 
interpretation of the Constitution [despite it making no explicit mention of any membership 
restrictions].68 
Given la Grange‟s cautious demeanor, the contents of his presidential address at the 
inaugural PIRSA congress are remarkable, lending weight to rhetoric‟s central insight that it 
is the audience that matters. Despite his personal ambivalence regarding the racial politics of 
the day, he ended up delivering a virtuoso performance that – in the tranquil hindsight of 
posterity – embodied the quintessence of unbridled racism. But it is also likely that la Grange 
and his coterie of southerners69 had been won over after the visit to their northern colleagues 
– a meeting of considerable import when one reflects on the politics of the day.  
Deep-set fault lines continued to hamstring the ruling National Party (NP) whose 
hardliners from the Transvaal and Orange Free State clung to their “northern demonology of 
the machinations of die suidelike belange (southern interests)” (D. O'Meara, 1996, p. 90).70 
The Cape NP was accused frequently of being too liberal. It had wanted a republic within the 
British Commonwealth and, in the early sixties, appeared to support the re-enfranchisement 
of so-called „coloreds‟. Prime Minister Verwoerd was not about to take this intransigence 
lying down. In August 1961, he appointed to his cabinet the feared Cape NP secretary, P.W. 
Botha, entrusting him with the Colored Affairs portfolio. Next, in the landmark general 
elections in October that year, the NP won almost two-thirds of seats in Parliament, playing 
on white fears of African nationalism in South Africa and across the continent. Verwoerd 
dominated the NP scene in a manner hitherto unprecedented, having survived not only the 
point-blank entry of two of David Pratt's bullets into his head on April 9, 1960 but also the 
country's withdrawal from the Commonwealth on May 31, 1961. La Grange‟s change of 
heart between Stellenbosch 1961 and Pretoria 1962 reveals the stellar rise of Die 
                                                                    
67 ibid., p. 5. 
68 ibid. 
69 Born, raised and educated in the Cape, la Grange served as professor of psychology at the University of 
Pretoria from 1945 to 1953 (van der Merwe, 1977). He returned to his alma mater – Stellenbosch 
University – in 1955 to take up the Chair in Educational Psychology. He then left Stellenbosch in 1962 to 
head the research planning division of the South African Road Safety Council (SARSC). He returned to the 
University of Pretoria’s psychology department in 1968 (Matieland, 1969). 
70 Indeed, the last two battles for the country’s premiership had pitted North against South – the first in 
1954 between the ‘Lion of the North’ J.G. Strijdom and the Cape-backed candidate Nicolaas Havenga and 
the second in 1958 between H.F. Verwoerd and Eben Dönges. 
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Hollander‟s71 political stock. In psychology, as in politics, the North was well and truly in 
control – and, after a personal meeting with Verwoerd on June 12, 1962, that fact could not 
have escaped the notice of A.J. la Grange. 
ANALYSIS 
Titled The Background and Most Important Objective of the Psychological Institute of the 
Republic of South Africa, Adriaan Johannes la Grange (1962) locates his address within the 
forensic and deliberative oratorical genres. In the wake of the SAPA split, a presumably 
shaken audience would expect as much – that is, firm statements of past fact and a future 
course of action. La Grange‟s opening paragraph does not disappoint and is notable for its 
high-stakes character: 
On the occasion of the first Congress and annual meeting of our Psychological Institute, it is 
not only appropriate but even necessary that plain and unambiguous answers be formulated 
in respect of a number of fundamental questions. It is necessary for the sake of developing a 
sober self-understanding of the nature and existence of our society, as well as in consideration 
of the desirability of providing a clear image to others, friend as well as enemy, of what we 
are, where we come from and where we are heading. (1962, p. 7)72 
 Speakers are advised ordinarily to avoid antagonizing audiences and to align 
themselves with common values. The fact that la Grange does not stop to ingratiate himself 
with his listeners – he introduces his talk in a manner that would arouse hostility, wariness or 
confusion in the uninitiated – suggests a mindfulness of preaching to the converted. There is 
no need to establish common ground: one‟s mere presence in this whites-only, Afrikaner-
dominated gathering guarantees rapport between speaker and audience. Indeed, the two are 
practically indistinguishable as evidenced by la Grange‟s repeated usage of the pronouns „we‟ 
and „our‟. There are none of the politeness strategies that ordinarily accompany what under 
different circumstances would constitute a “face-threatening act” (Brown & Levinson, 1987, 
p. 60 quoted in Fairclough, 1992, p. 163). Moreover, la Grange‟s use of words like “sober”, 
“clear”, “unambiguous” and “plain” is evidence of what is known in rhetorical parlance as an 
introduction corrective (Corbett & Connors, 1999, p. 262) – deployed typically when 
speaking about misrepresented subjects and consistent with defensive positionings.73 
                                                                    
71 This moniker was a reference to Verwoerd being born in the Netherlands. 
72 All excerpts from la Grange’s address were translated from the original Afrikaans. 
73 Strümpfer describes the atmosphere at the inaugural congress: “I actually went with the rest of the 
department, all the psychologists in Potchefstroom went to that meeting and it was really a Blood River 
kind of climate. A [Reformed Church] minister who was also a psychologist opened the meeting with 
scripture readings and prayer and he read from somewhere in the New Testament where it says that 
those that are not for us are against us, that little bit. The way he prayed about all of this, we were at 
Blood River. It was a Total Onslaught kind of meeting that he opened” (Nell, 1993, p. 35). (In 1838, the 
Voortrekkers defeated the Zulu king, Dingaan, at Blood River. Thousands of Zulu soldiers were killed with 
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 La Grange sets himself the task of addressing three overarching issues: 
I. What are the deep-seated factors that led to the formation of a society like PIRSA? 
II. What are the psychological principles of our basic policy of separate societies for 
different racial groups? 
III. What are the most important immediate objectives to which PIRSA should apply 
itself? (1962, p. 7) 
In answering the first question, la Grange argues that there is a “natural need for self-
protection against a worldwide, hysterical mass movement for equalization that is also busy 
steering some of our own people off course” (ibid.). He contends that this impulse for self-
preservation represents “the sane opposition against the irrational manner in which some 
western nations disregard the basic facts and devastating consequences of racial integration” 
(ibid.). La Grange reasons that the establishment of PIRSA represents “the natural striving for 
self-realization that forms the stimulus for the healthy development of every self-respecting 
individual as well as for every self-respecting people or nation” (ibid.). He repeatedly 
nominalizes processes when he speaks of “self-protection”, “opposition”, “self-realization” 
and “development”, which is typical of scientific language (Fairclough, 1992, p. 179). By 
turning “concretes into abstracts” (ibid., p. 182), he does not have to explain how the “self-
protection”, “self-realization” and “development” of whites living in apartheid South Africa 
are actually achieved, namely, by brutalizing blacks in every detail of their lives. Distinct 
from Strijdom‟s doctrine of white baasskap (domination), la Grange adopts an attenuated 
Verwoerdian idiom of „separate freedoms‟ that is mindful of anticolonial and independence 
movements sweeping through the developing world (see D. O'Meara, 1996). 
 With each justification for PIRSA‟s existence, la Grange directs an appeal to the 
reasonableness of his audience (logos) by portraying racial equality as nonsensical. But he 
has also expressed the rationale for what Verwoerd had begun calling the policy of “separate 
freedoms” (D. O'Meara, 1996, p. 107). In May 1959, when the Minister of Native Affairs, 
Daan de Wet Nel, introduced the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill to Parliament, he 
articulated formally these touchstones of apartheid thinking: first, the existence of an 
inviolable, God-given calling for every volk (ethnic group); second, the volk‟s right to self-
preservation; and third, its self-actualization through segregation from other ethnic groups 
(Moodie, 1975; D. O'Meara, 1996). La Grange succeeds intertextually in binding PIRSA to 
the political agenda of the state. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
no loss of life on the Voortrekker side. The victory was seen as proof of God’s Will that the Afrikaners exist 
as an independent people.) 
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On the other hand, he points out that 
[t]he allegation that is frequently heard that the policy of racial separation is based on white 
fears that they will be devoured by the numerical superiority of non-whites… is evidently an 
utterly naïve and inaccurate manner of stating the matter…. If the whites were no good for 
anything other than being devoured by the encircling masses, why should they be afraid of 
their destruction? (1962, p. 8) 
La Grange knows that white fear is a flimsy rationale for apartheid rule. He proceeds to 
metaphorize whiteness as threatened by a rapacious blackness, building into the metaphor a 
hyperbolic trope (Corbett & Connors, 1999, p. 403) that makes white fear seem 
preposterous.74 Besides, the state-sponsored policy of separate development has nothing to do 
with emotions (i.e. irrationality) and everything to do with a discourse of reasonableness – 
“natural striving”, “self-protection”, “sane opposition” and the like. The foregoing passage 
merely underscores the self-evident truth of apartheid rationality by ending with an 
unanswerable question that negates attempts to locate the essence of hiteness at the lower-
end of the food chain (see Billig, 1996). That is, la Grange‟s refutation (confutatio) is 
submitted by means of a logical appeal (logos) in which the terms of reference for whiteness 
are disputed in a manner that supports his general argument. Where fear is admitted, “if there 
is such a thing… [it is] at the prospect of our striving being impeded and that, instead of 
mental health, prosperity and happiness, we [end up having to] pick the bitter fruits of mental 
disturbance, social decay and the sorrows of an unhappy and miserable existence” (1962, p. 
8). And under such conditions, fear is a justifiable response.  
To analyze la Grange‟s strategy differently, he proves his point by making use of an 
abbreviated syllogism, or enthymeme. 75  In order to contest the charge that whites fear 
destruction, he resorts to a shortened argumentative form that, if spelt out in full, would read 
as follows: 
All people that exist only to be devoured do not fear their destruction (Premise A). 
Whites exist only to be devoured (Premise B). 
Therefore, whites do not fear their destruction (Conclusion). 
The argumentative form in itself is valid. What la Grange wants to reveal, though, is the 
specious reasoning of PIRSA‟s opponents. He concedes the “utterly naïve” belief expressed 
                                                                    
74 Metaphors exert a powerful influence not only on the way people think, but also on how they act 
(Fairclough, 1992, pp. 194-195). 
75 What makes enthymemes different from syllogisms is that they trade in probabilities rather than 
certainties, exchanging strict logic for “the province of rhetoric” (Corbett & Connors, 1999, p. 63). 
Moreover, because enthymemes are difficult to spot, those probabilities are taken up frequently as 
certainties. 
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in Premise B – but only for the purpose of demonstrating the desired Conclusion. The implied 
premise (A) he excises for the audience‟s convenience (Corbett & Connors, 1999). Yet it is 
this major premise – not mentioning the minor one – that is open to contestation. Are there 
people that exist only to be “devoured” and, if there are, do they never fear “destruction”?  
On the subject of “racial mixing”, la Grange says it would enjoy the “wholehearted 
support of all reasonable people” if its goal were “the attainment of a clear and meritorious 
objective for the promotion of human joy and peace between the members of different races” 
(1962, p. 9). As for the empirical findings on interracial contact, however, “we find precisely 
the opposite” (p. 10). La Grange quotes extensively from William McDougall‟s Group Mind 
and Kenneth Little‟s Race and Society, citing evidence of the deleterious fallouts resulting 
from racial integration in Brazil, India and Hawaii. He concludes that human felicity depends 
on “obedience to the demands of the elementary natural law that brings together those who 
on the basis of common inborn characteristics belong together” (p. 12). An instance of 
manifest intertextuality, the resemblance of this passage to the former Prime Minister D.F. 
Malan‟s celebrated aphorism – “Bring together what, through inner conviction, belongs 
together” – situates la Grange once again within the confines of Afrikaner nationalist 
discourse. 
 Drawing on John Carothers‟ The African Mind in Health and Society, la Grange 
argues that racial integration policies obstruct the root-taking of normal identification 
processes fundamental to the “natural striving for self-realization.” He summarizes 
Carothers‟ position on the African experience of integration as one in which “[t]he greater the 
contact with white civilization, the more frequent the occurrence of mental illnesses” (pp. 12-
13). La Grange reasons that “a state of tension and psychical conflict is initiated in the non-
whites…. In its turn this impairment of the personality core led to a lowering of the resistance 
threshold against tension and the result is loss of personal identity and eventually neurotic or 
psychotic breakdown” (p. 13). By focusing on the psychological sequelae of racial integration 
among non-whites, la Grange deploys the technique of prolepsis (Billig, 1996, p. 269), 
forestalling possible objections by turning to the authority of science. He is using a hidden 
disclaimer that, if it were to be repeated out loud, would sound something like, “I‟m not 
racist – but the facts of racial integration speak for themselves.” And, because he makes the 
case for other racial groups to establish their own psychological societies for the sake of their 
mental health, he legitimates PIRSA‟s existence further. Over and above its other virtues, 
apartheid is an ethical policy that guarantees the survival and development of all groups in a 
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veelvolkigge (multi-ethnic) polity. In fact, “[o]nly those who for one or other reason refuse to 
be themselves or refuse to accept themselves will refuse to accept the principle of separate 
societies for separate racial groups” (1962, p. 13). As the product of science and ethics, la 
Grange‟s logos is difficult to overturn. 
 He then turns to the second of the three questions: the psychological principles that 
underpin the state‟s policy of separate development. As with much of his speech, la Grange 
continues to work intertextually, in this case referencing a text “only in order to contest and 
reject” it (Fairclough, 1992, p. 122). He opposes Otto Klineberg‟s view that “we simply do 
not know how or why [racial differences] arose in the first place” by second-guessing 
Klineberg‟s scientific standing and asserting that he contradicts himself in his argument. 
Whether la Grange‟s attack on Klineberg had anything to do with the latter‟s reservations 
about South Africa‟s future admittance to the International Union of Scientific Psychology, 
cannot be determined (Dumont & Louw, 2001). Even so, la Grange is not Afrikanerdom‟s 
typical ideologue: though he may declare the only “true” Christians to be Afrikaners, he takes 
the trouble of addressing himself to someone of Klineberg‟s eminence. Despite PIRSA‟s 
laager mentality, la Grange signals his ongoing affiliation with the international 
psychological community. 
How on earth can a person reconcile it if a „scientist‟ like Klineberg gives the assurance that 
we do not know how or why differences between races arose, but in the same breath says that 
he is certain that the differences are not due to racial differences, in other words that 
inherited factors play no role therein? (1962, p. 15) 
 The charge of inconsistency is a rhetorical device that provides grounds for refutation. 
La Grange proceeds to quote Carl Jung for whom “resistances to psychological 
enlightenment are based in large measure on fear” (ibid.). That is, Klineberg‟s oversight is 
the result of fear: it is not Afrikaners that are afraid but supporters of “the superficial 
American psychometric-statistical approach” (p. 16). Drawing on Jung‟s concept of a 
collective unconscious, la Grange then theorizes an unbridgeable divide that separates the 
two-thousand-year-long evolution of Western Christianity from “[t]he Christian-conditioned 
primitive person [who] in the long run cannot satisfy the higher requirements of the true 
Christian civilization” (ibid.). “True” Christianity, meanwhile, is to be distinguished from 
what is practiced in Western Europe, since “[p]erhaps it is a fact that western Europe indeed 
was never truly Christian” (ibid.). In disputing the essence of Christianity, la Grange uses 
dissociation to separate its „true‟ and „false‟ forms (Billig, 1996, p. 181), before delivering his 
coup de grace that casts in stone the impossibility of racial integration: 
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Who knows! But one thing is certain: If it is true that two thousand years were too few for the 
true Christianity to take root in the deepest core of the western person, how can we ever 
(humanly speaking) assume that a period of two or three centuries will suffice for it to take 
root in the deepest core of Africa‟s barbarism? (la Grange, 1962, p. 17) 
La Grange concludes his address by listing what he believes should be PIRSA‟s main 
objectives: the establishment of a professional board, the institution of appropriate theoretical 
and practical training facilities for all categories of psychologists, and the provision of 
assistance to other racial groups seeking to form their own psychological societies. Foremost, 
however, are “the urgent demands [presented by] the social questions that at a national level 
are coming stronger to the fore… [and] that are busy threatening on a large scale the 
foundations of our continued national existence” (ibid.). For la Grange, these issues include 
alcoholism, traffic accidents and road safety, family disintegration, national mental health, 
moral decay and youth criminality.  
 In sum, la Grange provides natural, psychological, ethical and religious justifications 
for the existence of a whites-only association, implying that SAPA‟s racial integration runs 
counter to the cosmic order. He fixes PIRSA‟s mission to matters of „social relevance‟, 
inaugurating the new association not as a learned society where knowledge is to be shared 
and enjoyed for its own sake, but as a forum in which psychological expertise should be 
brought to bear on the national affairs of the day. With the country on the brink of 
obliteration, South Africa is dependent c nsequently on PIRSA‟s “service orientation” 
(Strümpfer, 1993, p. 6). La Grange again: 
It is my heartfelt wish that PIRSA, out of the strength of its will to live and serve, will grow 
into an institution that will earn the recognition and love not only of its own people but also of 
its other-raced [anderrassige] fellow citizens who, through its benefaction, [will] fulfill 
themselves in happiness and independence in their own associations in service to their own 
people. (1962, p. 18) 
DISCUSSION 
Reflecting on the consequences of the SAPA-PIRSA split, SAPA‟s first secretary, Daan 
Swiegers, suggests that it ended up dividing the academy: 
The English universities have a different… thought pattern…. If you speak to the guys at Wits 
or UCT [University of Cape Town] or Natal, they communicate in the first instance 
scientifically with the outside world.  They do research that is internationally relevant – their 
audience is in the world out there. The Afrikaans universities… [their] activities are more 
South African-oriented – what is done here will not for example get an ear in the outside 
world.76 
                                                                    
76 Daan Swiegers and Wynand Herholdt joint interview, May 1982, p. 12. Translated from the original 
Afrikaans. 
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One reading of la Grange‟s positioning of psychology at the service of an imperiled nation 
will describe it as typical of an Afrikaner sentiment that values service to the volk more than 
anything. The Afrikaner psyche was hypervigilant when it came to the preservation of its 
group. Built up over centuries, this unique sensitivity spanned, inter alia, the survival fears of 
early slave-owners concerned about disruptions to the ready flow of human cattle, the 
apprehensions of burghers at the frontier worried about the „barbarization‟ of their offspring, 
the peaceful revolt of the Voortrekkers (1836–1884) against the perceived threats of 
gelykstelling (social leveling) and cultural assimilation, the catastrophic reversals of the 
Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) and the pernicious decades-long consequences of the 
volk‟s subsequent urbanization – sympathetically termed the „poor white problem‟ (Giliomee, 
2003).  
 As had been the case for much of its history, survival remained the leitmotif of the 
mid-twentieth century volk. Three centuries had not dulled its frontier mentality: there were 
democrats, republicans, anarchists, atheists and rooi gespuis („red scum‟) all of whom NP 
security policy from the sixties onwards would deem enemies of the state (D. O'Meara, 
1996). La Grange is in survival mode when he catalogues “the social questions… that are 
busy threatening on a large scale the foundations of our continued national existence” (1962, 
p. 17). As countless others before him had done, he reminds his audience that they inhabit the 
“southern extremity of Africa” (p. 8), accentuating intertextually the precariousness of the 
divine Afrikaner calling.77 Chastened in a crucible of successive tribulations, la Grange‟s volk 
remains in need of practical solutions rather than obscure meanderings. For, just as the 
exigencies of life in the New World had given birth to American pragmatism, the perpetually 
endangered volk is not about to fiddle while Pretoria burns. Chronicling the beginnings of 
American civilization, Boorstin (1958, pp. 5-6) writes of how 
[t]he Puritans in the Wilderness – away from Old World centers of learning, far from great 
university libraries, threatened daily by the thousand and one hardships and perils of a 
savage America – were poorly situated for elaborating a theology and disputing its fine 
points. For such an enterprise John Calvin in Switzerland or William Ames in Holland was 
much better located…. So it was that although the Puritans in the New World made the 
                                                                    
77 For example, D.F. Malan opines about how God “[i]n his wisdom… determined that on the southern 
point of Africa, the dark continent, a People should be born who would be the bearer of Christian culture 
and civilization” (Die Transvaler, December 16, 1942 quoted in Moodie, 1975, p. 248). Elsewhere, 
Broederbond chairman Joon van Rooy interprets the God-given uniqueness of “the Afrikaner People [as 
assisting them to] fulfill a particular calling and destiny here in the southern corner of Africa” (Die Burger, 
October 11, 1944 quoted in Moodie, 1975, p. 110). And again, this time in a newspaper editorial: “The Day 
of the Covenant is indeed the day of inspiration for the People. It is the day upon which the heart-strings 
of the People are tuned in harmony with the great Divine Plan here on the southern point of Africa” (Die 
Transvaler, December 15, 1945 quoted in Moodie, 1975, p. 21). 
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Calvinist theology their point of departure, they made it precisely that and nothing else. From 
it they departed at once into the practical life. 
According to Peter Lambley, although 
Afrikaners today go to church more than most people… the kind of immoral boer society [of 
centuries past] still persists today. Religion, values and the like are changed and used today 
according to the demands of the state, just as they were by the frontier boers in the nineteenth 
century. (1980, pp. 209, 214) 
He remarks caustically that “[i]f the trekboers [nomadic pastoralists] had strictly applied the 
embargoes advocated by Calvinism on immorality – gambling, drinking, gossiping and 
dancing – their social lives would have quickly come to an end for there was little else to do 
but gambling, drinking, gossiping and dancing” (ibid., p. 20). In a more charitable tone, 
Jonathan Jansen argues that, as an ethnic minority, Afrikaners in contemporary South Africa 
remain a “pragmatic” community with a history of adjusting themselves to difficult 
circumstances (2009, pp. 237-238). 78  In fact, as far back as 1918, N.J. Brummer had 
eulogized  
[t]he Afrikaner [as] utilitarian. „Useful‟ is his favourite word. Everything is judged according 
to its usefulness for living. The Afrikaner will therefore not do any science for science‟s sake, 
but because it can be of service to him. The Afrikaner university will therefore have to strive 
above all to make the student suitable for the more responsible positions in society. 
(Brummer, 1918, p. 197 quoted in J. Louw, 1986a, p. 81) 
 There are several problems that arise when taking the notion of Afrikaner pragmatism 
too literally. For one, it leans heavily on the kind of cultural essentialism that dominated 
racist NP discourse. Second, the idea of an historically monolithic Afrikaner nation, 
positively identifiable across four centuries, leads inevitably to debates about „invented 
communities‟ that have troubled historians in recent years. Third, if Afrikaners were really so 
pragmatic, one would have expected them to have seen the political writing on the wall 
considerably earlier than they eventually did – that they did not, was due to differing degrees 
of pragmatism in the NP, with the realists in the Cape offsetting the insular die-hards of the 
North. And fourth, when linking American to Afrikaner pragmatism, it is important to keep 
in mind that, conceptually, the philosophical pragmatism of the former is a different prospect 
to having merely a practical outlook on life.  
 To explain more adequately the „service orientation‟ of Afrikaner psychology, one 
needs to look beyond oversimplified ideas about group traits in the direction of Christian-
National ideology, the evolution of which signaled a significant departure from previous 
                                                                    
78 Jansen cites the immortalization of Afrikaner adaptability in the Afrikaans language through the saying, 
“’n Boer maak ’n plan” – that is, “An Afrikaner will make a plan.” 
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versions of Afrikaner nationalism. When General Hertzog and his NP followers „fused‟ 
controversially with Jan Smuts‟ South African Party to form the United Party (UP) in 1934, it 
was only the NP‟s Cape branch that was left relatively unscathed. In the affected provinces of 
the north, however, a key group of young urban Broederbond intellectuals took the lead in 
defining gesuiwerde (purified) Afrikaner nationalism. The problem around which their 
deliberations converged was the armblanke vraagstuk (poor white question) of the 1920s and 
1930s. The devastations of the Anglo-Boer War and the lost Republics were no longer their 
explicit points of reference (D. O'Meara, 1996) – rather, it was the adaptive difficulties of 
Afrikaners in relation to capitalist agriculture and growing industrialization that galvanized 
their efforts. In its joint findings, the Carnegie-funded commission of inquiry into the poor 
white question reported that  
[l]ong-continued economic equality of poor whites and the great mass of non-Europeans, and 
propinquity of their dwellings, tend to bring them to social equality. This impairs the tradition 
which counteracts miscegenation, and the social line of colour division is noticeably 
weakening. (Grosskopf, 1932, p. xx) 
 The future existence of a discrete Afrikaner nation hung in the balance. In the hands 
of these young intellectuals, the emerging doctrine elevated above everything the idea of 
volksgebondenheid (ethnic solidarity): 
… the belief that ties of blood and volk come first, and that the individual existed only in and 
through the nation. The volk, rather than the individual, was the divinely ordained basic unit 
of social organisation. Individuals could realise their „true‟ selves and social potential only in 
identification with and service to the volk. (D. O'Meara, 1996, p. 41) 
South Africa was the divinely ordained homeland of an Afrikaner nation, charged with the 
sacred task of establishing a Calvinist republic and liberated from the chains of British 
imperialism, „Hoggenheimer‟ 79  capitalism and godless communism. But despite the 
meticulous articulation of Christian-National dogma during “the 1930s and 1940s [it] was an 
almost purely intellectual affair, conducted in the inner circles of party, press, Broederbond 
and church. The broad mass of Afrikaans-speakers displayed scant interest in these abstruse 
philosophical/theological debates” (ibid., pp. 41-42). Most Afrikaners still voted for 
Hertzog‟s UP in 1938 and did so once more in 1943 – notwithstanding the ruling party‟s 
support of Britain during the war. It was only after accommodating Christian-National 
ideology to the lived experiences of Afrikaners throughout the country that gains were made. 
During the forties, by appealing to “the economic disadvantages of speaking Afrikaans in an 
                                                                    
79  An anti-Semitic reference to the imperialist-capitalist connection in the South African Party, 
‘Hoggenheimer’ was a cartoon character in the Afrikaans-language daily, Die Burger, and was “English-
speaking, imperialist, and clearly Jewish” (Moodie, 1975, p. 15). 
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Anglophone-controlled economy, under a government minimally concerned with the fate of 
the Afrikaans language” (ibid., p. 42), the Broederbond launched a highly effective 
economic-cultural-educational mobilization campaign that targeted emerging Afrikaner 
business and labor via a proliferation of civic associations.80  
 For its part, the NP – once it had gotten its house in order – capitalized on the new 
broad-based alliance by preaching an intoxicating doctrine of Afrikaner exclusivism that 
would have found favor with an audience defined as oppressed by virtue of being Afrikaner. 
Indeed, it won the 1948 polls – albeit narrowly – because of this fledgling Afrikaner 
volksbeweging (people‟s movement). Before the elections, the NP had downplayed its 
republican ambitions: within the party and beyond, the republican manifesto was not 
unanimously supported and threatened the greater good of volkseenheid (people‟s unity). It 
decided instead to run its campaign by focusing on consensus-driven issues, namely, mother-
tongue education, the communist threat (“rooi gevaar”) and apartheid, interpreting each 
through the lens of Christian-Nationalism. While the election victory could be explained in 
terms of the changing support bases of Smuts‟ UP and Malan‟s NP, the former‟s political 
ineptitude and considerable post-war social changes (D. O'Meara, 1996), it owed as much to 
Christian-National ideology, Broederbond support and, still, the civil theology (Moodie, 
1975). 
 Following the NP‟s upset victory, this theology took even more of a backseat as the 
party went about broadening its support base. Consequently, neither of its first two prime 
ministers – the “convinced republican” D.F. Malan (1948-1954) and the “fiery republican” 
J.G. Strijdom (1954-1958) – made much noise about declaring a republic (Moodie, 1975, p. 
282). The republican ideal had been central to Afrikaner civil theology since its enunciation 
by Paul Kruger, president of the South African (Transvaal) Republic from 1881 to 1900. 
Although the civil religion did not represent at the outset all of Afrikanerdom, “conceived as 
a constellation of symbols [it was] held fairly universally and consistently by Afrikaners at 
least since the end of the Anglo-Boer War in 1902” (ibid., p. 295). Afrikaner civil religion 
was rooted in the sacred history of the volk that was, in the words of Malan, 
… nothing other than the greatest artwork of the centuries. We have a right to this nationhood 
because it was given to us by the Architect of the universe. The aim of the Architect was the 
formation of a new nation among the nations of the world… A miracle has occurred in the last 
hundred years, a miracle behind which must lie a divine plan. The history of the Afrikaner 
                                                                    
80 Moodie notes in passing James Luther Adams’ observation that “Calvinism encourages the formation of 
voluntary associations” (1975, p. 106). 
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signifies resoluteness and a determination, which leaves a person feeling that Afrikanerdom is 
not the work of people but the creation of God. (Malan, 1964, pp. 235-236)81 
 The “miracle” to which Malan was referring, was the epic tale of survival of a 
persecuted Afrikaner community. Against all odds, the volk had weathered eighteenth-
century Dutch East India Company oppression, nineteenth-century British liberalism and 
Anglicization policies, the Slagtersnek gallows of 1815, the Kaffir War of 1834, the 
treacherous murders of Piet Retief and his deputation at Blaauwkrantz, the successive British 
annexations of the Natalia, Orange Free State and Transvaal Republics, the deaths of 26 000 
Afrikaner women and children in British concentration camps, the death-in-exile of Paul 
Kruger and the martyrdom of Jopie Fourie. In short, Afrikaner sacred history was “made up 
of two cycles of suffering and death – the Great Trek and the Anglo-Boer War” (Moodie, 
1975, p. 12). But although the suffering was redemptive, “the logic of Christian theodicy 
[did] not rest alone in the notion of suffering for righteousness‟ sake” and provided for a 
much-anticipated resurrection (ibid., p. 13). Just as the Groot Trek had culminated in the 
foundation of the Afrikaner republics, the woes of the Anglo-Boer War would eventually be 
transformed into “a republican second coming” (ibid., p. 14). God had brought Afrikanerdom 
to the Promised Land and would do so again. 
 Resisting the allure of its republican ideals, the NP busied itself with the consolidation 
of its still tenuous hold on power: the civil religion lost its place to pragmatism and 
bureaucratization while the Broederbond became better known for reserving baantjies vir 
boeties (jobs for pals) (ibid., p. 102; D. O'Meara, 1996, p. 44). Nonetheless, the 1950s and 
1960s would prove the highpoint for Christian-Nationalism, while the task of exploiting it in 
the service of apartheid policy fell to H.F. Verwoerd and the Afrikaner intellectual elite.  
 To be sure, by the mid-1940s, the Christian-National exegesis of Afrikaner sacred 
history was already the standard version of the civil religion. In 1944, then Broederbond 
chairman Joon van Rooy summed up Christian-National philosophy in a speech delivered in 
Stellenbosch: 
In every People in the world is embodied a Divine Idea and the task of each People is to build 
upon that Idea and to perfect it. So God created the Afrikaner People with a unique language, 
a unique philosophy of life, and their own history and tradition in order that they might fulfill 
a particular calling and destiny here in the southern corner of Africa. We must stand guard on 
all that is peculiar to us and build upon it. We must believe that God has called us to be 
servants of his righteousness in this place. We must walk the way of obedience to faith… (Die 
Burger, October 11, 1944 quoted in Moodie, 1975, pp. 110-111) 
                                                                    
81 Translated from the original Afrikaans. 
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It had also been decided in that year‟s Volkskongres of the Broederbond-inspired Federasie 
van Afrikaner Kultuurorganisasies (F.A.K.) that  
… it is in the interest of both the white and non-white in South Africa that a policy of 
apartheid be followed so that non-white ethnic groups will also have the opportunity to 
develop according to their own nature, in their own area, and ultimately to obtain full control 
over their own affairs there. (Inspan, October 1944 quoted ibid., p. 263) 
It was the Christian-National responsibility of whites that they enter into a relationship of 
trusteeship with non-whites, acting as guardians until the latter had attained a sufficient level 
of maturity to administer their affairs independently (Dubow, 1995): 
In order to give the natives sufficient opportunities freely to realize their national aspirations, 
they must be provided with separate areas which will be administered and developed initially 
for them and eventually by them as self-ruling native areas in which the whites may have no 
rights of citizenship. (Inspan, 1944 quoted in Moodie, 1975, p. 273) 
Apartheid was justified on the grounds that it was God‟s Will that “the Afrikaner… 
implement it for the well-being of black and white alike” (Moodie, 1975, p. 248). 
Correspondingly, racial integration was sinful.  
 Fifteen years after the 1944 Volkskongres, when de Wet Nel stood before Parliament 
with the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill, he would state in full the F.A.K.‟s 
conclusions, reiterating that Christian-Nationalism was as important for „the white man‟ as it 
was for „the Bantu‟. Apartheid policy no longer amounted to a purely „negative‟ defense of 
the white race against degenerative miscegenation but had a „positive‟ aspect too – the 
creation of a segregated yet prosperous and peaceful multi-racial society. With a subtle shift 
in the nomenclature, negative apartheid was transformed into Verwoerd‟s positive-sounding 
„theory of separate development.‟82  
 The evolution of Christian-Nationalism explains how, in 1962, la Grange was able to 
deny the longstanding view that the apartheid concept of „self-preservation‟ was premised on 
whites‟ annihilatory fears.83 He could even appeal to the wisdom and generosity of Christian-
National logic: not only would a non-white association preserve the mental health of its 
                                                                    
82 As prime minister, Verwoerd was alert to the Black Nationalist sentiment taking hold across the 
continent: “[We] cannot govern without taking into account the tendencies in the world and in Africa. We 
must have regard to them. We are… taking steps to ensure that we adopt a policy by which we on the one 
hand can retain for the white man full control in his areas, but by which we are giving the Bantu as our 
wards every opportunity in their areas to move along a road of development by which they can progress 
in accordance with their ability” (Pelzer, 1966, p. 243 quoted in Moodie, 1975, p. 264). 
83 The NP had come to power by reminding the electorate repeatedly of a “sea” – an “inundation” 
(oorstroming) – of blacks (D. O'Meara, 1996, p. 34). The metaphor of an unstoppable black deluge – not 
infrequently tinged with sexual anxiety – had animated the South African political landscape for decades. 
Fanon (2008) and Kamin (1993) have written about the sexualization of black identity in European and 
American contexts. 
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members, PIRSA would extend a paternalistic hand to its “other-raced [anderrassige] fellow 
citizens who, through its benefaction, [would] fulfill themselves in happiness and 
independence in their own associations in service to their own people” (la Grange, 1962, p. 
18). When la Grange listed the various sosiale vraagstukke (social problems) that warranted 
disciplinary attention, he was not only thinking as an enterprising applied scientist but was 
adumbrating the Christian-National injunction of serving the volk. His own doctoral 
supervisors had done just that some three decades earlier: Raymond Wilcocks (1932) – “the 
doyen of Psychology in South Africa, the unforgettable professor” (van der Merwe, 1977, p. 
1) – served the volk by producing the Carnegie Commission‟s psychological report on poor 
whiteism, while Verwoerd became a leading advocate on the issue, assisting in organizing the 
1934 Volkskongres.  
 In his report, Wilcocks urged the establishment of  
… a thoroughly well-equipped department of social studies at one of our South African 
Universities, where skilled social workers will be trained, and where one of South Africa‟s 
most important social problems will be assured of receiving that degree of scientific attention 
which it truly deserves. (Wilcocks, 1932, p. 181) 
The faculty at Stellenbosch University obliged by creating the country‟s first Department of 
Sociology and Social Work before the report was even published – with Wilcocks‟ former 
student, Verwoerd, at the helm (Balstad Miller, 1993). From its earliest years, la Grange‟s 
Stellenbosch University had associated itself closely with “the Afrikaner and his „struggle‟” 
(J. Louw, 1986a, p. 81). Despite h s belief in the heritability of intelligence, Wilcocks 
inclined towards environmental causes when it came to the substandard test performances of 
poor white children – evidence of his sensitivity to Afrikaner nationalist claims (Dubow, 
1995). As professor of applied psychology, Verwoerd opened the 1929 academic year by 
reiterating the university‟s mission, namely, the preparation of the student for a vocational 
life – which meant serving the volk (J. Louw, 1986a).84 Indeed, this study will demonstrate 
how Afrikaner psychologists advanced a discourse of volksdiens (ethnic-national service) that 
demanded not only a „socially relevant‟ discipline but, increasingly, research of „ethnic-
national relevance‟. 
 
                                                                    
84 Although Balstad Miller (1993) makes the important point that Verwoerd was not a strident Afrikaner 
nationalist during his years as an academic, she cannot account conclusively for his later conversion. At 
the very least, it seems likely that he would have been influenced to some degree by the intellectual milieu 
in which he studied and taught for almost two decades – and his 1929 address suggests as much. 
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SAPA PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1962 (B.J. SCHLEBUSCH) 
A day before la Grange, Barend Johannes Schlebusch delivered his address as SAPA 
president at the University of the Witwatersrand. A year on from the Stellenbosch debacle, 
the erstwhile University of Pretoria colleagues found themselves on opposing sides of the 
political divide. According to then council member, Deo Strümpfer, the mood at SAPA was 
one of “exhaustion” and “sadness” for, despite its terminally insoluble „race‟ question, the 
association‟s affairs had been proceeding smoothly prior to the split, particularly with regard 
to the urgent matter of professional registration (personal communication, March 10, 2012). 
PIRSA, by contrast, was on the offensive, launching an aggressive recruitment drive. A.B. 
van der Merwe had returned to Stellenbosch University‟s Department of Psychology and 
instructed his staff to join the new association‟s ranks – no questions asked. When an 
offending junior contradicted van der Merwe, he was warned after the meeting that if he 
questioned his head of department about such matters again, he would find himself on the 
margins (ibid.). Elsewhere, two of PIRSA‟s other top lieutenants – Robbertse and Bekker – 
had distributed a circular informing all civil servants in possession of at least a bachelor‟s 
degree in psychology that they had to register as PIRSA members. 
 PIRSA‟s numbers grew exponentially. In the coming years, SAPA – with its 
membership drastically reduced – would find itself in the unfamiliar position of having to 
convene its meetings in conspicuously low-profile settings. Even its archives for the ensuing 
decade-and-a-half (1963–1977) would disappear mysteriously. Its one-time secretary, Dev 
Griesel, remarks blandly in a lette  to the director of the National Library of South Africa: 
We do not publish the proceedings of our annual congresses. Persons who attend the congress 
and our own members receive a copy of the summaries of papers read at the congress but in 
no way is this a publication.85 
Few could have predicted the rapid decline in SAPA‟s fortunes or, for that matter, that la 
Grange would write Schlebusch‟s obituary eight years on from the split. Since 1948, SAPA 
had been run more or less by Afrikaners: the English universities of Natal, the Witwatersrand 
and especially Cape Town had never taken much interest in the association‟s activities (K. 
Danziger, personal communication, March 8, 2012). 86  As a result, the mass exodus of 
Afrikaner psychologists in 1962 was a significant setback not only for the SAPA leadership 
but for its administration too. Along with Strümpfer, Bob Schlebusch was one of a handful of 
Afrikaners who withstood considerable pressure to remain with SAPA. Schlebusch, however, 
                                                                    
85 Dated February 20, 1979, National Library of South Africa, Cape Town. 
86 This contradicts Robbertse’s claim regarding the position of Afrikaner psychologists within SAPA 
(quoted above): “We didn’t count – we were nowhere.” 
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was in the unenviable position of finding himself its new president, the inheritor of a 
fractured and demoralized society. Nothing like the la Grange of 1962, he was no vuurvreter 
(firebrand), but while his fellow members were keen to put the recent debacle to bed, 
Schlebusch was not quite done. 
ANALYSIS  
Schlebusch (1963) begins his address by thanking the audience for doing him the honor of 
electing him the fourth president of SAPA. Unlike his counterpart – who petitions the logos 
of the PIRSA audience – Schlebusch, in his opening remarks, harnesses the attentions of his 
constituency through ingratiation, invoking his ethos as speaker. He accomplishes this, first, 
by expressing his gratitude to an approving audience; second, by pledging his loyalty to an 
association made vulnerable by a bitter secession; and third, by paying his respects to a 
former SAPA luminary (and leading member of the breakaway party) whose position he has 
just assumed: 
I have attempted and will continue to strive to serve the interests of the association to the best 
of my ability. To our retired president, Prof A.B. van der Merwe, although no longer a 
member of the association, on behalf of you I would like to extend our heartfelt thanks for the 
competent manner in which he furthered the interests and goals of the association and wish 
him the best for the future. (p. 3)87 
Ethical appeals are common when faced with an ambivalent audience: by appealing to the 
goodness of one‟s character and will, the listener is more inclined to being influenced by 
other logical (logos) and emotional (pathos) appeals (Corbett & Connors, 1999). 
 Unexpectedly, Schlebusch then informs his listeners that he will not, after all, be 
delivering a presidential address: 
At a conference on group dynamics in Leicester, England, it occurred to me how all the 
speakers began by saying that it was practically impossible to discuss such a broad subject in 
such a short time. I became so obstreperous about this that when I myself was allotted half an 
hour for a certain subject, I began by saying that I actually only need fifteen minutes for the 
subject but will at least attempt to devote half an hour to it. I am afraid that this is becoming 
true today. While I wanted to deliver a presidential address, because of the almost 
unbelievable convergence of events, the time to develop it was lacking. Instead of working on 
an address on psychodynamics, I had to be satisfied with a substitute and had to ask the 
congress‟s organizing committee to present it simply as „The president speaks.‟ I would like to 
apologize for this and express a few thoughts about the possible contribution of literature to 
psychological study. (1963, p. 3) 
 It is not immediately clear how the interpretation of this passage should proceed. 
Schlebusch resorts to what Corbett and Connors call an introduction narrative (1999, p. 263): 
he uses the anecdotal lead-in as he attempts to pique the audience‟s interest in his subject, 
                                                                    
87 Schlebusch’s address was delivered in Afrikaans. 
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although the anecdote itself is laced with humor and disappointment. As for what it is that 
can possibly have upset Schlebusch on this occasion, he does not tell, but that he is perturbed 
is communicated through the admission that he did not have sufficient opportunity to pen a 
presidential address. He makes mention of “the almost unbelievable convergence of events” 
that robbed him of the requisite time but stops short of giving details – though his use of the 
definite article suggests that his audience is privy to the nature of these events anyway. While 
la Grange is willing to air the dirty laundry in public, Schlebusch offers only an obliquely 
disapproving reference to the bitterness of recent months. Instead, he resorts to pedantries by 
explaining how he approached the organizing committee to recast his address as „The 
president speaks‟. And then he apologizes for no clear reason. Perhaps he feels guilty for 
claiming to feel honored by the society while appearing simultaneously to distance himself 
from the very position with which has been honored. Perhaps he feels he has let his audience 
down, which has gathered in troubled days in anticipation of a reassuring presidential 
statement rather than “a few thoughts.” Perhaps he is apologizing for wanting to talk about 
literature, rather than psychodynamics, at the single most important event on the society‟s 
calendar. Or perhaps the audience – well aware of “the almost unbelievable convergence of 
events” – already knows what the apology is for.  
 Schlebusch now moves on to the narratio (statement of fact) by citing the founding of 
Wundt‟s laboratory in 1879 as a milestone in the development of the discipline, 
acknowledging how psychology in its early days adopted an empirical-scientific perspective 
modeled on the physical sciences: 
No one will find fault with this, and everyone will agree that this development was absolutely 
necessary and will become even more necessary in the future. (1963, p. 4) 
Proceeding to the confutatio (refutation) by logical appeal, he draws attention to the fact that,  
with the main and almost singular emphasis on this [empirical-scientific perspective], another 
equally important aspect was frequently pushed to the background. I am referring to the fact 
that a person can also think scientifically – your thoughts can be subjected to the objectivity 
that is demanded in the execution of an experiment. (ibid.) 
Schlebusch argues against a narrow empiricism that does not allow for the investigation of 
“subtle behavioral expressions… [and] frequently prevents an analysis of the deeper-seated 
psychodynamics of the individual” (p. 4). Describing the intricacies of the psychotherapeutic 
encounter, he insists that 
[i]f a scientifically-schooled mind observes [patient and therapist behavior] the subjective 
observation and the observation of the subjective can indeed be objective and scientific. (p. 5) 
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For his confirmatio (proof), Schlebusch praises the work of the novelist Thomas Mann for its 
astute observations on the nature of grief. But this serves merely to justify the main focus of 
his talk, namely, literary depictions of social conformity, to which he now “brings to bear „all 
the available means of persuasion‟ to support the cause he is espousing” (Corbett & Connors, 
1999, p. 11).  
 After reading Schlebusch‟s full address, one wonders why he does not simply title it 
„The consequences of majority influence‟. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, just as 
he shuns direct reference to the politics of the SAPA-PIRSA schism, Schlebusch is clearing 
the decks for an allegorical attack on volksgebondenheid – that is, the Afrikaner group 
solidarity that hastened the split. Seeing as there are still a number of Afrikaners in the 
audience – least of all himself – he does not name the object of his assault directly. He is, 
after all, the president of Anglophone SAPA: any criticism of Afrikanerdom will likely 
offend even dissident Afrikaners if it is perceived as originating in the outgroup (Louw-
Potgieter, 1986 cited in Billig, 1996). Instead, he executes the face-threatening act by using 
an off record strategy, retaining his politeness by saying things in a roundabout way (Brown 
& Levinson, 1987, p. 60 quoted in Fairclough, 1992, p. 164). He accomplishes this by 
expressing an undirected dissatisfaction with the latter-day “domination of the group” in 
which “slavery and autocracy” have reappeared parading themselves as “freedom”, but 
because of the dissimulation, embody an even stronger form of “utter bondage” (Schlebusch, 
1963, p. 6): 
Whereas the individual formed the group to protect himself, the group became the monster 
that used the individual to protect itself. (ibid.) 
Drawing on Riesman‟s The Lonely Crowd, Schlebusch describes the outcome as a 
“dependence on the group… [that] led to standardization and inflexibility not only of 
behavior but also of thought and creative activities” (ibid.). It is Colin Wilson‟s “cult of the 
ordinary chap” (p. 7) that has snatched the accolades while Ayn Rand‟s protagonists – “being 
rebellious purely for the sake of rebellion” (p. 8) – are hardly heroes at all. Although he 
criticizes Rand‟s depiction of heroism, Schlebusch appears sympathetic to the objectivist 
philosophy that 
the great inventor and creator should not be motivated by the needs of his fellow people but by 
his search for the truth, by vision, strength and courage that springs from his own spirit. 
(ibid.) 
He asks the audience to consider whether in fact “this tyranny of the group” (ibid.) has gained 
such a foothold that the age of heroes – individuals in the truest sense – has passed.  
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 The extensive use of nominalizations – “domination of the group”, “standardization 
and inflexibility”, “this tyranny of the group” – allows Schlebusch to register his point from 
afar without having to wade into the messiness of SAPA-PIRSA politics. It is the individual – 
the hero – that he wishes to rescue from this state of affairs, which is why 
psychologists must make greater use of novels with the specific goal of using the shrewd 
observations of the writer for training [themselves] in observation and especially for further 
interpretation…. Changes in the social structure, as mentioned, and the individual‟s reaction 
thereto, are frequently reflected first in the works of great writers. (p. 9, added emphasis) 
And yet, for Schlebusch, Rand‟s account of her heroes‟ internal conflicts is inadequate. 
Accordingly,  
[t]he psychodynamic elaboration of the heroes‟ reactions will be extremely interesting…. 
Intensive knowledge of these social processes and individual reactions thereto is in different 
areas so important that it must be investigated in all possible sources. (ibid., added emphasis) 
The minutiae of human sociality essential to individual psychotherapy are lost in the 
psychological report‟s “dead succession of cold facts” (ibid.). Moreover, in the field of 
organizational psychology, 
the work context… that can bring to the fore or even strengthen the anxieties created by the 
social order is overlooked besides. The immovable standardization [the worker encounters] in 
social life he must now negotiate even more acutely in his work situation. (ibid.) 
 Schlebusch bemoans the standardization of thinking itself. A situation has arisen 
where success in the world of politics depends on one‟s affiliation with a strong party, while, 
in research circles, it hinges on “being a team member in a big organization like the Council 
for Scientific and Industrial Research, such that most books nowadays appear under the 
writer, „edited by‟….” (p. 10). The dearth of knowledge that human beings have about 
themselves is the result of being “caught up in [this] narrow passage in which [our] culture 
allows us to think” (ibid.). Psychological studies must become correspondingly “more alive” 
and “more interesting” by breaking out of “the conventional mentality” (ibid.). 
DISCUSSION 
By the end of his address, it is easier to appreciate the significance of Schlebusch‟s puzzling 
introduction. In what is predominantly a deliberative piece of oratory, he exhorts a new 
direction for South African psychology – chiefly methodological – in which parochial 
allegiances are to be set aside. In terms of his rhetorical style, the president foregoes candor 
for subtlety, initiating his audience into a literary world of manifold meanings where process 
becomes as revealing as content. Conversely, Schlebusch‟s use of an off record strategy 
facilitates a potentially high degree of propositional affinity (Hodge & Kress, 1988, p. 123 
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quoted in Fairclough, 1992, p. 158). That is, because he performs his face-threatening act 
through insinuation, he is able to state his case more or less emphatically. Time and again, he 
manages medium- to high-affinity epistemic (probability) and deontic (obligational) 
modalities (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 146) by using appropriate modal auxiliary verbs (“must”, 
“should”, “will”, “can”), modal adverbs (“indeed") and modal adjectives (“necessary”). 
Moreover, by having frequent recourse to the present tense, he disregards the academic norm 
of avoiding the categorical modality, while generating presidential gravitas (Fairclough, 
1992, p. 162). Schlebusch reinforces his authority through these modalities – the power 
vacuum created by the mass exodus of high-ranking Afrikaner psychologists demands as 
much – urging the association to follow his lead.  
 Yet he seems simultaneously to abandon his community of practice, presenting 
himself as a modified Randist maverick released from jingoistic groupthink. In casting 
mainstream politics, big industry and society in general (“die maatskappy”) in the role of 
villain with their unending “pressures and demands” (p. 9), Schlebusch takes a dig at his 
Afrikaner colleagues for capitulating to the machinations of big-time politics. After all, it was 
Prime Minister Verwoerd who, three months earlier, had informed a triumvirate of 
Stellenbosch University professors comprising A.J. la Grange, A.B. van der Merwe and J.M. 
du Toit: 
But look, if you are then developing in this direction – SAPA, I am after all an honorary 
member – then I am now obliged to terminate my honorary membership immediately. I can 
hardly belong to an association that is in direct conflict with our country‟s policy [of racial 
segregation]. How can I belong to it?  I must terminate it immediately.88 
As Robbertse would observe years later, “At that time, Dr Verwoerd did South Africa‟s 
thinking to a great degree.”89,90 
 Whereas la Grange venerates the volk and so can hardly do otherwise than to offer the 
discipline in service to the nation, Schlebusch adopts an opposing stance, driving a wedge 
between psychology and broader society. In effect, the two men are arguing about the 
independence of science: la Grange pursues the „social relevance‟ of a committed Afrikaner 
nationalist while Schlebusch desires the disinterested freedom of the intellectual pioneer. La 
                                                                    
88 Quoted in the Newsletter of the Psychological Institute of the Republic of South Africa, August 1962, 
Vol. 1, p. 13. The passage – translated from the original Afrikaans – is taken from a statement delivered by 
la Grange at PIRSA’s founding meeting on June 23, 1962. 
89 P.M. Robbertse interview, May 12, 1982, p. 13. Translated from the original Afrikaans. 
90 In a remarkably similar turn of phrase, Verwoerd’s successor, B.J. Vorster, reminisced at the first 
cabinet meeting after the prime minister’s assassination: “Dr Verwoerd was an intellectual giant. He did 
the thinking for each one of us” (Schoeman, 1974, p. 14 quoted in D. O'Meara, 1996, p. 112). 
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Grange like a sledgehammer, Schlebusch as a thief in the night, the vehemence of state and 
the elegance of science collide in an attritional battle of rhetorical styles. 
 Of course, for Schlebusch, it is not solely about science for science‟s sake, but an 
associated liberal tradition that resonates with the English speakers in the audience. Despite 
delivering his speech in Afrikaans, he makes no mention of the Afrikaans literary canon, 
eschewing it in favor of English-language classics. Schlebusch presents himself as an 
Anglicized Afrikaner, expressing solidarity with white English-speaking South Africans 
(WESSAs). Prior to the republican declaration of 1961, WESSAs tended to divide their 
loyalties between Britain (the homeland) and South Africa (the colony). Now, in the wake of 
the NP‟s shock electoral victory, the ethnic mobilization of Afrikanerdom and the split from 
the British Commonwealth, the question for WESSAs was whether they had any home at all 
(Foley, 1992). But even with the “identity crisis” (ibid., p. 16) that was in part the result of 
their heterogeneous composition, a discrete WESSA cohort distinguished itself through its 
social, cultural and political progressiveness. This grouping of WESSAs  
is associated with university education, with high socio-economic status, with occupations in 
education and service sector of the economy, and with non-affiliation to a religious 
denomination…. [It] also seems to be related to anti-materialistic attitudes, opposition to 
authoritarian political measures, lower needs for in-group identification, a secular outlook, a 
non-patriotic orientation, a non-traditional moral outlook, a belief in the social and political 
responsibility of the Church, and with a sophisticated view of literature, art and intellectual 
activity. (Schlemmer, 1976, p. 124) 
 Schlebusch‟s speech is an ora orical tour de force that displays almost all of the 
above. His valorization of inspired individualism serves as antidote to the “clumsy hatchet 
jobs” in which WESSAs are reviled as imperialist “bastards”, “pseudo-liberal weaklings” and 
“ghosts with ears” (Banning, 1989 quoted in Foley, 1991, p. 15). Yet his disdain for politics 
does not make him one of a near majority of WESSAs described as 
political introverts… less concerned with encouraging a practical solution to South Africa‟s 
problems, more concerned with preserving a „White‟ heritage, more concerned simply with 
leading a quiet, respectable life and more concerned with protecting the standards of the 
social class to which they belong. (Schlemmer, 1976, p. 124, original emphases) 
Kurt Danziger, for example, whose opposition to apartheid injustice earned him the wrath of 
then Minister of Justice B.J. Vorster and a one-way exit permit in 1965, attributes his non-
involvement in the SAPA-PIRSA „race‟ controversy to the episode‟s patent absurdity 
(personal communication, January 2011). Likewise, when Schlebusch stops short of „outing‟ 
an issue that must have been foremost in the minds of his listeners, he is employing the 
rhetorical trick of undermining an opposing position by virtue of withholding what would be 
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a dignifying response (Billig, 1996). The SAPA president‟s reticence is not the mark of a 
political introvert but of Schlemmer‟s “political activist” (1976, p. 124).  
 The general ascription of political apathy to South African psychology in its entirety 
overlooks the “tradition of dissent” among an influential minority of independent-minded 
WESSAs (Garson, 1976, p. 37 quoted in Foley, 1991, p. 22). Then again, Schlebusch‟s 
politics does not mean that SAPA had no apartheid sympathizers – or that his brand of 
activism was non-ideological. After all, he may have distanced himself from the Afrikaner 
group ethic, but he hardly aligned himself with African nationalism either. Indeed, a politics 
that idealizes an amorphous (scientific) freedom but stops short of naming its object of 
criticism – in this case racial policy – does itself no favors. By invoking science in the 
struggle against apartheid, Schlebusch adopted what was a common discursive practice 
among English-speaking liberals (Dubow, 2001). But, having “scant awareness of themselves 
as a group” – and Schlebusch went assuredly to great lengths to isolate himself from any 
group – the WESSA appeal to science was prone to being interpreted as the political 
dithering not of activists but “wimps” (Foley, 1991, pp. 15-16). 
 When read in tandem, la Grange (1962) and Schlebusch (1963) appear to espouse 
significantly different views on the desirability of „relevance‟ in psychology. The former‟s 
concern for the welfare of the Afrikaner volk anticipates PIRSA‟s volksdiens discourse of the 
1960s that will compel the discipline to safeguard „our continued national existence‟ from the 
„threat‟ of „urgent social questions‟. By contrast, Schlebusch seeks to uncouple psychology 
from societal considerations, advancing instead a liberal-individualist discourse that 
panegyrizes an almost esoteric science in which „the great inventor‟ as „truth seeker‟ 
struggles valiantly against this „tyranny of the group‟. Taken together, the presidents‟ 
respective articulations provide support for Strümpfer‟s (1993) characterization of Afrikaner 
psychology as „service-oriented‟ and the English version as driven by the basic science. The 
thesis turns now to an analysis of addresses delivered during SAPA‟s early years so as to 
account for the development of these contrasting positions. 
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CHAPTER 7: SAPA ADDRESSES (1950–1961) 
 
Although contemporary psychology has in the main passed out of that phase of its immediate past history 
generally referred to as the „battle of the schools‟, that does not mean that contemporary psychologists are 
necessarily in agreement upon fundamental issues at the present time. (Ian MacCrone, 1951) 
Our association developed out of a need… for professional psychological services in this country, a gap the 
community feels increasingly with each passing day. (A.B. van der Merwe, 1958) 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter analyzes addresses delivered in the 1950s in order to clarify the emergence of la 
Grange and Schlebusch‟s contradictory discursive projects. The analysis identifies among 
Afrikaner psychologists a concern for „social relevance‟ expressed in the shape of a 
professionalist discourse that encourages public service yet bears no trace of Christian-
National influence. Among English-speaking psychologists, by contrast, „relevance‟ is less of 
a priority in a discourse of disciplinarity concerned with fundamental debates in the field. It is 
argued that Afrikaner psychologists of the 1950s dispensed with Christian-Nationalism not 
only because the NP of those years had sidelined the Broederbond, but because the primary 
goal of professional registration necessitated a spirit of cooperation with their Anglophone 
colleagues. For their part, the latter group of psychologists advanced a moderate form of 
Schlebusch‟s liberal individualism, largely avoiding consideration of the wider public‟s 
needs. Schlebusch‟s retreatism in the wake of PIRSA‟s secession, therefore, may be thought 
of as an intensive form of disciplinarity suspicious of any kind of social mobilization.  
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1950 (A.J. LA GRANGE) 
In 1950, A.J. la Grange was SAPA president, a position he had held since the founding of the 
association in July 1948. SAPA had been established for professional reasons – chief among 
them the registration of trained psychologists (Foster, 2008; Seedat & MacKenzie, 2008). In 
the published summary of his address, la Grange identifies “[t]he greatest problem facing 
modern psychology [as] the fact that [the unprecedented demand for psychological services] 
is being shamelessly exploited by quacks and pseudo-psychologists of all kinds” (1950, p. 7). 
He adds that “[c]ondemnation and disapproval of these practices must be voiced in the 
strongest of terms” and recommends “[p]romulgation of an energetic short-term policy 
intended mainly for the protection of the title „psychologist‟” (ibid.). He advises further that 
SAPA membership be conditional “not only on the basis of academic and professional 
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qualifications, but also upon proof of a deserving reputation and high standing in public 
esteem” (ibid.).91 Regarding long-term policy, la Grange sets out in some detail the contents 
of a suitable undergraduate curriculum, proposing the introduction of a dedicated Bachelor‟s 
degree for aspiring teachers and the provision of training facilities for both undergraduate and 
postgraduate students. He anticipates such outcomes as the improvement of clinical services 
in schools, public appreciation of psychological services, increased inter-disciplinary 
cooperation and “facilitation of the achievement of the ultimate goal” (p. 8): statutory 
recognition of the discipline. 
Given the ascendancy enjoyed by Afrikaner nationalism at the time, la Grange‟s non-
partisanship is surprising. Granted, a public service motif does feature prominently in the 
address – but it is not couched in the nationalist idiom of serving the volk. On the political 
front, the newly installed NP regime did not regard the further elaboration and dissemination 
of Christian-National ideology as a pressing concern: because it had won the 1948 elections 
on a minority of votes, the party‟s immediate challenge was to broaden its constituency. In a 
similar vein, la Grange would have understood the significance of his audience comprising 
“psychologists of various stripes, English and Afrikaans-speaking, liberal and conservative, 
[who] came together to form… SAPA” (Foster, 2008, p. 105). To persist with the Afrikaner 
nationalist agenda that had percolated the discipline since the formulation of the poor white 
question would have risked alienating his English listeners. SAPA‟s forerunner, the 
Psychological Society, Johannesburg (PSJ), had been dominated by English-speaking 
psychologists (Wulfsohn, 1948) – and with registration ostensibly the new association‟s 
„ultimate goal‟, having all hands on deck was a basic prerequisite. 
OPENING ADDRESS, 1951 (I.D. MACCRONE) 
In July of the following year, the liberal psychologist and former president of PSJ, Ian 
MacCrone, delivered the opening address at the SAPA congress in Pietermaritzburg. Titled 
Perspective in Psychology, MacCrone attempts to define the discipline‟s proper subject 
matter. He dismisses the potential role of neurophysiology in understanding human behavior 
for the reasons that “fundamentally it is a cock-eyed view which offends against psychology, 
against its own logic, and against a sound philosophy of science” (1951, p. 9). He criticizes 
on similar grounds stimulus-response theory, as it “seems to me to reduce behaviour to an 
unreal abstraction, a kind of artifact, since it consistently ignores the organism itself” (ibid.). 
                                                                    
91 This stipulation was a far cry from the later recruitment efforts of PIRSA begun under his presidential 
watch. 
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MacCrone‟s address ends abruptly with him arguing instead for the importance of 
consciousness in behavior and self-consciousness in particular. 
Simon Biesheuvel remembers MacCrone as “essentially an academic” who was not 
easily interested in psychological applications (1981, p. 2). Indeed, the disparity between la 
Grange (1950) and MacCrone – the latter was at the time of his address head of psychology 
at the English-language University of the Witwatersrand – cannot be starker. La Grange is 
already plotting the extension of the discipline into the public domain, while MacCrone has 
yet to move on from “the fundamental debate in psychology” – known otherwise as the 
“battle of the schools” (MacCrone, 1951, p. 8). Whereas la Grange restricts himself to 
professional issues, MacCrone immerses himself in “these fundamental issues… that go back 
to the beginnings of psychology as science” (ibid.). MacCrone reminds his audience that, 
while the „battle‟ may have receded in recent years, it remains unresolved. By implication, 
hopes for the professionalization of a „pre-paradigmatic‟ discipline with an undecided subject 
matter are misplaced – which explains in part why, despite psychologists‟ desire for 
professional registration since at least the mid-1940s, they had to wait until 1974 before the 
establishment of the first Professional Board for Psychology (Seedat & MacKenzie, 2008). 
All hands were not on deck: MacCrone spoke a scientific vernacular familiar to English-
speaking psychologists, while la Grange represented Afrikaner pragmatists eager to serve the 
public. 
OPENING ADDRESS, 1953 (E. PRATT-YULE) 
At the 1953 SAPA congress, Eleanor Pratt-Yule, long-time head of psychology at the 
University of Natal, delivers the opening address. Unlike MacCrone and la Grange, who 
confine their deliberations to the basic and applied science respectively, Pratt-Yule focuses 
her attention on the “dichotomy” itself, lamenting the harm it has done “in Britain where 
clinically oriented and experimentally minded research workers are separated by an abyss of 
prejudice” (1953, p. 4). Trained as a psychoanalyst but interested in animal experiments 
(Böhmke & Tlali, 2008), she concedes “at the outset that both the clinical and the 
experimental approaches have their aberrations” (Pratt-Yule, 1953, p. 4). Expressing concern 
about “the type of article too frequently found in the psycho-analytic reviews”, she rebukes 
simultaneously the scientific approach for its “worship of measurement for its own sake, a 
tendency to juggle with statistics, a free use of pseudo-mathematical symbols” (ibid.). She 
implies, also, that the clinical approach is of greater real-world significance, as “[v]ery often 
the results of precise and carefully designed experiments appear to have little relevance to 
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significant and urgent problems of behaviour” (ibid.). Pratt-Yule then sets herself the task of 
“bridg[ing] the gap between the two approaches and consider[ing] what contribution each 
may properly make to the scientific study of behaviour” (ibid.).  But since the 
“achievements... of experimental psychology are obvious… it is the clinical approach which 
requires clarification, evaluation and defence” (ibid.).  
Pratt-Yule‟s position is inconsistent: she finds fault with both traditions, but states that 
only one is in need of “defence.” According to her protégé, 92 Ronald Albino, Pratt-Yule had 
played an instrumental role in the founding of SAPA: 
Now also in that time the South African Psychological Association was founded. I was present 
on the very morning that it began when Prof Pratt-Yule said to me: „I think there are enough 
psychologists in South Africa to have a psychological association,‟ which she then proceeded 
to form. She wrote a letter to Prof MacCrone at Wits making this proposal, [I] can‟t 
remember the year…. He wrote back and said, „Fine,‟ and immediately… the first [congress] 
was [held] in Bloemfontein. I don‟t know how many were there, [it] must have been about 
twenty people at the most – that was our first conference…. That meeting was very interesting 
in that it exhibited this conflict… between behaviourism and the non-behaviouristic 
psychologies. There was a man at Wits – American – he got up and told us in very vigorous 
terms that… behaviourism was what psychology was all about. That immediately produced an 
uproar and for the rest of the three days it was a battle.93 
From its humble beginnings, SAPA was split not only along the pure/applied divide, but also 
– and more or less correspondingly – between behaviorists and non-behaviorists. Pratt-Yule 
was a compromise figure in both controversies, having interests in psychoanalysis and animal 
experimentation while excelling as teacher94 and practitioner.95 Albino recalls how, because 
of the limited number of psychology staff at the University of Natal, “we did everything: we 
taught fundamental psychology, applied psychology, we did service work – everything that 
came to hand – which I think made us all quite good general psychologists.”96 Pratt-Yule was 
uniquely positioned to appeal to all constituencies: by placing the burden of proof squarely on 
the clinical approach, she endears herself to experimentalists; on the other hand, by taking it 
upon herself – a psychoanalyst – to present the clinical case, she is assured the approval of 
non-experimentalists. 
                                                                    
92 Jack Mann’s description of Albino. Mann interview, May 14, 1982, p. 13. 
93 Ronald Albino interview, April 7, 1982, p. 3. 
94 Mann interview, ibid., p. 15. When asked to think of “great names in South African psychology” (p. 14), 
Mann answered: “I think on the purely academic scene Pratt-Yule had an enormous influence on the 
teaching. It was interesting that after the Second World War there was a time that nearly all the top posts 
at the English universities in psychology were held by people that had been trained by her and they 
seemed to naturally go into academic psychology” (p. 15). 
95 Albino interview, ibid., p. 2. 
96 ibid. 
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 While Pratt-Yule suggests that her point of departure is experimentalist, this amounts 
to little more than a rhetorical attempt to set experimentalists at ease. Midway through her 
address, she returns once again to the shortcomings of the scientific method: 
Every day research workers in the field of personality get new reminders that restricted test 
situations are restricted in their effects; they do not „excite‟ the subjects adequately. If people 
are placed in non-significant situations and set trivial tasks, trivial and non-significant 
responses are elicited, and conclusions based on these have little predictive value for real 
behaviour. The more complex, the more involved in total character structure, the more 
significant the variables we wish to estimate, the more useless the laboratory and test 
situation. Examples are legion. (1953, p. 6) 
Pratt-Yule proves unable to further the claims of clinicians without circumscribing those of 
experimentalists – one would expect nothing less in a “dichotomy.” Yet she admires the work 
of Lorenz and Tinbergen because, “[i]f they have shown us the value of the clinical eye, they 
have never questioned the value of the experimental eye” (p. 7). It is this approach that allows 
her to resolve the impasse: 
We like the outlook of a certain professor who has portraits of Freud and Pavlov on opposite 
walls of his study and declares that his aim as a psychologist is to move those portraits round 
till they hang side by side on the middle wall! (ibid.) 
Pratt-Yule asserts that much psychological research entails in any case “the proper blending 
of both approaches… despite the theoretical controversy between the die-hards of both 
camps” (ibid.). Confronted with urgent real-world problems, psychologists have been forced 
into a methodological pragmatism, “developing new techniques ad hoc, ignoring 
methodology, and drawing heavily on „hunches‟. For such as these, theoretical dichotomies 
have not existed” (p. 8). Pratt-Yule concludes her address with the observation that 
[h]ere in South Africa we are fond of stressing the immense complexity of the problems which 
face us as a multi-racial society. If we, as psychologists, are to play our proper constructive 
role in their solution, we cannot afford to spend much time on theoretical controversy, 
however much intellectual fun and stimulus we may undoubtedly derive from it. The problems 
which face us are indeed urgent, and it behoves us to be both liberal-minded and pragmatic in 
our approach to them. (p. 9) 
By the end of her speech, Pratt-Yule comes down decisively on the side of the clinical 
approach. She talks up the potential of “intuition… as a potent source of testable hypotheses” 
in the course of a lengthy discussion on “how the clinical approach may enrich the 
experimental” (ibid.). By contrast, her account of the benefits of the experimental approach is 
considerably less substantial as she reproaches “militant experimentalist[s]” for their “basic 
insecurity” (ibid.). The ongoing theoretical controversy is, for the most part, the fault of 
experimentalists, the continuation of which will curtail the discipline‟s efforts to solve the 
country‟s problems. Still, Pratt-Yule maintains the importance of being “both liberal-minded 
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and pragmatic” (ibid.) – a significant choice of adjectives given the opposing constituencies 
they call forth. What is implied is that, whereas English science provides objectivity and 
Afrikaner practice affords „social relevance‟, neither can do without the other. Pratt-Yule is 
identifying and attempting to heal a fracture in South African psychology that, less than a 
decade later, will break entirely. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1954 (S. BIESHEUVEL) 
Since he is the first personnel psychologist to lead the association, Simon Biesheuvel believes 
that his choice of topic – The Relationship between Psychology and Occupational Science – 
is justified. 97  He admits the possible tedium the field may induce in clinicians and 
theoreticians – shades of Pratt-Yule‟s „dichotomy‟ – but claims to “make no apology for 
discussing it on this occasion” (1954, p. 129). Biesheuvel links productivity to economic 
prosperity and reasons that psychologists should involve themselves in the question of labor 
efficiency – “[i]f for no other reason than that their own way of life is directly and vitally 
involved” (ibid.).  
Despite his claim to the contrary, Biesheuvel‟s tone is preponderantly apologetic. He 
appeals to his ethos (the presidential prerogative) as well as the pathos (sympathy) and logos 
(reasonableness) of the audience, creating an impression of one uncertain of his place in the 
discipline. While he acknowledges the field‟s “disreputable origins” (p. 130), he hails its 
improved sensitivity to workers‟ needs. He accepts, further, that occupational psychology‟s 
subject matter can appear, at times, to be unpsychological and, on other occasions, to 
transcend psychology. Biesheuvel ends up suspecting that 
[o]ur analysis [is] leading us to the absurd conclusion that in order to carry out his job 
properly the occupational psychologist must become a kind of scientific „superman‟ required 
to conquer a universe of sciences within the time of an ordinary professional training course. 
In this predicament, he could either choose to become a scientific dilettante, knowing the 
headlines but none of the content, or accept the advice given by Hamlet to his mother 
concerning her heart, to „throw away the worser part of it, and live the purer with the other 
half.‟ (p. 134) 
Whereas Pratt-Yule resolves her „dichotomy‟ by asserting the mutual dependence of 
basic and applied psychology, Biesheuvel sees an impossible “dilemma” (ibid.). He escapes it 
by explaining the process by which a pure science is able to generate a “technology” – or 
“practical art” – such as occupational science (ibid.). Just as medical doctors and engineers 
are not required to master each of their respective ancillary sciences – “[o]f necessity the 
treatment must often be synoptic, but never to the point of inculcating headlines only” (p. 
                                                                    
97 At the time of his address, Biesheuvel was also the director of the National Institute for Personnel 
Research (NIPR). 
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135) – the same holds true for occupational scientists. A host of sciences have contributed 
unevenly to the emergence of occupational science and so deserve differing degrees of 
devotion: “mothered” by occupational psychology with mathematical statistics in “the role of 
father”, physiology and sociology are its “godparents” while education, physics, economics 
and the rest of the multidisciplinary family function “as aunts and uncles” (p. 136). 
 Biesheuvel‟s standing in South African psychology is a matter of controversy (Painter 
& van Ommen, 2008; van Ommen, 2008). Described conflictingly as a “liberal-inclined 
psychologist and critic of race bias in intelligence testing” (Dubow, 2006, p. 253) but 
elsewhere as a “public apologist” for the exploitation of black labor (Cooper, Nicholas, 
Seedat, & Statman, 1990, p. 10), Biesheuvel‟s detractors will argue that his speech says 
nothing of the fact that the NIPR‟s special interest in African educability was born not of 
intellectual curiosity but of funder-driven obligations “to generate knowledge [that would] 
promote efficiency of the workforce and curtail industrial action by workers” (Seedat & 
MacKenzie, 2008, p. 80). Others take the benign view that the NIPR‟s studies on personnel 
management corresponded to a massive expansion in South Africa‟s industrial capability, 
which resulted in skills shortages and an associated need for vocational and aptitude testing 
(Dubow, 1995). For the former group, NIPR research exemplifies the kind of liberalism 
typical of WESSA „bastards‟: “rapacious, exploitative imperialists cunningly masking their 
racist, reactionary attitudes and conduct beneath a veneer of apolitical neutrality” (Foley, 
1991, p. 15; see also Terre Blanche & Seedat, 2001), while, for the latter, such research 
“involved an element of social meliorism” (Dubow, 1995, p. 237). 
 Biesheuvel‟s location on the basic-applied continuum is also unclear. According to 
one commentator, his bearing towards theoretical considerations in psychology was 
habitually dismissive (Dubow, 1995) – yet his speech does not come across as anti-scientific 
in the least. Biesheuvel makes the case, for example, that regardless of whether trainees are 
interested in human relations, personnel techniques or ergonomics, mathematics and statistics 
are “essential for all” (1954, p. 139). In his later years, moreover, he seemed especially taken 
by the notion of scientific disinterestedness (Biesheuvel, 1987, 1991). Gordon Nelson, a 
former NIPR director himself, remarks that Biesheuvel‟s career had “a profound effect on the 
[post-war] development of applied psychology and basic psychological research in South 
Africa” (1991, p. 571, added emphasis).  
Adopting a different strategy to Pratt-Yule, Biesheuvel seems almost to position 
himself beyond the “dilemma.” Indeed, when reminiscing a quarter-of-a-century later about 
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the early SAPA congresses, he would recall how “[u]nfortunately a perennial debate between 
behaviourists and psychoanalysts developed, which I found rather sterile and partisan” (1979, 
p. 6). Although he was “irritated by irrelevancies and anything that he construed as a waste of 
time” (G. Nelson, 1991, p. 572), as an applied scientist he also cautioned against the pursuit 
of the “perfect product [because] one would have to spend one‟s whole life on it, and in the 
end it would probably be irrelevant” (ibid., p. 571). In short, „relevance‟ was irrelevant. 
Unlike Pratt-Yule, Biesheuvel considered applied psychology to be as susceptible to 
„irrelevance‟ as the pure science itself. This explains not only the circumspection of his own 
conceptual analysis of „relevance‟ (Biesheuvel, 1991) but also clarifies why, despite wanting 
to put occupational science „on the map‟, he makes virtually no effort to extol its real-world 
virtues. Rather, in the introduction to his address, Biesheuvel chooses to distinguish himself 
from “those who require their subject matter spiced with the more colorful and imaginative 
aspects of personality study” as well as those desirous of “opportunities for the formulation of 
theoretical ingenuities, so amply provided by behaviour studies” (1954, p. 129). But this 
reluctance to position himself within either the basic/behaviorist or applied/non-behaviorist 
traditions meant not only that he would not offend anyone in the audience – after all, his 
noncommitalism was a rhetorical strategy designed to win occupational science a seat at 
psychology‟s table – it also meant that more than three decades later it would prove 
impossible to fix his location on the political spectrum. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1955 (A.B. VAN DER MERWE) 
After obtaining a master‟s degree in psychology in 1938 from Stellenbosch University, A.B. 
van der Merwe went on to qualify as a medical doctor at the University of Cape Town. In 
1945, he returned to his alma mater to teach clinical psychology, earning a doctorate in 1949 
for his exploration of Peripheral Vasomotor Reactions as an Index of Emotional Tension and 
Emotional Stability. By 1955, van der Merwe was SAPA president: titled Tension and 
Psychosomatic Reactions,98 his address was an abbreviated form of his doctoral thesis and 
consisted of a two-page foray into physiological psychology.  
In comparison to those of his predecessors, van der Merwe‟s address is arguably the 
least controversial. It resembles in content most APA speeches in which “presidents… 
summarize their own substantive contributions or… describe recent developments in a 
particular subarea of psychology” (Fowler, 1990, p. 1). Just as la Grange had done in 1950, 
van der Merwe steers clear both of Afrikaner ideology – unusual for a Broederbonder 
                                                                    
98 The address was delivered in Afrikaans. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
106 
 
(Wilkins & Strydom, 1978) – and of wading into the „battle of the schools‟ that troubled in 
varying measures such Anglophone psychologists as MacCrone, Pratt-Yule and Biesheuvel. 
Then again, as regards the interpretation of psychosomatic disturbance, he does mention in 
passing how “[o]n the one side there is the school that wants to see a deep-seated symbolic 
meaning in every functional symptom” (van der Merwe, 1955, p. 4). He ends his address 
enigmatically too, concluding that  
[t]he concepts of basic tension and lability help us to view certain reactions of the normal 
person, the neurotic as well as the psychotic from a new vantage-point, and necessarily direct 
our attention to psychotherapy of a different nature. (ibid.) 
Until as recently as the new millennium, psychology at Stellenbosch University cared 
little for psychoanalysis. Yet van der Merwe‟s comments about the field do not constitute 
evidence of an underlying behaviorist antipathy. 99  He noted for himself how young 
Stellenbosch psychologists of the late forties and early fifties “were obsessed with the idea… 
of giving the theoretical subject a practical orientation” (van der Merwe, 1984, p. 1 quoted in 
Scholtz, 2002, p. 10). But this was not to be accomplished through inter-school one-
upmanship or, for that matter, Christian-National rhetoric about serving the volk. Similar to 
NP strategy, the first half of the 1950s was to be years of consolidation rather than 
antagonization in the discipline. Psychologists throughout the country were beginning to open 
private practices (J. O'Meara, n.d.); SAPA, for its part, was in the process of developing an 
ethical code of conduct – it was passed at the 1955 AGM – and had been negotiating since 
1951 with the Minister of Health and the South African Medical and Dental Council 
regarding the registration of psychologists (J. Louw, 1997). Professional interests encouraged 
SAPA in-group solidarity “against a pretty tough and exclusive [medical] trade union” (J. 
O'Meara, n.d., p. 15). 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1958 (A.B. VAN DER MERWE) 
At the 1958 congress, A.B. van der Merwe was into his second term as SAPA president. He 
starts his address by thanking the audience for the confidence it has placed in him by electing 
him president.100 He then pays tribute to la Grange and Biesheuvel for their leadership at a 
time “when the air was but rather thin” and “feelings of insecurity, and inferiority, were busy 
overcoming many of us” (van der Merwe, 1958, p. 2). He compares both predecessors to the 
prophet Elijah, who, lifted into the heavens on a chariot drawn by steeds of fire, drops his 
                                                                    
99 In those years, the psychology department at Stellenbosch was “eclectic in nature” (Scholtz, 2002, p. 
10). 
100 This address, like the 1955 one, was delivered in Afrikaans. 
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mantle, which is then gathered up by his successor, Elisha. Humbled by the occasion, van der 
Merwe “in this case cannot help but wonder if Elijah‟s mantle has descended on the true 
Elisha” (ibid.). Under the successive stewardships of la Grange – “the father of our 
association” – and Biesheuvel – who “with his thorough, scientific aggression inspired us to 
independent conduct” (ibid.) – SAPA has emerged from “its infant years” and “youthful 
uncertainty” to “where we stand today” (ibid.). 
 Van der Merwe proceeds to remind his listeners of the association‟s founding 
sentiment: “a need for professional psychological services in this country, a gap the 
community feels increasingly with each passing day” (ibid.). Accordingly, his address pays 
homage to the role of the clinical psychologist in the community, firstly, in respect of “the 
positive promotion of mental health” (p. 3) and, secondly, in encouraging the rehabilitation of 
patients that otherwise would spend their lives in institutions. He details the shortage of 
psychiatric facilities and trained personnel in the face of massive public demand, criticizing 
the fact that, while only two hundred beds exist in the country for the treatment of patients 
with serious neurotic illnesses, there are ten state institutions for a much smaller population 
of psychotic patients. In addition, national mental health organizations and education 
departments are hamstrung by a crippling shortage of trained clinical psychologists. For van 
der Merwe, the remedy is two-fold: a focus on preventative work and the creation of “a more 
effective psychotherapy” (p. 4). By the latter he means an “active psychotherapy” (p. 5) that 
is offered in outpatient settings, is multidisciplinary in scope and involves a “thoroughly 
elaborated readjustment program for each patient” (ibid.). Citing British, Dutch and 
American examples of community-based mental health services, van der Merwe predicts the 
end of custodial care, an eventuality owing much to the maturation of modern 
psychopathology over the previous fifty years and the development of tranquilizer drugs. 
Moreover, because no single science can assume responsibility for the mental health of a 
community, the clinical psychologist plays a vital role in the multidisciplinary team, failing 
which “he will commit an unforgiveable sin against humankind” (p. 6). 
In comparison with his 1955 address, van der Merwe‟s change of tone is conspicuous: 
whereas his earlier speech is chiefly of a forensic kind, the l958 address is in turns epideictic 
and deliberative. The difference is that, in the course of the intervening years, the effects of 
two important developments have begun to permeate the discipline. First, in December 1955 
the profession attained statutory recognition as an auxiliary medical service (J. Louw, 1997). 
The achievement of this milestone along with, second, the formal adoption of an ethical code 
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at that year‟s AGM, afforded psychologists the much-desired legitimacy of bona fide 
professionals. This is why van der Merwe can „biblicalize‟ the occasion, declaring 
triumphantly that the discipline has moved beyond its “periods of youthful uncertainty”, with 
psychologists now operating alongside psychiatrists, general practitioners and social workers 
(1958, p. 2). With the requisite ethical and legal credentials, he is in a stronger position than 
any of the earlier presidents to affirm the necessity of psychological services while warning 
off “the ignoramus [who] is busy gambling with the mental health of his patient” (p. 4). 
Unlike MacCrone, Pratt-Yule and Biesheuvel who apply themselves to intra-disciplinary 
controversies, van der Merwe can extend the discipline‟s horizon of ambition by exhorting 
his fellow professionals to dedicate themselves to the mental health of all. But like la Grange 
(1950), he manages to draw on the unifying ideal of public service without ever having 
recourse to Afrikaner nationalist discourse. 
PRESIDENTIAL / OPENING ADDRESS, 1961 (A.B. VAN DER MERWE) 
By 1961, events had gone pear-shaped. Since the Naidoo debacle of 1956, the „race‟ question 
had been simmering in the background. Delegates arrived at the Stellenbosch congress in the 
knowledge that, this time around, there would be no postponement of a matter on which there 
were fierce differences of opinion. In the absence of the university‟s rector, A.J. la Grange 
calls on van der Merwe – once again president – to deliver the opening address.101 To general 
laughter, van der Merwe complains that the venue is lacking in homeliness, before adding 
that “[y]ou will however not get too cold or warm as we regulate the temperature 
automatically according to the heatedness of the discussions taking place” (1961, p. 229). His 
mood darkening, he then gives the lie to his 1958 celebration of SAPA‟s coming-of-age: 
Ladies and gentlemen, the Psychological Association is now in its thirteenth year – from a 
genetic point of view it can thus be considered in the stage of puberty – and we must perhaps 
expect some or other growth pain and passing fancy. I just hope that, as true professional 
psychotherapists, we shall be very sober-minded when considering and dealing with these 
whims. (ibid.) 
Van der Merwe stops short of outing the „race‟ question directly. He attempts, instead, 
to normalize the controversy as a foreseeable growth pain, cautioning the audience against 
overreaction. Three years earlier, he had waxed lyrical about the “independent conduct” of 
the association and its successful negotiation of “youthful uncertainty” – now, he returns 
SAPA to the adolescent gawkiness it was supposed to have resolved. In contrast to his earlier 
speeches, he also takes the trouble to address the delegates partly in English, quoting for good 
                                                                    
101 On this occasion, van der Merwe takes turns to speak in Afrikaans and English. 
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measure the national poet of Scotland. With this ethical appeal (ethos), van der Merwe 
attempts to ingratiate himself as a benevolent and even-handed leader (Corbett & Connors, 
1999). He recognizes the importance of finding common ground with English-speaking 
psychologists, since it was more or less understood that the English-medium universities 
entertained liberal views on the „race‟ issue. And then, having already made reference in 
Afrikaans to the temperature in the venue, he informs his English colleagues of the expected 
weather outside: 
Our branch secretary, Mr. Botha, guarantees fine weather. If we do get a few occasional 
showers, please remember the immortal words of Robert Burns: „The best laid schemes o‟ 
mice an‟ men gang aft agley.‟ (ibid.) 
In quoting Burns, was van der Merwe making a veiled threat against the English 
contingent that had come to Stellenbosch in droves to outvote any proposal for racial 
segregation (Nell, 1993)? It is impossible to tell. As surely as la Grange did not anticipate the 
incipient drama,102 van der Merwe could not have foreseen what was to happen either – that 
the coming days would alter irrevocably the future of South African psychology. 
Notwithstanding the tense debates between Freudians and behaviorists, English-Afrikaner 
relations during the early SAPA conferences had at least been collegial. But in the years 
following the 1961 congress, which witnessed the establishment of the whites-only PIRSA, 
“a lot of damage was done” 103  between the two associations – and South African 
psychology‟s international profile suffered accordingly.104 
DISCUSSION 
The previous chapter concluded with the observation that la Grange (1962) and Schlebusch 
(1963) ended up articulating opposing discourses in the wake of the SAPA-PIRSA split. The 
present chapter was introduced, therefore, as an attempt to reveal the order of discourse 
within South African psychology that preceded the rupture. A general observation is that the 
addresses of the 1950s provide almost no discursive indication that a break was on the cards. 
To be sure, references were made to the tensions that existed between the basic/behaviorist 
and applied/non-behaviorist camps, which corresponded roughly to an English-Afrikaner 
divide. But at no point during the course of the decade did addresses ever turn overtly 
political. It is as if English- and Afrikaans-speaking psychologists had decided unconsciously 
                                                                    
102 According to Dreyer Kruger, la Grange had not prepared himself for the possibility that the Afrikaner 
psychologists might lose the vote on the ‘race’ question (Kruger interview, April 15, 1982, p. 2). 
103 Ronald Albino interview, April 7, 1982, p. 10. 
104 Biesheuvel interview, May 14, 1982, pp. 20-21. 
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on a moratorium and colluded to visit their „displaced‟ hostilities on an unsuspecting pure-
applied antinomy.  
Both Afrikaner presidents of the decade – la Grange (1950) and van der Merwe 
(1958) – articulate a professionalist discourse of public service. They speak variously of the 
imperative to protect a „shamelessly exploited‟ public, a service „gap the community feels 
with each passing day‟ and „an unforgiveable sin against humankind‟ should psychologists 
fail to assume their places on multidisciplinary teams. For their part, the English-speaking 
psychologists advance a discourse of disciplinarity that leaves them preoccupied with a 
„battle of the schools‟ (MacCrone, 1951), a „dichotomy‟ between the clinical and the 
experimental (Pratt-Yule, 1953) and a „dilemma‟ between pure and applied psychology 
(Biesheuvel, 1954). Troubled by these „fundamental issues‟, they seek „perspective‟ and 
„liberal-minded pragmatism‟. 
The discursive order of the 1950s includes elements of the la Grange–Schlebusch 
constellation of 1962. A notable difference, however, is that the Afrikaner professionalist 
discourse lacks the accouterments of its volksdiens count rpart, which reflects the general 
downplaying of Christian-Nationalism in political circles of the 1950s. In order to set in 
motion the apartheid project, the NP needed to expand its political base: there was little 
likelihood of an Afrikaner republic with a five-seat parliamentary majority when the UP had 
won the popular vote by some margin. Moreover, because Malan and Strijdom “were 
determined to keep the nationalist policy agenda firmly in the party‟s hands”, the 
Broederbond – the custodians of Christian-Nationalism – ended up being sidelined for much 
of the 1950s (D. O'Meara, 1996, p. 47). So, too, in the discipline, the apparent absence of 
ideology among Afrikaner psychologists mirrored the goings-on among their political 
masters, while there was also the practical matter of professional registration that required 
cooperating with their Anglophone colleagues. 
Among English-speaking psychologists, the distinction between the discourses of 
disciplinarity and liberal individualism is a matter of degree since they both draw – 
unequally, it should be noted – on a culture of retreatism. The former is concerned with the 
scope and structure of the discipline and is broadly – yet not exclusively, as Pratt-Yule‟s 
address illustrates – uninterested in matters beyond the discipline. Its general advocacy of 
circumspection, „perspective‟ and „liberal-minded pragmatism‟ is characteristic of “liberals in 
the post-1948 era [whose] insistence on reason and moderation was, perhaps, a comfortable 
and comforting position to adopt – because it allowed those in the beleaguered middle ground 
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to cast their opponents as extremists” (Dubow, 2001, p. 116). But with the resurgence of 
Christian-Nationalism in the new republic and the subsequent secession of Afrikaner 
psychologists now confident of their mission, this posture hardened into Schlebusch‟s liberal-
individualist ethic that was inimical to social formations of any kind. Meanwhile, Strümpfer‟s 
(1993) claim that the call for „relevance‟ began at English universities during the late 1970s 
no longer convinces. With a thoroughgoing focus on public service, Afrikaner psychology of 
the 1950s had been concerned with „social relevance‟ all along. In the 1960s, however, this 
would transmute into an appeal for „ethnic-national relevance‟ directed specifically at 
Afrikaners. 
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CHAPTER 8: PIRSA ADDRESSES (1963–1977) 
 
Research on a topic such as the sexual life of a scorpion is clearly a waste of manpower, especially when our 
country‟s many human problems are taken into account. (P.M. Robbertse – PIRSA president, 1969) 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter analyzes PIRSA addresses of the 1960s and 1970s. It observes how, during the 
sixties, a discourse of volksdiens (ethnic-national service) emerged, calling for „ethnic-
national relevance‟ in the discipline. With the volk facing such menaces as communism, 
capitalism and egalitarianism, psychological research needed to dedicate itself to addressing 
these and other threats.  In the seventies, however, appeals for „ethnic-national relevance‟ 
became less prominent with discussions of South African issues disappearing from the 
agenda. Instead, the centerpiece of „ethnic-national relevance‟ – volksdiens itself – came 
under attack. The unraveling of PIRSA‟s quest for „ethnic-national relevance‟ reflected the 
disintegration of apartheid rationality from the mid-sixties onwards, which resulted from a 
concatenation of economic, cultural and political upheavals. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1963 (A.J. LA GRANGE) 
In his 1962 inaugural address, A.J. la Grange ranked the phenomenon of traffic accidents 
second on his list of “problems that are busy threatening on a large scale the foundations of 
our continued national existence” (1962, p. 17). This may explain why, by the time of his 
1963 speech, he had left Stellenbosch University to head up the SARSC‟s Division for the 
Planning and Coordination of Road Safety Research. But despite the urgency with which he 
viewed the road safety question, at the 1963 congress la Grange chose to speak on a topic that 
had featured last on his 1962 list – hence the title of his speech, Background and Perspective 
on the Latter-day Interest in the Gifted Child (la Grange, 1964).105 
 Revisiting the history of education, la Grange criticizes the egalitarianism of 
revolutionary France and, later, “[t]he unrealistic post-war socialistic-inspired policy of 
provision of primary education for all [in the belief that] it should be a universal human right” 
(ibid., p. 3). He adds that  
[t]his tendency could be observed most clearly in Britain during the rule of the Labour 
government… [when] there was an unmistakable swing away from monetary investment in the 
education of gifted children in favor of the appropriation of more generous teaching amenities 
for the masses. (ibid.) 
                                                                    
105 In this chapter, all titles and excerpts have been translated from the original Afrikaans. 
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La Grange notes, however, that whereas “Russia has nevertheless been acutely aware of how 
to nurture the development of her gifted” (ibid.), she has done so only to actualize “[t]he 
communist striving for world domination” (p. 5). By contrast, he castigates the United States 
for an utilitarian outlook vis-à-vis giftedness, which he traces to “[t]he capitalistic-democratic 
striving for self-assertion by means of the concentration of economic and political power in 
the hands of the directors of private and state-supported enterprises in all areas of life” (ibid.). 
La Grange also takes issue with what he locates “[b]etween the titanic power struggles of 
communism on the one side and capitalism on the other side” (p. 7), namely, “[t]he 
liberalistic-socialistic striving for the obliteration of all class differences and the equalization 
of all people regardless of race, nationality or individual differences of whatever kind 
whatsoever” (p. 5).  
 La Grange cautions against “a one-sided development of giftedness” (p. 6) in the 
direction of scientific and technological achievement:  
The development of giftedness in a certain direction without taking into account the social 
structure within which that giftedness must be applied, would not only be meaningless but, if 
the healthy balance is disturbed, can lead to the spiritual and material decline of the 
community in question. (ibid.) 
Quoting Abraham Tannenbaum, he asserts that “[a]ny definition of talent must have a social 
reference” (p. 11) – which in the South African instance is “separate development for the 
different racial groups that make up the population” (ibid.). However, despite the fact that 
these different groups are “considered potentially equal in all respects” (ibid.), it remains the 
case that, “because of the existing differences in level of civilization and education, culture 
and traditions, there are basic differences in the valuation of different forms of giftedness 
within the different communities” (ibid.). Moreover, since the white community exists  
in a relationship of guardianship over the non-white communities… it is self-evident that 
among other things great value be attached to the discovery and development of talents 
among whites that can be applied also to the needs of the non-white communities in numerous 
areas, especially in those of educational, social and medical services. In so far as the non-
white communities succeed in discovering and developing their own talents in all areas under 
the leadership of whites, they will eventually be capable of providing for their own needs in all 
respects. (ibid.) 
La Grange reasons that, since the level of civilization is directly proportional to the number of 
careers available in a given community, and, because it is “the basic task of the white 
community… to lead the non-whites gradually to the highest rung of civilization and full 
independence” (ibid.), “… the non-whites – with the growing differentiation and increase in 
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the number of careers – will require special help directing the multiple talents of their own 
children in the desired directions according to the special needs of their community” (ibid.). 
 La Grange recommends that the education system commit itself to the fulfillment of 
two goals. First, white South Africa‟s “rich heritage of the past [must] be transmitted 
faithfully to posterity, and its principles made known to the non-white communities in the 
country” (p. 12). Second, “provision [must] be made… for highly-skilled manpower in all 
areas of national existence” (ibid.). The preservation of this heritage – “with its 
predominantly Christian and Nationalist life- and worldview” (ibid.) – indicates that “we are 
not willing to sacrifice our highest spiritual values for material gain” (ibid.), while the 
question of skilled labor means “that we shall also not countenance our material decline by 
allowing, through neglect of our gifted [people], that we fall behind the rest of the Western 
world in scientific and technological areas” (ibid.). La Grange then mentions by name several 
Afrikaner psychologists and students that have contributed actively to the study of giftedness, 
before concluding with a list of additional research questions “for which the help of 
psychologists is indispensable” (p. 13). 
 At first glance, the bearing of giftedness on „our continued national existence‟ may 
seem melodramatic – but by the end of his address la Grange has provided a compelling 
argument. At a rhetorical level, an outward appeal to reason (logos) is buttressed with an 
emotional appeal (pathos): ad populum arguments preponderate in which terms such as 
„socialism‟ and „the masses‟ are used pejoratively, creating a neurotic climate that facilitates 
the conversion of assertions into facts (Corbett & Connors, 1999, p. 70). At a discursive level, 
la Grange develops the prodromal volksdiens discourse of the previous year‟s address. The 
apartheid state‟s raison d‟être depends on the „ethnic-national relevance‟ of psychological 
research: without the study of giftedness, the black community will not attain the heights of 
white civilization, while the ensuing failure of white trusteeship – voogdyskap (1963, p. 11) – 
amounts to a breach of Christian-National morality. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1964 (P.M. ROBBERTSE) 
In 1964, the new president, P.M. Robbertse, delivered a talk entitled Creative Thoughts or 
Abilities. Just as la Grange had spoken of the „indispensable contributions‟ that psychologists 
could bring to the question of giftedness, his successor now claimed – regarding the broader 
matter of human potentiality – that “psychology has a meaningful contribution to make” 
(Robbertse, 1964, p. 1). Robbertse echoes his predecessor in several places besides, noting in 
his introductory comments the underdevelopment of the social sciences and humanities in 
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comparison with the natural sciences, “the shortage of highly-trained manpower” and the 
necessity of applying “the Republic‟s human potential in the most effective manner” (ibid.). 
Robbertse, that is, frames his speech intertextually as an extension of la Grange‟s – he 
references explicitly the latter‟s 1963 address – adding that “the objective in this address is to 
shed light on a particular form of giftedness namely creative thoughts or abilities” (ibid.). 
Reviewing several authoritative American sources – he apologizes for reinforcing this focus 
on the “new American illness” (p. 8) – Robbertse considers at length the nature and 
measurement of creative thoughts and abilities. He concludes that neither question is settled 
and that “[t]he matter of creative thoughts is recommended eagerly to PIRSA members for 
[further] research” (p. 9). Despite an implicit endorsement of la Grange‟s volksdiens 
discourse, Robbertse‟s 1964 address is a far cry from his addresses later in the decade – 
which went a long way to cementing his reputation as arguably PIRSA‟s most outspoken 
ideologue. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1965 (A.J. LA GRANGE) 
At the 1965 congress, la Grange returns as president. He revisits his maiden address at the 
1962 congress – it is now PIRSA‟s manifesto – and quotes in full his list of six “questions 
that are busy threatening on a large scale the foundations of our continued national existence” 
(la Grange, 1966, p. 1). Expressing his appreciation at the progress being made on the last of 
these questions – giftedness – he doffs his hat at PIRSA members working in the area and, in 
particular, at Robbertse, then director of the National Bureau for Educational and Social 
Research.106 La Grange goes on to observe that, while previous congresses have not focused 
on any of the other five questions, “noticeable progress has indeed been made in the area of 
road safety research, and it is appropriate on this occasion that mention be made of it” (p. 2). 
Here, unlike in his 1963 address, he speaks directly to his own research specialty, titling his 
address Recent Contributions of Psychologists (with Special Reference to PIRSA Members) in 
Respect of Urgent Problems in the Area of Road Safety Research and the Prevention of Road 
Accidents. 
 La Grange deals mainly with the legal, technical and psychological factors that affect 
the incidence of motor vehicle accidents on South African roads. He advocates the 
importance of road safety education – padveiligheidsopvoeding – which  
                                                                    
106 The Bureau was established in 1929 as a research division by the then South African Union’s 
Department of Education. It was the central player in the developing relationship between social science 
research and state policy. The Bureau was incorporated into the Human Sciences Research Council in 
1969 (Fleisch, 1995). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
116 
 
must serve as a prophylactic agent against the development of accident proneness, that is, it 
must strengthen positive characteristics in the character and personality that can serve as 
resistance against the operation of both detrimental environmental factors as well as social 
and emotional maladjustments that can strengthen the tendency to become involved in 
accidents. (p. 10) 
He then describes a number of road safety projects being conducted around the country at 
mainly Afrikaans-medium departments of psychology – Pretoria University, Potchefstroom 
University, the University of the Orange Free State and the University of South Africa (pp. 
10-11). 
 But despite demonstrable interest in the road safety question, la Grange warns that,  
[w]hen the need for psychological help [as regards road safety] becomes acute, the following 
questions among others will be posed: Where are the psychological organizations that can 
deliver this service? To what extent are the existing departments of psychology at our different 
universities equipped and competent to deliver this service? (p. 14) 
Apart from recommending the “creation of additional facilities for the psychological 
investigation of traffic offenders” (ibid.), la Grange encourages university authorities to show 
greater interest in national road safety education (volksopvoeding). The modern-day 
university, he opines, is a “people‟s university” (p. 15), the result of centuries-long 
democratizing processes that eventually succeeded in wresting control of the university from 
the Church. Quoting from H.B. Thom‟s address at the official opening of the 1965 academic 
year at Stellenbosch University, la Grange stresses that universities “have become a mirror of 
society… [and] provide leadership to the community through which they are nourished in the 
first instance, and also leadership to the whole country” (ibid.). Given that road accidents are 
“the curse of contemporary society… as regards the prevention of road accidents the honor 
belongs to [the universities] as the trailblazers” (pp. 15-16).  
 At the core of this university-driven road safety program is “the development of a 
social value system in which road safety must be included and placed on a high rung in the 
hierarchy of values” (p. 16). This value system originates in the community  
but for its success is dependent on the leadership provided by leading institutions such as 
universities that are accepted by the people [volk] as their possession. Here we see a golden 
opportunity for the university branches of PIRSA to take the lead. Psychologists can make 
valuable contributions to the planning and introduction of a comprehensive program of 
national education in which road safety education is integrated as an inseparable ingredient. 
The major motivations in this regard will have to be sought in the appeal to national self-
respect and national pride that must form the foundation for a code of road behavior of the 
highest quality. (ibid.) 
La Grange then asks how a high level of 
national self-respect and national pride can ever be attained, given the multiracial 
composition of our population? The answer to this question will only be discovered when the 
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different universities for the different racial groups in our country… all become true people‟s 
universities and each with its own service orientation [diensmotief] that arises from its own 
ethnic solidarity [volksgebondenheid]. (pp. 16-17) 
He concludes that  
it is above all my inner wish that [PIRSA members] will not be found wanting when, in 
relation to questions of national scope, an appeal for help and leadership is made to them. 
Only on the basis of a strong orientation of service to country and people [volk], including 
service to fellow citizens within the different national associations of different racial groups, 
is our survival [voortbestaan] justified and our future assured. (p. 18) 
 It is unclear if, in his closing sentence, la Grange has in mind the survival of PIRSA, 
Afrikanerdom or the white „race‟ generally. In any event, the survivalist outlook of his 1962 
address is still apparent: whether it is the future of his association, volk or „race‟, the only 
way to guarantee „our survival‟ is through „a strong orientation of service to country and 
volk.‟ La Grange, therefore, remains committed to a volksdiens discourse: a psychology 
devoted to questions of „ethnic-national relevance‟ is valorized to the point that research 
problems of limited consequence appear to have their social significance read into them. 
After all, it is with some difficulty that the prevention of road accidents or, for that matter, the 
cultivation of giftedness, can be considered matters of national urgency, the neglect of which 
will imperil „the foundations of our continued national existence‟. La Grange, however, under 
the spell of an apocalyptic Afrikaner nationalist discourse, seems to view any given question 
through the prism of „ethnic-national relevance‟.107  
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1966 (J.M. HATTINGH) 
Delivering his presidential address on Clinical Psychology, Professionalism and Own 
Identity, Potchefstroom University‟s J.M. Hattingh takes issue with the medical community‟s 
opposition to the professional recognition of clinical psychology. He argues that, given the 
contributions of South African clinical psychologists in a variety of settings – educational and 
psychiatric in particular – public esteem for the profession is evident. Registration with the 
Medical Council as one of several „auxiliary services‟ confers on the profession no more than 
“underling” status (1966, p. 5); the ideal of a clinical psychology with “a fully-fledged 
professional status with [its] own identity can only be obtained in [its] own association, with 
[its] own register and ethical code, under control of its own Psychological Council” (ibid.). 
For Hattingh, this is to be achieved partly through universities offering suitable training 
programs for students and partly through clinical psychologists “actively convincing the 
                                                                    
107 Talk of ‘social relevance’ – of which ‘ethnic-national relevance’ can be considered a subtype – is 
associated typically with fears of “imminent social catastrophe” (Sher & Long, 2012, p. 569). 
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public and the medical profession of their competence” (p. 7). In turn, the standing of clinical 
psychology depends on the profession‟s effectiveness in ministrating to the needs of a help-
seeking public – that is, its „social relevance‟. Hattingh‟s address is aligned more closely with 
the professionalist discourse common among Afrikaner psychologists in the 1950s than with 
PIRSA‟s volksdiens discourse of the 1960s. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1967 (P.M. ROBBERTSE) 
In his address – Racial Differences and Psychology – Robbertse criticizes “[t]he shift in 
opinions about natural [racial] differences [in the direction of racial] equality” (1967, p. 1). 
Drawing on Henry E. Garrett, he attributes the altered climate of opinion to the rise of 
modern anthropology,108 the bad name the Nazis gave to racial theories, “[t]he striving of the 
African natives for freedom [that] roused strong sympathy in many whites” (ibid.), the 
Supreme Court ruling of 1954 that brought about the desegregation of American schools and, 
finally, the influence of communism. Robbertse agrees with Garrett that  
egalitarianism is the scientific joke of the century [but] a dang rous joke [at that] in so far as 
it implicates other people‟s survival. For these reasons it is deemed necessary to deal briefly 
with racial differences and the contribution that psychology has made and must still make. (p. 
3) 
Citing a host of American researchers and the work of the International Association for the 
Advancement of Ethnology and Eugenics, Robbertse decries UNESCO‟s Statement on Race 
as “notorious” (p. 5). Just as la Grange did in 1962, he falls back on “the ground-breaking 
work” (p. 7) of John Carothers who likened the intellectual capacity of the African to that of 
the lobotomized European. Y t he insists that the PIRSA principle on “the unlikeness of 
races” should not be confused with a belief in “the superiority or inferiority of races” (p. 3). 
 Robbertse reminds his peers that PIRSA was founded on the conviction that the 
equality of races was a “false religion” (ibid.). All PIRSA members – he calls them “realists” 
– have a “solemn duty” to “destroy the faulty and dangerous image [beeld] that the 
egalitarians have created” (p. 4). He laments the fact that  
some of the lecturers in psychology at our Afrikaans-language universities have become 
entangled in the nets of the racial equality philosophy… they have become its victims and… 
they are busy spiritually poisoning our students with it. Let us wake up before it is too late. (p. 
10) 
Robbertse – a Broederbonder himself (Wilkins & Strydom, 1978) – appeals to PIRSA 
members to “engage in research in the area on a greater scale because it involves the 
                                                                    
108 Robbertse adds that modern anthropology’s originator, Franz Boas, “a German Jew”, was also “a 
communist or had communistic affiliations” (p. 2). 
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scientific basis of separate development and it touches on the root of our survival” 
(Robbertse, 1967, p. 11). 
 Robbertse‟s rhetoric is rich with religious imagery. In his rendering, PIRSA‟s mission 
takes on Abrahamic proportions and involves nothing less than the destruction of a false idol: 
egalitarianism. Similar to la Grange, Robbertse‟s main concern is with guaranteeing „our 
survival‟ by proving through research of „ethnic-national relevance‟ that „the scientific basis‟ 
of apartheid policy is well-established. He, too, advances the discourse of volksdiens in which 
psychologists have a „solemn duty‟ to protect the volk from „spiritual poisoning‟. But unlike 
the professionalist discourse of the 1950s that concentrated largely on psychological practice, 
PIRSA‟s presidents – with the exception of Hattingh – are concerned only with the „ethnic-
national relevance‟ of psychological research. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1968 (P.M. ROBBERTSE) 
Continuing where he left off the previous year, Robbertse retains a focus on the perilousness 
of the modern life, influenced almost certainly by the worldwide turmoil of 1968. He begins 
his address – A Modern View of the Human Being in Psychological Practice – with the 
assertion that it is “the task… of the psychologist to reconsider and question the essence of 
schools of thought that deal with the origin, existence and destiny of man” (1968, p. 1). This 
is because of “the current unrest in human events on account of strike actions, protests and 
revolution, the misinterpretation and unholy violation of the moral codes of society on 
virtually all… fronts” (ibid.). He asks to what extent the “natural-scientification” 
(vernatuurwetenskapliking) of the discipline “has contributed to [the fact that] at present 
man‟s religious-ethical mode of existence is deteriorating [geknaag word] at increasing pace” 
(ibid.). Following la Grange‟s (1964) line of argument, Robbertse takes the view that 
technological progress “has robbed man of his soul” (1968, p. 2): now “a utility-being in the 
great machine of Robotism”, modern man “has become estranged from the cause of his 
existence, namely, God” (ibid.).  
 With the world in irreligious meltdown, the scene is set once more for socially 
conscious psychologists to intervene appropriately. Indeed, “as fellow guardians of national 
distinctiveness, we cannot but deliver a timely plea through our psychological work by 
attempting at least to make a contribution as a matter of support for a deranged humankind in 
a reeling [kenterende] world” (ibid.). Robbertse points the way by contending that humans 
are both spiritual and relational beings: he finds fault not only with the Freudian and 
behaviorist traditions but also with the dehumanizing manner in which psychologists 
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routinely interact with their respondents. Arguing for an “intersubjective method of approach 
in psychological practice” (p. 10), he contradicts any would-be objectivists on the grounds 
that “God the Creator… is the only complete Knower of each person and thereby the entire 
mankind” (ibid.). Like Schlebusch (1963) before him, Robbertse reacts negatively to social 
mobilization – but whereas the former opts for a liberal-individualist response, Robbertse 
adopts a service-oriented discourse of benevolence – distinct from Christian-National 
survivalism – whose concern is not with Afrikaners but with a „deranged humankind‟. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1969 (P.M. ROBBERTSE) 
Addressing himself to the topic, Psychology and the Problem of Scientific Unity in Our Time, 
Robbertse claims that it was Galileo‟s work that facilitated the separation of the natural from 
the human sciences and, later on, additional specializations within the two camps. From the 
seventeenth century onwards, scientific practice shifted from being qualitatively person-
oriented to being quantitatively materialist. Robbertse then observes, however, that recent 
developments in the natural sciences are leading to “the breaking-down of barriers” (1969, p. 
5). Meanwhile, as in eastern Europe, “[i]t appears as if in Western countries the pendulum 
has started to swing back and the nations of the West are approaching a rediscovery of the 
human sciences” (p. 6). The importance of social, economic and cultural development 
programs can be seen in the growing communist influence around the world: “in the socialist 
countries the human sciences are considered as important as their physical arsenal” (p. 7).  
 Robbertse believes that “[p]sychology is in a favorable position [with respect to the 
unity of science question] because it extends so neatly over both of the cultures in question” 
(p. 5). Additionally, given the spread of communist ideology, he recommends that 
the psychologist must ask himself what his duty is. Does the psychologist have a duty as 
regards the spread of ideologies that weaken his own worldview right down to the root so that 
his own survival is thereby threatened, or must he just follow an ostrich-politics and not 
notice the problem? (p. 7) 
In fact, the psychologist must do more than merely notice the problem because  
his spiritual assets will be threatened… he must also actually undertake research in the area 
[of communication studies]… The question can also be posed as to whether research in the 
field of psychology is providing the necessary contribution to the elaboration of our national 
affairs [volkshuishouding] – or is it purely research for the sake of research? … An analysis 
of the research projects that are currently underway in the field of psychology in South Africa 
does not leave a person without doubts. Too much thereof bears no relation to our national 
needs and the findings are often of such a nature that they have no meaning for anyone other 
than the researcher… Research on a topic such as the sexual life of a scorpion is clearly a 
waste of manpower, especially when our country‟s many human problems are taken into 
consideration. (pp. 7-8) 
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 According to Robbertse, psychological research – by dint of orienting itself towards 
issues of national import – will curtail the reach of communist propaganda, contribute to the 
national life by addressing its manifold human problems, and eventually assist in the 
reunification of science by bringing the human sciences to a point where “they can assume 
their rightful place beside the natural sciences” (p. 8). As in most of his previous addresses, 
Robbertse‟s rhetoric is symptomatic of the siege mentality that pervades Afrikaner nationalist 
discourse. Consistent with volksdiens discourse, he prescribes studies of „ethnic-national 
relevance‟ for dutibound psychologists, in order to avoid the calamitous trajectory of 
„irrelevant‟ research, namely, a communist takeover and a barrage of other social problems. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1970 (P.M. ROBBERTSE) 
Robbertse begins his address – Psychological Research and the Development of the Bantu 
Homelands – by recalling his previous year‟s plea, namely, that “psychological research in 
the Republic of South Africa must relate to our national needs” (1971, p. 2). In particular, he 
has in mind “an actual human problem that affects closely everyone in South Africa, 
regardless of color or political conviction… the reaction of the Bantu to the twentieth century 
Western world” (ibid.). Consequently, he regrets the fact that “publications about any aspect 
of the psychology of the Bantu are far scarcer than what they should be” and are restricted for 
the most part – as in the work of Biesheuvel – to the study of urban Bantus working in 
“White” areas (p. 4). 
 In terms of “research on psychological factors that play a role in the development of 
the Bantu homelands… what is the duty of psychology?” Robbertse asks (ibid., original 
emphases). He wonders whether “science can put itself in the service of the state” (ibid.), 
reasoning that “applied science, you will surely concede, primarily seeks after methods for 
the attainment of policy goals” (ibid., original emphasis). Besides, if Chris Barnard can find 
the justification to lengthen a person‟s life by giving him another heart,109 “isn‟t there just as 
much, if not more, justification to find a scientific basis for the motivation of people to 
develop their underdeveloped homeland” (p. 5)? While accepting that a scientist may choose 
not to contribute to the realization of a certain policy goal, Robbertse maintains that, “if a 
policy goal for humanitarian reasons… appears desirable or even crucially necessary, who 
can condemn [the researcher] if he orients his research towards the realization of that goal” 
(ibid.)? 
                                                                    
109 Robbertse is referring to the first successful human heart transplant performed in 1967 by South 
African cardiac surgeon Chris Barnard. 
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 For Robbertse, the question of the economic development of the Bantu homelands 
“must be seen especially as part of a process of acculturation induced to a large degree by 
Western culture” (ibid.). It is in the Bantu that certain characteristics – determinable through 
appropriate psychological research – “must be cultivated if he wants to function effectively in 
a predominantly Western capitalistic world” (p. 6). Moreover, psychological research into 
cultural factors that may influence the uptake of these characteristics is also indicated. 
Robbertse concludes with another question: “Are we, more particularly, directed adequately 
to the study of the Bantu in his hour of crisis, which is perhaps also our own hour of crisis” 
(p. 7)? 
 In calling for psychological research that will facilitate the cultural assimilation of the 
Bantu, Robbertse‟s address heralds a softening of hard-boiled PIRSA dogma. Whereas in 
previous addresses capitalism was an object of sustained derision, it is presented here as an 
economic system that Bantus need to embrace. To be sure, Robbertse continues to objectify 
the Bantu in a manner consistent with the notion of white stewardship – but on this occasion, 
he makes comparatively little effort to address the Afrikaner subject directly. Drawing on a 
collection of third-person interrogatives, hypotheticals and nominalizations, the survivalism 
of bygone years – bar the closing paragraph – is entirely absent. In the publishing journal, 
even, one observes the oddity of a PIRSA presidential address being followed for the first 
time by a brief English-language synopsis. At the level of the text, the once doctrinaire 
Afrikaners are in retreat from a world dominated increasingly by Western capitalists and 
English-speakers. As in his 1968 address, Robbertse employs the discourse of benevolence 
that, in this instance, is less concerned with the plight of Afrikaners than with the wellbeing 
of „Bantus‟. 
OPENING ADDRESS, 1970 (A.S. ROUX) 
Described by South Africa‟s first black psychologist, Chabani Manganyi, as “a very 
thoughtful person” (Segalo, 2006, p. 27), A.S. Roux was a member of PIRSA‟s first 
executive committee and, by 1970, had chaired the psychology department at the University 
of South Africa for nearly a quarter-of-a-century. His address – Revolution: A Few Social-
Psychological Characteristics – is divided into two sections: first, a general commentary on 
the genesis of revolutions, and second, an assessment of revolutionist potential in present-day 
America. Roux details “the gradual unwinding of historical processes” that preceded the 
French, Russian, English and American Revolutions, as well as the Reformation (1971, p. 
11). He notes further how the predictors of revolution – “travel and wanderings, moral 
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decline, feelings of frustration and bitterness, economic prosperity, hope among the 
oppressed and the changed loyalties of the intelligentsia” (pp. 12-13) – are present in some 
form or another in the United States, though he stops short of making a prediction. 
 Roux‟s position on revolution is not immediately clear. His low-key introduction does 
not reveal much, containing only the matter-of-fact remark, “We live in a time of revolution” 
(p. 10). The first indication of his politics comes later in the shape of his description of 
Patrice Lumumba as “half-literate” (p. 12). Resembling the reformed Robbertse (1971), Roux 
does not view American capitalism as the enemy. He expresses solidarity with Richard Nixon 
and claims that it is the “subverters of authority” (Roux, 1971, p. 13) – leftist intellectuals and 
student radicals – that present the greatest danger to future civilization whose “potential 
leaders in their youth are wasting their valuable opportunities for preparation… for the 
increasingly stern demands of the technocentric civilization for which we are heading” (pp. 
13, 17). Then, reflecting on one Franklin H. Williams‟ claim that “the traditional, hide-bound 
white-power [university] establishment… has abandoned its democratic ideals, and become 
bogged down in technocratic irrelevancies” (1969, quoted ibid., p. 14), Roux observes first of 
all that Williams is “a Negro” (p. 14) before writing him off as one among several instances 
of “authority figures and intellectuals that attempt to whitewash lawlessness, violence and 
anarchy” (p. 15).  
 Since campus radicalism was a response to the „social irrelevance‟ of universities 
claiming to serve humankind, Roux‟s repudiation of Williams is unusual given the service 
orientation of Afrikaans-language universities themselves. Like Robbertse (1971), he appears 
to accept the “Robotism” against which the same president had railed just two years earlier. 
Another anomaly in Roux‟s address is the lack of consideration given to revolutionist 
potential in South Africa. Again similar to Robbertse (1971), Roux distances himself from the 
Christian-National discourse of dangerousness and from PIRSA‟s associated imperative to 
serve the endangered volk. Then again, because the period between the mid-sixties and early-
seventies represented the heyday of apartheid rule (D. O'Meara, 1996), the sense of threat 
may well and truly have subsided. With the Afrikaner predicament no longer what it used to 
be, PIRSA bigwigs started to go along with the prospect of a technocratic capitalism – and 
drifted from the „ethnic-national relevance‟ of yore. This would occasion a corresponding 
change in the order of discourse.  
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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1972 (H.L. KRIGE) 
Talking about Personality, Giftedness and Creative Thoughts against the backdrop of “all the 
dangers of changing world conditions,” H.L. Krige (1973, p. 1) recalls la Grange (1964) and 
Robbertse (1968) in their pomp, as well as Roux‟s address on revolution. He blames the 
“rapid technological development of Western civilization” for creating “a worrying gap 
between old and young” (Krige, 1973, p. 1), with the result that “the gifted youth in 
particular… revolts against existing systems” (p. 2). Speaking to “one of the greatest 
contradictions of the modern youth rebellion” (p. 4) – gender equality – Krige points out that 
“the woman… has a smaller brain than the man” (ibid.) and that “because the emotionally 
labile person displays a tendency to perform worse under pressure… we cannot expect 
therefore that the achievement of the woman will match that of the man in all respects” (p. 5). 
According to his research, men are more capable of creative thoughts than women – “it is 
therefore surely not pure coincidence that the four most creative personalities that I was able 
to identify during ten years of research in this area were all boys” (p. 7). Krige‟s broader 
point, however, is that unless provision is made for gifted children in the schooling system – 
many of whom are already underachieving – they will not achieve in later life in accordance 
with their abilities and may end up dedicating their creative talents to the cause of political 
rebellion. 
 Although Krige introduces his topic with political-sounding turns of phrase – “the 
challenge of the near future”, “the leaders of the future”, “maintenance of current progress” 
(p. 1) – the remainder of his address is devoted to the humdrum reportage of correlations and 
means. The discontinuity between his opening paragraphs and what follows is a function of 
being a new president with no reputation to precede him. Krige must earn, as it were, the 
right to speak. His use of an introduction inquisitive, therefore, is not simply an attempt to 
persuade his audience that the chosen topic is an important one (Corbett & Connors, 1999, p. 
261). By using this rhetorical form, he accomplishes simultaneously an ethical appeal (ethos), 
revealing his moral character to the audience by speaking a language with which it is well 
familiar: the significance of giftedness and creativity in a dangerous world. By declaring his 
allegiance to standard PIRSA doctrine, Krige shows his “respect for the commonly 
acknowledged virtues” (ibid., p. 73) – that is, the importance of „ethnic-national relevance‟ in 
psychological research – while the audience, now convinced of his good intentions, is better 
disposed to receiving his message. 
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PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1973 (A.B. VAN DER MERWE) 
The first southerner to be elected PIRSA president,110 A.B. van der Merwe presents a talk on 
The Medical Model in Clinical Psychology. Contradicting the biologism of his 1955 SAPA 
address, van der Merwe advises the natural scientist against reducing all conscious 
experience to biochemical reactions, which will result in “the person being treated more and 
more like a robot” (1974, p. 9). On the other hand, he questions the competence of 
psychologists in treating a new form of personality disturbances that emerged in the sixties: 
“[a]nomie, alienation, rootlessness, existential vacuum, nonbeing, meaninglessness, 
absurdity, despair philosophy, credibility gap, generation gap, campus radical, backlash, etc.” 
(Mitchell, 1971, p. 120 quoted ibid., p. 11).  According to van der Merwe, neither Freudian 
pessimism nor Rogerian humanism can provide adequate frameworks within which to 
conceptualize these phenomena. Cognizance must be taken of the importance of the religious 
sensibility to personality structure: 
The religious self enables the human being [to participate] in a completely different 
relationship to the purely interpersonal, namely, the relationship with his personal Creator. If 
this highest need of the personality is not satisfied, or if the personal relationship is severed, 
then we can expect nothing other than alienation, meaninglessness and aimlessness… (p. 15) 
 Similar to Robbertse (1971) and Roux (1971), van der Merwe is far removed from 
PIRSA‟s customary survivalism. But this is not proof of some intractable discrepancy 
between the political articulations of southern and northern Afrikaners (D. O'Meara, 1996): 
after all, Robbertse (1971) and Roux (1971) are hardened northerners themselves who appear 
to have relinquished many of the ideological assurances of old, while van der Merwe‟s views 
resonate appreciably with those of la Grange (1964) and Robbertse (1968) in recalling the 
dehumanizing consequences of modern living. All things considered, van der Merwe‟s 
address fits the mold of the 1970s during which PIRSA‟s discursive formations become 
increasingly unstable. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1975 (J.M. DU TOIT) 
J.M. du Toit begins his address – Psychology – the Science of Living? – with an introduction 
narrative in which he describes how Sigmund Koch, the editor of a seven-volume tome on the 
discipline in the 1950s, was “now looking back with a measure of disillusionment and despair 
at the undertaking of those days” (du Toit, 1975, p. 1). Du Toit accuses educational 
institutions of “indoctrination”, “tyranny” and “coercion” exercised against their own 
                                                                    
110 In his final address as PIRSA president, la Grange refers to van der Merwe as “our dear Vice-President 
from the South” (1966, p. 13). 
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students who, under “threat of exams” and faced with “the full authority and eminence of the 
master”, end up believing that the material transmitted to them is “the whole truth of 
undeniable facts” (ibid., original emphasis). He muses that,  
unless a man petrifies in the groove completely, all manner of vexations, doubt, uncertainties, 
things that bother, questions [must] gather, which get pushed aside for attention one day if 
there is time…. He asks out loud: “Is there such a thing as truth? (pp. 1-2) 
 Taking his own advice “to stare your sacred cows… in the eye” (p. 2), du Toit 
launches into an excoriating takedown of the discipline, lambasting what he sees as the 
intersection of cult formation in psychology (p. 3) with the scientific posturing of 
psychoanalysis (pp. 4-5), psychodiagnostics (pp. 6-10), psychophysiological measurement 
(pp. 10-13), encounter groups (pp. 13-15), behavior therapy (pp. 15-17) and research 
practices (pp. 17-21). In contrast to Roux‟s (1971) unruly students, du Toit expresses 
sympathy for his charges who – he quotes Koch –  
are asked to read and memorize a literature consisting of an endless set of advertisements for 
the emptiest of concepts, the most inflated theories, the most trivial „findings‟, and the most 
fetishistic yet heuristically self-defeating methods in scholarly history – and all of it conveyed 
in the dreariest and most turgid prose that ever met the printed page. (du Toit, 1975, p. 25) 
 Du Toit‟s second-guessing of the benefits of registration, meanwhile, contradicts not 
only the views of la Grange (1962) and Hattingh (1966), but seems ill-advised when one 
considers that the first Professional Board for Psychology had been established only a year 
earlier – and after much struggle, at that. Indeed, just as he buttresses his wide-ranging 
criticism of the discipline with the disclaimer that his intention “is not to discredit 
psychology” (du Toit, 1975, p. 2), he apologizes for his forthright remarks about the 
profession with a negative politeness strategy that, in terms of transitivity, makes liberal use 
of nominalizations and the passive voice: “[w]hat is mentioned here is not meant as 
accusations [but is presented] only as considerations… for deliberation” (p. 21). Nonetheless, 
despite himself Du Toit ends up questioning the Afrikaner ideal of public service through 
psychology, claiming that registration does not protect the public but, rather, practitioners 
themselves, adding that psychotherapy on average achieves nothing. 
 More than Robbertse (1971), Roux (1971) or van der Merwe (1974), du Toit turns 
1960s‟ PIRSA dogma on its head. He foregoes the strains of Afrikaner piety for a discourse 
of disciplinarity, while rejecting the charge of scientism (1975, pp. 2, 4). Akin to Robbertse 
(1969), however, he concedes that “despite advanced methodological development a very 
large part of the overwhelming amount of research remains insignificant, trivial, practically 
inconsequential or unreliable” (du Toit, 1975, p. 18). Du Toit‟s relentless interrogation of 
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science and profession constitutes a sweeping re-evaluation of the discipline‟s „ethnic-
national relevance‟ credentials. A programmatic U-turn that began with Robbertse (1971) has 
culminated in iconoclastic free-fall: du Toit‟s diatribe hints at an association in despair over 
the merits of its case. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1977 (H.P. LANGENHOVEN) 
If du Toit‟s address marks a low-point in PIRSA‟s regular order of business, H.P. 
Langenhoven‟s What Can Psychology Do? comes close to restoring equilibrium. Like du 
Toit, Langenhoven begins with an introduction narrative, his opening comments an implicit 
reference to the deadly riots of 1976 and the ongoing border wars: 
In 1917, when the U.S.A. entered the First World War, the American Psychological 
Association appointed a committee to determine what psychology could do to win the war… 
Today South Africa is also involved in a war, not just a military war but a war on different 
fronts that is being waged against it – especially psychologically. Today every citizen, every 
organization, even science, even psychology, should ask itself what it can do to confront our 
current problems. In my opinion we in psychology have a very meaningful contribution to 
make… Our country is involved in the first instance in a psychological war that must be 
fought with the best psychological means. I wonder if the time has not come for our 
universities to make far better provision for the teaching of military psychology. (1977, pp. 1, 
4) 
Elsewhere, on an economic front marked by “capital shortages, a decrease in economic 
activity, unemployment and inflation” (p. 4), Langenhoven recommends that psychologists 
assist in the identification of leadership potential and the maximization of workforce 
productivity.  As for „race‟ relations, “the psychologist can make an important contribution 
by putting the problem in proper perspective, collecting and analyzing appropriate data, 
coming to conclusions, communicating these in an understandable and acceptable manner 
and helping with the implementation of the findings” (p. 8). Similarly, valuable contributions 
can be – and are being – made in education and mental health. 
 Given that “psychology in many of these instances is not up to the task of [fulfilling] 
its exceptionally difficult duties” (p. 10), Langenhoven proceeds to share his reflections on 
how the discipline can meet these various challenges. He asks if “the courses that we teach 
and the training that we provide to students [are sensitive to] the needs of the future in a 
changing society” (p. 11). He observes that a lack of funding in the social sciences explains 
why the world‟s biggest problems are human problems and that “[a]ttempts at eliminating the 
human being from the system are doomed to failure” (p. 13). Furthermore, the lack of 
incentives for researchers means that research for curiosity‟s sake is becoming scarcer too. 
On the other hand, “we are not only responsible for the development of psychology as 
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science but also of psychology as a profession that must deliver a service to society” (ibid.). 
Accordingly, close collaboration between PIRSA and SAPA – “which is the case anyway” 
(p. 14) – becomes a necessity. For Langenhoven, there is nothing odd about having two 
associations negotiating with one Professional Board: “the biggest problem in my opinion is 
the group that stands apart and does not join either of the associations,” he says (p. 15). He 
adds that it can be arranged for “non-whites” to be admitted to PIRSA if sufficient members 
desire this – although “the opportunity [to join] SAPA already exists” (ibid.). 
 Consonant with early PIRSA addresses, Langenhoven recapitulates the precariousness 
of the South African situation and the consequent duty of psychologists to intervene. 
Countering du Toit‟s nihilism, Langenhoven commends social engagement to his listeners 
but does so from a position of seeming remoteness. For example, he never pauses to disclose 
the identity of the enemy in this “war of low intensity” (p. 3). As for the two-year compulsory 
military service, he speaks impersonally of “the absolute importance of special steps being 
taken [to ensure] that these people‟s time is put to best use” (ibid., added emphasis). The 
proposed solution for „race‟ relations – quoted earlier – is similarly abstract: all that is 
required is for one to follow the standard research recipe, namely, problem formulation, data 
collection, data analysis, conclusion, communication of findings and implementation, in that 
order. On the professional front, there is nothing more to be done vis-à-vis PIRSA-SAPA 
relations as the two associations are collaborating already, nor is there any reason to tamper 
with PIRSA‟s whites-only policy since SAPA is already willing to admit “non-whites” to its 
ranks. In other places, “the group that stands apart” (p. 15) remains unnamed, while 
nonspecific talk of “pro-active forces”, “reactive forces”, “pressure from outside” (p. 6) and 
“people” (e.g. pp. 7-8) proliferates. In light of Langenhoven‟s frequent use of the high 
modality auxiliary verb, must, it is not clear where the necessary human agents will be 
coming from when his subjects‟ identities remain consistently indeterminate. In retrospect, it 
is poignant that la Grange (1964) warned of the existential threat facing the Afrikaner nation, 
Robbertse (1968) grieved the loss of man‟s soul and van der Merwe (1974) inveighed against 
alienation, for, by the time one gets to Langenhoven, there appear to be no sentient beings left 
at all. It is as if du Toit‟s annihilation of the discipline ends up depriving Langenhoven of the 
very protagonists his plan of action requires. Although Langenhoven goes through the 
motions of advancing a volksdiens discourse – the country is „at war‟ while the discipline 
struggles with „exceptionally difficult duties‟ to „deliver a service to society‟ – the volk itself 
seems to have disappeared. 
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DISCUSSION 
In the 1960s, PIRSA advances the cause of „ethnic-national relevance‟ by drawing on a 
discourse of volksdiens (la Grange, 1964, 1966; Robbertse, 1964, 1967, 1969). For most of 
that decade, addresses are saturated with concerns about the survival of Afrikanerdom and the 
resultant need for a psychology oriented towards ethnic-national service. Over the course of 
the 1970s, however, calls for „ethnic-national relevance‟ recede into the background. 
Increasingly less mention is made of South African politics – Robbertse (1971) and 
Langenhoven (1977) are nominal exceptions – as speakers discuss international 
developments (Roux, 1971), intra-disciplinary matters (du Toit, 1975; Krige, 1973) and the 
existential angst of human beings in general (van der Merwe, 1974). This is surprising in 
view of the fact that, by the early seventies, the apartheid state was beginning to show signs 
of decline. Instead of a reinvigorated Christian-National discourse of danger, one observes a 
growing distance from the travails of local politics that manifests rhetorically as a series of 
red herrings (Corbett & Connors, 1999), including culturally imperiled Bantus (Robbertse, 
1971), intellectually inferior women (Krige, 1973), pervasive anomie (van der Merwe, 1974) 
and the scientific posturing of an unscientific discipline (du Toit, 1975). 
 The discordance between PIRSA‟s discursive orders of the 1960s and 1970s has much 
to do with the declaration of a republic in 1961, when Afrikaner nationalism forfeited its sine 
qua non: it “could no longer avail itself of its old British bogeyman to mobilise the volk” (D. 
O'Meara, 1996, p. 116).111 Meanwhile, economic and cultural developments weakened the 
apartheid project further as verligtes (reformists) and verkramptes (conservatives) battled 
each other for control of the NP. On the economic front, the trouble began in 1964 with a 
mining agreement between Federale Mynbou and Harry Oppenheimer‟s Anglo American 
Corporation. Afrikanerdom was outraged. Afrikaner nationalist discourse was zealously anti-
capitalist, sustained by “the myth of a classless volk” (ibid., p. 136). After having struggled 
valiantly against the depredations of British imperialism, the volk appeared now to be cutting 
deals with „Hoggenheimer‟ capitalism. The uncomfortable truth, however, was that the NP‟s 
economic policy of favoring Afrikaner workers had increased their social stratification to 
such an extent that, by the mid-sixties, it was no longer possible to identify the volk‟s 
common interest. Meanwhile, on the cultural scene, the rise of the Sestigers – a literary 
                                                                    
111 Verwoerd himself would abandon the goal of fully Afrikanerizing the country. Pursuing a conciliatory 
line with English-speaking whites and pressing ahead with his ‘Homelands’ policy, he was always headed 
for trouble with the far right. But because of the prime minister’s commanding personality, dissent did 
not break out until after his assassination in September 1966. 
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movement that tackled questions on sexual liberation, racial tolerance and modernity – 
scandalized the sedate Afrikaner establishment but ignited the imagination of Afrikaans 
readers (Giliomee, 2003). Conservatives interpreted the trend as evidence of a creeping 
communist influence: the remainder of the decade saw much maneuvering within Afrikaner 
cultural institutions and a concomitant struggle to define authentic Afrikanerdom (D. 
O'Meara, 1996).  
 Complicating these inter-Afrikaner tensions was the eruption of a press war that 
stoked longstanding north-south rivalries. When, in late 1965, the Cape-based Nasionale Pers 
decided to publish a Sunday paper – Die Beeld – in the Transvaal, it loosed upon itself the 
fury of northerners, lighting the fuse for an all-out war between verligtes and verkramptes. 
Driven by commercial interests, the press saga drove another stake into the heart of Afrikaner 
unity. With Verwoerd‟s killing and John Vorster‟s succession to the prime ministership, the 
flames of discontent spread rapidly. Vorster had no NP track record to speak of, nor did he 
enjoy a provincial constituency within the party. With a consequently hands-off leadership 
style, he not only came close to presiding over what would have been a catastrophic splitting 
of the volk but also proved unable to provide any ideological direction for the party (D. 
O'Meara, 1996). It was only when he revisited his strongman past – as one-time Justice 
Minister, Vorster is credited with having put down the black resistance of the early sixties – 
that a semblance of order was restored. In 1969, after establishing the brutal Bureau for State 
Security and using it as his de facto political base, Vorster – a verligte by default – crushed 
what had been building into a formidable verkrampte insurrection. While he may have lacked 
the ideological nous of his predecessor, he was not short on pragmatism, for, despite flirting 
with defeat at the hands of those more inclined to a laager psychology, state had trumped 
party. With the emergence of newly-rich Afrikaners during the boom years of the sixties, 
Vorster was indifferent in the face of verkrampte disgust at “the crass materialist excess of 
the new Afrikaner bourgeoisie [and] its easy renunciation of the populist civic culture of 
Afrikaner nationalism for capitalist wheeling and dealing” (ibid., p. 165).  
 The years of plenty did not last. South Africa‟s capital-intensive mode of production 
led to rising unemployment among black African workers while job reservation for whites 
and movement restrictions on blacks translated into a shortage of workers with the requisite 
technical skills (D. O'Meara, 1996). Inflation started rising in the early seventies, black 
African workers began striking and, by 1976, the country had been plunged into a recession. 
The buffer states, too, were seeing revolutionary change. ZANU guerrillas succeeded in 
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infiltrating Rhodesia in 1972, Mozambique attained independence in 1975 via the collapse of 
Portuguese colonialism, the South African army suffered a humiliating defeat in early 1976 at 
the hands of Angolan and Cuban forces, and, after the death-by-shooting of scores of Soweto 
youths later that year, the NP could no longer swear by the morality of the Afrikaner mission 
(D. O'Meara, 1996). If the sixties were about the splintering of the party, the seventies 
witnessed the decline of the state.  
 When interpreting the PIRSA addresses for the period in question – 1963 to 1977 – 
the socio-political currents of those years assume heightened significance. The speeches point 
clearly to the progressive unraveling of PIRSA‟s ideological coherence, which can be 
explained in terms of several developments. First, with the fulfillment of the republic dream, 
nationalist discourse no longer exerted a vice-like grip on the collective imagination of 
Afrikaners. Second, economic progress led to the stratification of the volk and the mitigation 
of anti-capitalist scorn. Third, cultural trends undermined the received wisdoms of 
Afrikanerdom. Fourth, a rancorous press war fomented regional divisions. And fifth, 
contrasting prime ministerial leadership styles ensured that the ideological certainties of 
bygone years would be lost forever.  
 PIRSA‟s inability to get back on the ideological bandwagon was not the result of 
deliberately nonpartisan professionalizing drives – it was only Hattingh (1966) who paid 
professionalization any serious attention at all. Rather, it was the inevitable consequence of 
the bandwagon itself – Grand Apartheid – beginning to lose its wheels altogether. During the 
sixties, PIRSA, in pursuit of „ethnic-national relevance‟, could appeal to an age-old discourse 
of dangerousness. At the start of the seventies, however, with the fragility of the apartheid 
project starting to show, it was now a generic „social relevance‟ that was sought, rationalized 
by identifying conditions obtaining in the wider world – such as Western capitalism 
(Robbertse, 1971), the contradictions of a technocratic social order (Krige, 1973) and the 
preponderance of anomie (van der Merwe, 1974). Later still, one encounters the inversion of 
„social relevance‟ in the forms of an irreverent critique of an irrelevant discipline (du Toit, 
1975), an impugnment of the Afrikaner public service ideal (ibid.) and a formulation of 
„socially relevant‟ psychology best described as rarefied (Langenhoven, 1977). With its 
politics on the brink, one discerns in the final years of PIRSA‟s existence the collapse of its 
„relevance‟ register. Disconnected for all intents and purposes from the lexicon of its 
founding philosophy, the association itself was soon to run its course. 
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CHAPTER 9: SAPA, PIRSA, PASA & OASSSA ADDRESSES (1978-1993) 
 
Knowledge for the sake of understanding, not merely to prevail, that is the essence of our being… For if we 
fail to struggle and fail to think beyond our petty lot, we accept a sordid role. (Simon Biesheuvel quoting 
Vannevar Bush – PASA address, 1986) 
[T]raditional professional organisations… have in the perception of both the people of this country and 
beyond, been seen to be too closely allied to the ideology and practices of the apartheid state and are 
therefore irrelevant to people’s needs. (Jerry Coovadia –OASSSA address, 1987) 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter analyzes addresses delivered at SAPA/PIRSA, PASA and OASSSA congresses 
between 1978 and 1993. It details how, during the height of resistance to apartheid rule, 
SAPA, PIRSA and PASA advanced a depoliticized order of discourse consisting of 
disciplinary, professionalist and cultural discourses in which „social relevance‟ was either 
defined as a non-issue or articulated in politically conservative terms. It illustrates further 
how OASSSA, in its rendition of „social relevance‟, promoted a liberationist discourse that 
insisted on the harmful impact of apartheid policy on mental health and the ensuing 
obligation of mental health professionals to align themselves with the mass resistance 
movement. The chapter then describes PASA‟s anointment of a salvation discourse according 
to which the pursuit of „social relevance‟, with a new political era beckoning, became a 
rescuing act that would assure the future of the discipline. It concludes with an account of the 
political climate in which these contrasting discursive formations took shape. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1978 (H.P. LANGENHOVEN – PIRSA) 
In 1974, SAPA and PIRSA‟s joint efforts culminated in registration becoming a requirement 
by law (Nicholas, 1990). By November 1976, PIRSA was putting out feelers with a view to 
establishing an even closer alliance – including the possibility of outright unification. Dreyer 
Kruger, for example, who had opposed the registration of the Indian psychologist 
Chanderpaul Ramphal in 1960, now believed that the existence of two associations was not in 
the best interests of the discipline: apartheid policy was not working, professional divisions 
made little sense to the younger generation of psychologists and “[n]o black or brown group 
had made use of PIRSA‟s willingness to assist in the establishment of separate organizations 
for these groups” (PIRSA Newsletter 16, 1977, p. 3 quoted ibid., p. 62). Kruger‟s position, 
however, far from represented the official party line: PIRSA hardliners were not interested in 
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integration, while moderates such as Langenhoven (1977) were more circumspect in their 
appraisals. It took, consequently, several more years before the amalgamation was realized, 
but between 1978 and 1982, SAPA and PIRSA agreed to hold joint national congresses. 
 In The Registration of Psychologists,112 Langenhoven describes at length the events 
that led to the establishment of the first Professional Board, pausing to pay tribute to the 
many psychologists that contributed to the cause but “are no longer with us to reap the 
benefits” (1978, p. 4). He states that the Board was established “with a view to protecting the 
general public from psychological malpractices” (p. 3), which should be “more inclined to 
utilize the services of psychologists” (pp. 5-6). In turn, “the reputation of the profession and 
the status of practitioners can be improved” (p. 6). Unlike la Grange – who had in mind only 
“the professional interests of all psychologists in the Republic” (1962, p. 17) – and du Toit – 
for whom “an organized profession… solidifies sooner or later into a more or less rigid 
bureaucracy” (1975, p. 23) – Langenhoven believes that professionalization “is a very noble 
cause [from which] the public, psychology as a science and profession, as well as all 
practicing psychologists should reap the benefits” (1978, p. 6). 
 Langenhoven expresses his concern, however, at the possibility that certain provisions 
in the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service Professions Act may end up 
placing much-needed psychological services beyond the reach of the community. By 
reserving certain practices for registered psychologists, the Act can “do serious harm to 
psychology and deprive society of valuable services” (p. 8). Also – as in his 1977 address – 
he repudiates “the false impression that the introduction of the Professional Board has 
rendered SAPA and PIRSA superfluous” (p. 13). Statutory recognition is not a goal in itself: 
“[it] is a necessary means to help ensure that the goal of good psychological services to the 
community and satisfaction with the people that deliver it is attained” (p. 14). Although the 
Professional Board continues to function beneath the aegis of the South African Medical and 
Dental Council, the goal of psychologists – departing from Hattingh‟s (1966) position – 
should not be the attainment of full independence: “[w]e should rather with all our strength 
develop our profession to deliver the kinds of services to society by which we shall earn their 
respect” (Langenhoven, 1978, p. 14). What this requires is not “a long list of regulations 
which even prescribes the size of nameplates” (p. 15) – “[i]n this way we do not win the 
respect of the public” (ibid.) – but continued SAPA-PIRSA cooperation in order “to keep [the 
                                                                    
112 Full text versions of this speech are available in both English and Afrikaans. Most excerpts here have 
been taken from the English version. 
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Professional Board] on the right track” (ibid.). Langenhoven concludes with the assurance 
that “I have no fear that on the road ahead there will not be work for psychologists” (p. 16). 
 As he did the year before, Langenhoven continues to speak the language of public 
service – the difference, on this occasion, is that he makes no reference to the domestic 
political landscape. Instead – like the Afrikaner psychologists of the 1950s – he inserts the 
service motif into a professionalist discourse, precipitating something of a contradiction: 
protection of the term „psychologist‟ means not only that “better services can be rendered to 
society” (p. 6) but also that “[r]egistration is compulsory for everybody who wishes to 
practice as a psychologist for a profit” (p. 5, added emphasis). The choice of words is 
revealing: Langenhoven implies that not everyone practices for a profit and – true to the 
Afrikaner service ideal – distances himself from the profit motive. That he stops to draw this 
distinction arises from the fact that the composition of his audience has changed. 
Langenhoven is no longer preaching to the converted: he is addressing the first-ever joint 
SAPA-PIRSA congress and must innovate, therefore, a non-partisan, inclusive discourse. It is 
unavoidable that incongruities such as the service-profit antinomy will arise, the direct result 
of his discursive hybridization (Parker, 1992). 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1979 (L.C. GERDES – SAPA) 
Appointed in 1975 as the first female head of UNISA‟s Department of Psychology, Lily 
Gerdes observes that her presidential term coincides with the discipline‟s international 
centenary.  In her address – Perspectives, Issues and the Need for a History of Psychology in 
South Africa113 – Gerdes explains the wording of the title: “I hesitate to use the phrase „South 
African Psychology‟ because this would imply that a psychology peculiar to South Africa 
had been produced” (1979, p. 1). She notes that “psychology and psychologists stand on the 
brink of a new era” heralded by  
(i) A growing spirit of co-operation between SAPA and SIRSA.114 
(ii) A new system of professional registration. 
(iii) The urgent and far-reaching changes which are taking place in South Africa. (p. 2) 
 
Accordingly, she encourages – among other objectives – interdisciplinary collaboration, the 
relating of “teaching, research, professional training and community needs to one another by 
                                                                    
113 The address was delivered in English. I am deeply indebted to Professor Gerdes for making this speech 
available to me. 
114 SIRSA is the Afrikaans-language equivalent of the PIRSA acronym and stands for “Sielkundige Instituut 
van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika.” 
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being sensitive to real-life situations and crises” (ibid.), and a consideration of “what 
psychology can do to enhance the future of this country and its peoples” (ibid.).  
 For Gerdes, “[p]sychology is the study of human development and behaviour in a 
variety of contexts and in interaction with many systems of which the individual is a part” (p. 
3). These include the family system, the educational and knowledge system, the continuing 
education system, the recreation system, the health system, the social and ideological system, 
the economic and occupational system, and the environmental system. She proceeds, then, to 
ask:  
[I]s the clinician trained in a mental hospital equipped to deal with the cardiac patient in a 
general hospital or with a woman in a maternity home facing the birth of her first child?... On 
the other hand, one may similarly ask whether the psychologist who is a content specialist, say 
in the field of human development, is by virtue of his theoretical knowledge equipped to deal 
with a child suffering from some kind of developmental delay? (p. 4) 
Academic departments need to distinguish between general and specific knowledge, which, 
for Gerdes, requires “[t]he introduction of a specialist register at doctoral level [that] will 
encourage highly specialized training” (p. 5). This suggests the usefulness of having different 
kinds of psychological associations: a “General Psychological Association” (p. 7) that 
oversees the interests of the discipline and specialist professional groups that operate beneath 
this umbrella body. Gerdes argues that there is also a need to utilize the services of lower-
level graduates with undergraduate and honors degrees because of the high demand for 
services, the wastage involved in using “highly trained persons for certain activities” (p. 8), 
and the fact that “[t]he greatest shortage of registered psychologists exists in the Black, 
Indian and so-called Coloured population groups” (p. 9). The contributions of laypersons are 
also not to be underestimated, particularly since “the indications are that psychologists will 
increasingly move into the community” (p. 11). A professional focus on prevention and 
“optimum development” is essential (p. 13) as is a re-evaluation of disciplinary values – for 
example, the sexism of psychoanalysis. 
 Gerdes is speaking the language of „relevance‟: from her use of systems theory, her 
positive valuation of the role of lay persons in the profession and her concern with the 
shortage of psychologists in other “population groups”, her objective is evidently to promote 
the „social relevance‟ of the discipline. Nonetheless, while she regards the “social and 
ideological system” as an integral part of the human context, she never explores this system 
that has brought untold misery into the lives of the majority of South Africans. She focuses, 
rather, on the “cardiac patient”, a “woman in a maternity home” and helping “the aged in 
their own homes” (p. 11). For Gerdes, „social relevance‟ amounts to a capacity for 
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“involvement with „normal‟ crisis situations of non-psychiatric and non-clinical groups” 
(ibid.), and implies further differentiation of the professional register. The idea of drawing on 
lay expertise, meanwhile, occurred to her not on the basis of local insights but during “my 
recent study-tour overseas to the U.S.A., Netherlands, England, Germany and Austria. In a 
hotel in the United States I was, for example, amazed by an array of brochures on where to 
seek help for [a variety of] problems” (p. 10). She also desists from explaining why the 
“shortage of registered psychologists [that] exists in the Black, Indian and so-called Coloured 
population groups” (p. 9) is problematic in the first place. It may be that there is nothing to 
explain: her allusion to various racial groupings is symptomatic of the country‟s hegemonic 
discourse of difference and its taken-for-granted implication that effective psychological 
interventions can only occur between patients and professionals of the same „population 
group‟. In sum, Gerdes‟ understanding of „social relevance‟ is politically conservative, 
articulating itself in the form of a professionalist discourse. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1980 (I. VAN W. RAUBENHEIMER – PIRSA) 
Naas Raubenheimer begins his address – Psychology in South Africa: Development, Trends 
and Future Perspectives115 – with the observation that “South Africans are moving into an 
era which is characterized by marked changes in almost all spheres of life – political, societal, 
religious, social and psychological” (1981, p. 1). He adds that since “South Africans today 
ask penetrating questions about the future… it is imperative that psychologists or behavioural 
scientists should be certain about the role they can play in contributing to, or in adapting to 
the processes of change” (ibid.). He reflects positively on the growing profile of academic, 
professional and research psychology in the country and notes that “psychologists in South 
Africa have succeeded in attracting the attention of the public at large. The demand for their 
services is certain, they are increasingly acquiring esteem and respect, and have secured a 
particular status in society” (p. 3). 
 Nevertheless, Raubenheimer is critical of the state of the discipline. Broadly, “all 
work done by South African psychologists” (ibid.) is either unempirical or shows “little or no 
concern for generalized validity and applicability to real life situations” (ibid.). The local 
corpus of psychological knowledge amounts to little more than “an overwhelming collection 
of facts” (ibid.), while psychological practice inhabits “a climate of pragmatism and 
superficiality” (ibid.). In order to integrate this “uncoordinated collection of facts” (p. 4), 
Raubenheimer talks up the potential of a general systems approach that, because “it 
                                                                    
115 The address was delivered in English. 
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comprises a breadth of vision… [it] makes provision for the integration of knowledge in a 
wide array of fields” (p. 4). He concludes that “[i]t seems as if the end of an era in many 
spheres of life has been announced…. All factors considered, it would appear that two 
interesting decades await us, a period during which unprecedented progress and 
breakthroughs could be made” (p. 5). 
 Like Gerdes, Raubenheimer reminds the audience of the momentous changes 
sweeping through the country – and, as with his predecessor, he provides no details about 
what or whom these changes involve. Because of his acknowledgement of “the contemporary 
South African scene” (p. 1), he ends up invoking the importance of systems theory – again 
similar to Gerdes – but without a grounded demonstration of its suitability for the South 
African situation. Instead, when referencing the national context – that is, the impending 
collapse of apartheid ideology – he opts for the orthodoxies of scientific language, describing 
through his use of passivization (“has been announced”, “could be made” – to mention 
already-cited examples) a tumultuous process of social change that is seemingly agentless. 
While he asserts that “the end of the 20th century is no longer on the distant horizon” (p. 5) 
and that, therefore, a more „socially relevant‟ psychology is urgently required, the transitivity 
features of his speech end up keeping the exact details of „the end of the 20th century‟ at 
arm‟s length. Raubenheimer, in fact, spends the greater portion of his address reflecting on “a 
psychology whose metaphysical framework… is outdated [and whose] conception of its 
subject matter, man, is no longer appropriate if indeed it ever was” (p. 3). Taken up with 
fundamental questions, he ends up endorsing a discourse of disciplinarity. 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS, 1980 (D.J.W. STRÜMPFER – SAPA) 
In his keynote address – Towards a More Socially Responsive Psychology 116  – Deo 
Strümpfer pauses to reflect on the congress theme of „Taking Responsibility‟. He claims that, 
given “the incidence of social pathology among our black population” (1981, p. 18) and the 
rates of divorce and coronary heart disease on the white side, “there is undoubtedly enough to 
be done by psychologists” (ibid.). He finds himself wondering, however, “[w]hat can be done 
to wake us up” (ibid.), seeing as  
South African psychologists are often conspicuous by their absence [when it comes to] getting 
out of our laboratories into the real world, out of an environment controlled and manipulated 
into experimental sterility, into the places where people live and work in dread, dearth and 
desperation. (ibid.) 
                                                                    
116 The address was delivered in English. 
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 Strümpfer notes that “from where the budget is to be balanced many of our activities 
look like games academics play” (p. 19). And yet, he says, “I am fully aware of all the 
problems inherent in defining what is „relevant‟. I know that today‟s basic research may 
tomorrow produce an explosion of technological applications” (ibid.). This does not prevent 
him, however, from criticizing most psychologists who “tend to be method-orientated rather 
than problem-orientated” (ibid.), as a result of which “we dawdle… [and] get tied up in 
irrelevancies” (ibid.). Apropos of the experimental method, Strümpfer questions both “the 
extent to which empirical generalizations are feasible in a world in which most effects are 
interactive” (ibid.), as well as the ethics of deception, citing a host of papers from the 
American „relevance‟ corpus (e.g. Cronbach, 1975; Gergen, 1973; Ghiselli, 1974). He argues 
by way of contrast that data generated by qualitative methods “tend to have greater credibility 
due to their „real life‟ character” and that these methods are more respecting of the humanity 
of research participants (Strümpfer, 1981, p. 22). 
 Strümpfer disagrees with Raubenheimer‟s misgivings about universities “yield[ing] to 
the pragmatic demands of society, which expects knowledge and research to produce 
practical and usable results that can be applied cook-book fashion to everyday pursuits” (p. 
24). For Raubenheimer, solutions to practical problems must be grounded in “scientifically 
verified systems of knowledge” (ibid.); Strümpfer, on the other hand, believes in the 
historicity of psychological knowledge. For the latter, psychology‟s popularization in the 
mass media means that “it is up to us to assure that what is available will be applied as 
intelligently and as wisely as possible, under our own guidance wherever possible” (ibid.). 
Strümpfer is advocating a closer – not a more distant – relationship between psychology and 
the real world, one in which “psychologists maintain constant dialogue with decision makers” 
(p. 25). What this requires is “willingness and courage to get our hands dirty. [It is] when we 
really accept responsibility [that] we become… both learned scientists and useful servants of 
humanity” (ibid.). Strümpfer recommends accordingly a need for “better understanding, as 
well as new or improved technology” (ibid.) on such social issues as school boycotts, labor 
disputes, black unemployment, disintegration of the black family and the future likelihood of 
urban terrorism. Although he denies “suggesting that psychologists should enter the political 
arena as ordinary citizens – that is a matter of choice and conscience” (p. 26) – he expresses 
the view that industrial psychologists in particular should be trained “to become active agents 
of this kind of change… [and] that such changes should be motivated by convictions of social 
responsibility, so as to contribute indirectly to the struggle against social pathology” (ibid.). 
What South Africa needs is an “applied social psychology” or “community psychology” (p. 
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27) in which parochial-minded psychologists set aside “their self-serving subdiscipline 
competitiveness and learn to co-operate and negotiate” (ibid.); in this way, disparate fields 
can “be brought together and integrated innovatively” (ibid.). 
 Strümpfer‟s address achieves several firsts vis-à-vis the quest for „social relevance‟. 
Unlike any of his predecessors, he is the first to speak of „relevance‟ reflexively, reifying it as 
something to be thought about in its own right – as in his remark, “I am fully aware of all the 
problems inherent in defining what is „relevant‟” (p. 19). It is his familiarity with American 
„relevance‟ literature – in his speech he draws extensively on his experiences during a study 
tour of the United States – that enables him to make this and other critical comments about 
„social relevance.‟ Moreover, his interrogation of the concept will shift mere talk about 
„social relevance‟ to an actual debate about it. Second, Strümpfer is also first in relating 
„social relevance‟ to the concrete social problems endemic to the country, emphasizing by 
means of an alliterative scheme of repetition, for instance, how “people live and work in 
dread, dearth and desperation” (p. 18). Whereas Langenhoven (1978), Gerdes (1979) and 
Raubenheimer (1981) flatter only to deceive, Strümpfer pulls few punches about the 
starkness of lived realities. Third, he is the first proponent of „social relevance‟ to resort to 
apologetics in order to tone down what must have sounded like political hard-talk. For 
example, while he endorses “getting out of our laboratories into the real world”, he also talks 
up the value of basic research (Strümpfer, 1981, p. 18); elsewhere, he considers it “a moral 
obligation” (p. 19) that psychologists contribute to social wellbeing despite casting political 
participation as “a matter of choice and conscience” (p. 26). And fourth, Strümpfer is unique 
among his contemporaries for expanding the terms of reference. „Relevance‟ does not 
connote an exclusive relationship between psychology and society, but encompasses an 
industrial-commercial aspect as well: Strümpfer‟s use of such terms as “budget” (p. 19), “go-
getter” (ibid.), “decision makers” (p. 25) and “technology” (ibid.) is as much a nod to his own 
background in industrial psychology as it will prove to have been a harbinger of the 
discipline‟s eventual adoption of a technocratic rationality.  
 Then again, in view of his honorific as a „dissident‟ Afrikaner psychologist (Nell, 
1993), Strümpfer‟s non-treatment of apartheid policy and practice per se is worthy of note. In 
fact, no different from his peers, he never mentions the „A‟-word. Other than presenting a 
litany of social problems, there is little to no consideration of their political correlates – only 
agentless nominalizations such as “poverty” and “unemployment” that are true of most 
countries in the world. Consequently, much as Strümpfer declares himself a supporter of 
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„social relevance‟, his reading of it is not an explicitly politicized version, which, by 1980, is 
yet to come. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1982 (G. RADEMEYER – PASA) 
The first president of the newly minted, racially integrated Psychological Association of 
South Africa (PASA), Gert Rademeyer, celebrates how, “[f]or the first time in more than 
twenty years psychologists are uniting enthusiastically and pooling their resources in an effort 
to play a more constructive role in South African society” (1982, p. 1).117 In his view, the 
SAPA-PIRSA split of the early sixties happened because “this first Society fell prey to 
centrifugal forces… [but f]ortunately enough, centripetal forces also emerged” (ibid.). He 
then recaps the congress theme of „Interpersonal Relationships‟, which refers, firstly, to “the 
socio-political problems which we are experiencing in our society at this point in time” (p. 2), 
and secondly, to “the epistemological shift which we are currently experiencing in our 
discipline… and I am obviously referring to the advent and development of general systems 
theory” (ibid., original emphasis). 
 Rademeyer spends the majority of his fifteen-page speech detailing the clinical 
insights of such family therapy luminaries as Jay Haley, Mara Palazolli and Salvador 
Minuchin. Apart from one comment-in-passing about political activism during his discussion 
of morphogenesis (p. 8), his overriding concern is with the quality of relationships between 1) 
organized psychology and the Professional Board; 2) the various professional psychological 
associations (e.g. clinical, counseling and educational psychology); and 3) psychologists and 
the public. Using various principles from family therapy, he demonstrates how these 
relationships can become healthier.  
 Regarding the relationship between psychology and society, Rademeyer speaks of 
“the patient” and how, when resistance arises in the therapeutic relationship, “it is perhaps not 
the patient that is not ready for therapy, but the therapist who is not ready for the patient” (p. 
14), which stems from the “negative labels that therapists attach to patients as a result of the 
DSM-III” (ibid.). Despite referencing “the socio-political problems which we are 
experiencing in our society” (p. 2), Rademeyer applies the principles of systems theory in an 
apolitical manner. Similar to Langenhoven (1978), Gerdes (1979) and Raubenheimer (1981), 
he offers token acknowledgement of the deteriorating political situation.118 All the while, a 
professionalist discourse proceeds to dominate a discursive order whose organizing principle 
                                                                    
117 This address was delivered in both English and Afrikaans. I am grateful to Professor Rademeyer for 
sending me a copy of his speech. 
118 Seeing as their audiences are racially heterogeneous, it is the least all four presidents can do. 
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is the consolidation of what is still a fledgling profession. While he makes implicit reference 
to the question of „social relevance‟ by virtue of his periodic invocation of the psychology–
society dialectic, Rademeyer does so within the confines of a depersonalized rhetoric. The 
use of terms such as “systems” (Rademeyer, 1982, p. 2), “centrifugal forces” (p. 1), 
“centripetal forces” (ibid.), “seesaw” (p.4), “homeostatic” (p. 12), “digital” (p. 6), “analogic” 
(ibid.), “pathogenesis” (p. 7), “morphogenesis” (p. 7), “elements” (p. 9), “cybernetics” (pp. 
11-12) and “the new technology of behavior modification” (p. 12) creates the impression of a 
stage without actors, muddying the ethico-moral dimension of the world about which he 
speaks. While systems theory can offer valuable commentary on political phenomena, in 
Rademeyer‟s discursive universe it succeeds only in technicizing social processes. 
OPENING ADDRESS, 1983 (R.C. ALBINO – PASA) 
In his address – Psychology and South African Society119 – Ronald Albino proposes that the 
role of South African psychologists is to facilitate the development of an integrated society in 
which all are accommodated and none are marginalized. In his view, psychologists are not 
meant “to assist the imposition of a particular way of life on the whole society” (Albino, 
1983, p. 1). After all, “there are moral choices facing the psychologist in this society, for the 
choice of a way of life is a moral and not a technical problem” (ibid.). Commenting on the 
recent creation of PASA, he observes “the caravan to have many parts, each differing from 
the others and often in conflict” (ibid.), a state of affairs he attributes to “basic differences in 
what it is thought Psychology should be” (ibid.). For Albino, the subject matter of 
psychology is determined by the prevailing ideology – which is that “the only forms of 
management and organisat on and of life appropriate for an urban and industrial society are 
those devised by European and American minds” (p. 2). For this reason, he predicts that “we 
will be unable to be useful in the new society which is undoubtedly to come” (p. 1). 
 Although Albino does not reflect on the form this “new society” will take, he is 
issuing a warning to his colleagues: they run the risk of becoming „culturally irrelevant‟. 
Reminiscing about the early days of South African psychology, he recalls how “we 
psychologists were a tentacle of the North lying in an alien land, believing and acting as 
Northerners – intellectual colonialists” (p. 2) – who were Dutch and British disciples of 
Western liberal capitalism. Because he advocates the importance of research on black 
Africans, Albino anticipates the possible objection that “you may be taking my suggestions as 
                                                                    
119 The address was delivered in English. I am grateful to Professor Margaret Daymond for making it 
available to me. 
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supporting arguments for the separation of peoples. I most certainly do not intend that,” he 
disclaims (p. 6). Instead, he goes on the rhetorical counter-attack, insisting that such research 
has been overlooked because of “the belief that what has been discovered of the basic 
psychological functions of Western man is universal” (ibid.). He identifies a knowledge-gap 
– a dearth of “local descriptive theories” (p. 7) – that must be filled if we are “to live together 
in a cooperative social order” (p. 6). What is needed, therefore, is “a new breed of 
investigator which I will, following industry, call a development researcher” (p. 7). Albino is 
skeptical of what he deems an unhelpful tendency within psychology to separate basic from 
applied knowledge – hence the appeal for a special type of researcher capable of generating 
both forms of knowledge. Indeed, “[i]n South Africa most of our clinicians and applied 
psychologists work in the Westernised part of our society and they are ill-equipped, either in 
skills or understanding, to enter the larger and very heterogeneous society” (p. 9, added 
emphasis).  
 Albino is enunciating a cultural discourse on „relevance‟ that will become 
increasingly influential in the post-apartheid years. He may appear fluent in the language of 
science – for example, he speaks of “neurological structures”, “computer firm ware” and “the 
functional architecture of the brain” (p. 5) – but he offers also this categorical takedown of 
Popperian dogma:  
And there is a pressure on all psychology students to adhere to this creed – for it is a creed, 
and, as the philosophers of science will tell you, not a very good one, even as a description of 
a hard science. (p. 9) 
For Albino, the matter is straightforward: the discipline is „culturally relevant‟ only insofar as 
it generates culturally inclusive knowledge. But his position also involves a measure of racial 
othering peculiar to iterations of „cultural relevance‟. As a result, when juxtaposing sameness 
and difference, Albino finds himself encumbered with the stubborn intricacies of apartheid 
logic. 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS, 1986 (S. BIESHEUVEL – PASA) 
By this stage of his career, Simon Biesheuvel has become a grandfather-figure in the 
discipline and describes himself as “a member of the old school” (1987, p. 1). Conceding that 
PASA has deliberated at length on his chosen topic, he proceeds nevertheless with an 
examination of the role psychology can play in present-day South Africa. Thus he begins his 
talk – Psychology: Science and Politics 120  – by lamenting the bleakness in the world: 
                                                                    
120 From this point onwards, all addresses appear to have been delivered exclusively in English. 
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“Mankind is not in very good shape anywhere, as we all know” (ibid.). In South Africa, 
however, these world-wide problems – ecological dangers, the threat of another world war, 
stress-induced ill-health – have been overshadowed by “the power struggle between a 
dominant white minority and a disadvantaged black majority [that is aggravated by] strife 
within each ethnic group about the course to be followed to arrive at a settlement” (ibid.). Yet 
there is hope that community psychology and general systems theory can be “of considerable 
help in gaining an understanding of the South African turmoil” (p. 2). Biesheuvel notes the 
growing awareness of “the relativity of psychological constructs” (ibid.) and, accordingly, the 
importance of developing indigenous psychologies “[f]or a country like ours, with so many 
culturally divergent value systems and ways of living” (p. 3). 
 Biesheuvel insists, however, that while science “has never been value free” (ibid.), the 
scientific method “should be value-free and obedient only to its own prescriptions” (ibid.). He 
reasons that, 
[b]ecause of the plural composition of South African society, the firm convictions held by 
many of us, and the strong moral and partisan feelings aroused in all who are concerned with 
the outcome of the present conflict, it is essential that social scientists who believe that it is 
their duty to contribute to its resolution, not just as concerned citizens but as scientists, should 
be clearly aware how and where values and ideology can legitimately enter in scientific 
endeavour, how and where they cannot. (ibid.) 
Just as he castigates “academic bully boys” (p. 4) for visiting physical violence on Hans 
Eysenck and Arthur Jensen, Biesheuvel disagrees with the position put forward in a recent 
paper by Dawes for whom “[a]partheid and health, whether mental or physical, are 
irreconcilable” (1985, p. 60). For Biesheuvel, “[t]he stresses experienced by blacks in their 
daily lives cannot by any means be ascribed totally to apartheid” (1987, p. 5), which is, at 
best, “only a proximate cause” (p. 4). Rather, what underlies the enactment of apartheid law 
is, first of all, white prejudice, which is only incidentally racial; second, white fear, which “is 
not entirely irrational” (p. 5); and third, economic exploitation, for which “[t]here is no 
guarantee whatever that there would be a radical change in the power position of the black 
masses if they exchanged a white for a black government elite” (ibid.).  
 Whereas Dawes argues that South African psychology is bordering on „social 
irrelevance‟ because of a reliance on band-aid interventions – “the source of the illness [i.e. 
apartheid policy] needs attention if we are to move towards primary intervention” (1985, p. 
57) – Biesheuvel believes that  
what is needed first of all is in-depth study of the numerous factors that influence their [black] 
lives, the interaction of these factors and their susceptibility to intervention. The pathogenic 
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apartheid laws to which Dawes refers are only part of the situation, albeit a very important 
part. (1987, p. 6) 
The task at hand, therefore, is not the sole preserve of clinical psychologists, but requires 
input from multiple disciplines including sociology, social anthropology, economics, 
demography and political science.  
Joining the ideological bandwagon of those inside and outside South Africa who demonstrate 
against apartheid will achieve little or nothing, apart from moral self-satisfaction on the part 
of the protesters. Anyway, it is wrong to use the prestige attaching to the clinical 
psychological profession to speak out on action about which they can claim no expertise. To 
accuse those who refuse to tag along of being morally suspect, as Dawes does, is 
unwarranted. They may have rational reasons… for not doing so. Meanwhile, the first duty of 
clinical psychologists [such as Dawes] is towards their clients, to alleviate distress and to 
build up coping behaviour. There are other constituencies available through which they can if 
so inclined and acting as concerned citizens, make their views known on what they consider to 
be desirable political action. (ibid.) 
 Appealing to the pathos of a multiracial audience, Biesheuvel defends his position 
with the following disclaimer: “Let me emphasize that I share [Dawes‟] views about 
apartheid as a mistaken policy, intolerable to blacks, reprehensible in its administration” (p. 
4). And yet his meaning is clear: while Dawes and his supporters ride “the ideological 
bandwagon” and attain “moral self-satisfaction”, they lack an appreciation of the complexity 
of the political situation, neglect their primary duty to their patients and invoke without 
warrant the authority of clinical psychology to underwrite their claims. At least he – 
Biesheuvel – has “rational reasons” for his position. Constructing an argument about “what it 
is to do science” (Gross, 1990, p. 7), Biesheuvel makes extensive use of stasis theory. First, 
he poses the question of what actually exists (an sit). Since apartheid is epiphenomenal – “it 
is only a proximate cause” – the real issues are white prejudice, white fear and black 
“acculturation” processes resulting from “migrant labour policy” (Biesheuvel, 1987, p. 5). 
Second, because he queries the value of investigating the lives of whites under apartheid – 
white prejudice is incidentally racial and white fear is rational – the nature (quid sit) of white 
fear and prejudice is unimportant in comparison with the nature of black adjustment: “the 
trauma of the transition from a rural subsistence economy to an urban technological one, 
from a very effective network of kinship and social relations to what is still a disorganized, 
unstable community life in the cities” (ibid.). And third, the laws (quale sit) pertaining to 
black acculturation must be explicated accordingly: “… what is needed first of all is in-depth 
study of the numerous factors that influence [black] lives, the interaction of these factors and 
their susceptibility to intervention” (p. 6).  
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 Like Albino (1983) before him, Biesheuvel cannot dissolve the universalist-relativist 
antinomy. Just as he affirms the transitoriness of psychological concepts he swears also by 
the unity of psychological science. By resorting to a discourse of disciplinarity, however, 
Biesheuvel invisibilizes white complicity in black suffering by redefining the purpose of 
psychological knowledge. Questioning the worth of „socially relevant‟ science, Biesheuvel 
closes with the words of Vannevar Bush: 
„Science has a simple faith which transcends utility… It is the faith that it is the privilege of 
Man to learn to understand, that this is his mission. If we abandon this mission under stress, 
we shall abandon it forever, for stress will not cease. Knowledge for the sake of 
understanding, not merely to prevail, that is the essence of our being… For if we fail to 
struggle and fail to think beyond our petty lot, we accept a sordid role. The light of our minds 
tells us that there is more to life than that.‟ I share these sentiments. (1987, p. 7) 
 Similar to the English-speaking psychologists of the 1950s – which included himself 
– Biesheuvel‟s concern is with the scope of the discipline. In asserting variously that the 
scientific method “should be value free” (p. 3), that social scientists must “be clearly aware 
how and where values and ideology can legitimately enter in scientific endeavour, how and 
where they cannot” (ibid.), and that “it is wrong to use the prestige attaching to the clinical 
psychological profession to speak out on action about which they can claim no expertise (p. 
6), Biesheuvel reveals his preoccupation with the limits of psychological science and 
practice. But despite his seeming conservatism, Biesheuvel remains the first speaker since 
PIRSA‟s early years to initiate a frank discussion on the subject of apartheid itself. For all his 
customary outspokenness, Strümpfer (1981), for one, never mentions the „A‟-word. And yet, 
because he summonsed science to justify a politics of neutrality, Biesheuvel‟s intellectual 
forthrightness would not avail him in the courtroom of his peers (Cooper et al., 1990). 
OPENING ADDRESS, 1986 (L. VOGELMAN – OASSSA) 
In 1982, SAPA and PIRSA buried their hatchet to form PASA. For progressive 
psychologists, however, the reunion meant nothing for the political direction of the discipline. 
Matters came to a head soon enough with the 1983 hosting of an international family therapy 
conference at Sun City – a gambling and entertainment center in a Bantustan “setting which 
is responsible for the break-up of thousands of [black] families” (Vogelman, 1987, p. 24). 
Appalled at what they considered a questionable display of judgment, disaffected mental 
health professionals and students formed the Organisation for Appropriate Social Services in 
South Africa (OASSSA) and committed themselves “to work only with those who are the 
victims of oppression” (Anonymous, n.d., p. 2). 
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 In 1986, the OASSSA chairperson, Lloyd Vogelman, opened the association‟s first 
national conference. In his address – Apartheid and Mental Health – he reminds his audience:  
Our gathering today is more than an act of protest, it is more than an acknowledgement that 
apartheid and ill-health are inseparable and indivisible. This conference is a beginning of 
trying to discover what appropriate social services are (and are not). (1986, p. 3) 
In this passage, Vogelman makes rhetorical use of a scheme of repetition known as 
anaphora, the presence of which is always deliberate (Corbett & Connors, 1999). The 
repetition of the words “… it is more than” creates a rhythm between successive clauses that 
produces a powerful emotional effect. Vogelman, already, has broken the mold of 
Biesheuvel‟s (1987) dispassionate scientist. He states unequivocally: “We are not a neutral 
organisation. We identify with the forces of progress rather than reaction and we are thus 
vigorously opposed to apartheid and to the oppression and exploitation that go with it” 
(Vogelman, 1986, p. 3). His position – “In order to make South Africans more 
psychologically healthy and to resolve crises of mental health, we need to engage in politics” 
(ibid.) – is consistent with that of Dawes (1985) who is himself an OASSSA member. 
 For most of his address, Vogelman drives home his point that apartheid policy in all 
its manifestations – high unemployment, low wages, forced removals, skewed mental health 
services and low welfare grants and pension payments – is a major contributor towards poor 
mental health outcomes among the black majority. In further contrast to Biesheuvel (1987), 
he criticizes both community psychologists – “[T]hey accept the status quo. Their activities 
help people to live in surroundings of crisis” (Vogelman, 1986, p. 9) – as well as cross-
cultural psychologists for downplaying the significance of class. He concludes that  
[t]he challenge now is [for] all democratic social service workers to strengthen their position 
with the democratic movement for change. And it is the duty of all those committed to a free 
and democratic future in South Africa to rise to meet this challenge. (p. 11) 
 Although Vogelman‟s concerns rest exclusively with professional matters, he is not a 
proponent of the professionalist discourse favored by Langenhoven (1978) and Gerdes (1979) 
for whom the consolidation and expansion of the profession are prime considerations in their 
own rights. Vogelman is opposed to what he terms the “commercialisation” (1986, p. 4) and, 
by extension, urbanization of mental health services that proceed on the mistaken premise 
that “mental health is an individual matter” (ibid.). He devotes himself, rather, to the view 
that the provision of mental health services is a political affair: with talk of “exploitation” (p. 
3), “ideology” (p. 4), “class” (p. 10) and “collective power” (p. 11) preponderating, 
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Vogelman promotes a liberationist discourse in the struggle for an inclusive, politically 
engaged and therefore „socially relevant‟ profession.121 
OPENING ADDRESS, 1987 (J. COOVADIA – OASSSA) 
Jerry Coovadia, professor of pediatrics at the University of Natal, picks up where Vogelman 
leaves off. He notes in an example of manifest intertextuality that “[t]he damaging effects of 
apartheid on mental health have been documented most elegantly by Vogelman… among 
others. They need not be repeated here except in the broadest of terms” (Coovadia, 1987, p. 
23).122 Titling his talk, Social Service Professionals as Agents of Structural Change in South 
Africa, Coovadia relies on four different schemes of repetition in the first page of his address 
– a feature of emotionally evocative prose (Corbett & Connors, 1999). Like Vogelman, 
Coovadia makes use of anaphora: “These people-based organisations are the most visible 
evidence of the unyielding will of South Africans of all races and colours, all sexes and 
creeds, to achieve freedom and democracy” (Coovadia, 1987, p. 1). He follows this up with 
an instance of epistrophe, which occurs when the same group of words is repeated at the ends 
of consecutive clauses): “In these organisations no formulations are accepted without reason, 
nor any model rejected without cause” (ibid.). Immediately thereafter, anadiplosis is 
deployed in which the same word that ends one clause is used to start the following clause: 
“The struggle for liberty is thereby transformed from being only a means to an end, to being 
an end in itself” (ibid.). And, finally, Coovadia employs a device known as epanalepsis by 
using the same word to open and close a single clause: “In the peculiar symmetry of South 
African politics, an extra-parliamentary President is being opposed by extra-parliamentary 
organisations of the people” (ibid.). 
 Coovadia constructs a detailed argument in favor of the involvement of professionals 
in the mass struggle for democracy. First, professional organizations “have in the perception 
of both the people of this country and beyond, been seen to be too closely allied to the 
ideology and practices of the apartheid state and are therefore irrelevant to people‟s needs” 
                                                                    
121 It would be something of an overinterpretation to cite the rhetoric of Vogelman and subsequent 
OASSSA speakers as instances of Marxist discourse. While OASSSA addresses abound with Marxist 
terminology, it cannot be claimed that the organization was Marxist in any programmatic sense. 
122 Unlike Biesheuvel (1987), neither Vogelman (1986) nor Coovadia deem it necessary to launch a multi-
pronged investigation into black impoverishment – the deleterious impact of apartheid policy is obvious. 
In the words of their colleague, Dawes, who was reflecting on the scientific credentials of his paper: 
“There are no figures quoting mental health / ill health statistics in this article, which would have added a 
certain scientific respectability to my argument. I maintain that to argue that my reasoning is suspect 
until such figures are presented, is similar to suggesting that because we do not have stress data on 
concentration camp victims in the Boer War this experience was not psychologically destructive. The 
events speak for themselves…” (1985, p. 60). 
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(p. 15). Second, the capitalist hegemony creates contradictions for people of all classes. 
Third, institutionalized racism is offensive to the sensibilities of all people, the “petit 
bourgeois… as much as the urban and rural proletariat” (p. 17). Fourth, a victory is needed 
“not only with regard to the state… but of civil society too” (p. 18). Fifth, in the majority of 
twentieth century revolutions, success has depended on “the collective action of all classes” 
(p. 19). And sixth, it is the personal responsibility of social service professionals to cultivate 
deliberately egalitarian relationships with laypeople. 
 Akin to Vogelman, Coovadia emphasizes the political aspects of mental health service 
provision, the avoidance of which translates into „socially irrelevant‟ practice. Coovadia, 
however, draws on liberationist discourse to an even greater extent with an assortment of 
references to ideology, class, exploitation, “bourgeoisie” (p. 19), “proletariat” (p. 17), “state 
apparatus” (p. 14), “the people” (p. 18) and “false leaders” (p. 24). He appears, also, to 
disagree with Vogelman regarding the political effectiveness of the community psychology 
movement: Coovadia makes positive reference to “empowering people” (p. 14), “primary 
health care” (p. 28), “promotion” (p. 29) and “the optimum guiding of life for every citizen” 
(p. 30). 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS, 1988 (B. NZIMANDE – OASSSA) 
Speaking about African Life and the „Hidden Abode‟ of Mental Health: Some Unasked 
Questions about „Tradition‟ and Progressive Social Services in South Africa, Bonginkosi 
„Blade‟ Nzimande contradicts Vogelman (1986) and Coovadia (1987) on a pivotal doctrinal 
point. Despite being comfortable with Marxist terminology – Nzimande refers to “bourgeois 
scholarship and practice” (1988, p. 77), “subjective interpellations” (p. 82) and “ideological 
carry-overs” (p. 83) – he questions what he regards as OASSSA‟s oversimplified theorization 
of the relationship between racial capitalism and mental health. For Nzimande, “left wing 
theoretical discourses on mental health… have been argued in a rather rhetorical way, 
without being concretely linked to a theory of mental health practice” (p. 82) – hence, “the 
very choice of the topic I will address you on tonight is partly a function of trying to go 
beyond rhetoric” (p. 76). The result of OASSSA‟s reductionism “is the absence of a dialogue 
with the traditional practices” (p. 82) in relation to which the majority of Africans have made 
“ontological commitments” (pp. 80, 83) that “transcend historical conjunctures” (p. 83). Alert 
to the triple-threat of paternalism, romanticism and professional elitism, Nzimande urges 
OASSSA members to ask themselves whether “our openness in working with the oppressed 
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communities go[es] as far as to be prepared to incorporate these traditional conceptions of 
madness as part of the emerging progressive social services” (ibid.). 
 Nzimande‟s comment on the „rhetoric‟ – and poverty – of left-wing theories of mental 
illness is ironic. An industrial psychologist like Biesheuvel, his remark does not differ much 
from the latter‟s caustic appraisal of left-leaning psychologists as drivers of an “ideological 
bandwagon [who] speak out on action about which they can claim no expertise” (Biesheuvel, 
1987, p. 6). Doubtless, Nzimande – like Albino (1983) – is dissatisfied with the lack of 
„cultural relevance‟ in the discipline. But his disagreement with what has become OASSSA 
canon also lets slip, arguably, progressive psychology‟s most crippling philosophical rupture. 
Moreover, Nzimande‟s suggestion that it is possible „to go beyond rhetoric‟ reads like 
scientism – which is not only politically conservative (Vogelman, 1986) but antithetical to his 
special focus on culture. 
OPENING ADDRESS, 1989 (D.J.W. STRÜMPFER – PASA) 
Then chairman of the Professional Board for Psychology, Strümpfer sets the scene for his 
address by commenting on the rise of systems thinking, informing his audience that he 
“would like to touch upon some areas where there is a great need for working together within 
and between systems” (1989, p. 1). Noting the poor relationship that exists between PASA 
and the Professional Board, he chastises the former for its passivity and for setting up the 
Board “as a convenient straw man from whom all blessings are expected to flow and then to 
be attacked and vilified if the blessings do not flow” (p. 2). He warns, also, that frayed 
relations between English- and Afrikaans-speakers within PASA risk the possibility that “the 
system of psychology will break into two again, with worse consequences than those of our 
nearly two decades of shame before PASA came about” (p. 3). Strümpfer criticizes his white 
colleagues for acting either like Afrikaners of the Great Trek or English imperialists who 
dream of other colonies, saying, “When the others don‟t want to play my game, I‟ll take my 
marbles and go play elsewhere” (ibid.). He censures PASA for “behav[ing] as if it is a 
whites-only association” (ibid.), for failing to encourage dialogue between its constituent 
subdisciplines, for not doing enough to reach “an amicable understanding” with OASSSA 
“radicals” (p. 4), and for failing to appreciate the necessity of interdisciplinary collaboration. 
Similar to Rademeyer (1982), his plea is for the discipline to apply its knowledge of systemic 
processes in order to heal its own fractiousness. 
 Strümpfer sounds like a father rebuking his squabbling children. Indeed, when he 
eventually turns his focus to resolving the aforementioned problems, he concedes: “I have no 
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easy recipes or quick-fix solutions to offer… you chose a person with the wrong colour of 
hair for that” (p. 5). Here and at various other points in his speech, he underplays his 
reputation as one of the country‟s leading psychologists. He begins his speech, for instance, 
by saying, “I cannot really speak on behalf of the Professional Board…. I would now prefer 
just to be a „bare-head‟ psychologist, wearing no hat” (p. 1), while he concludes with the 
words,  
I want to close with a moral appeal, rather than further psychological ones: If you are 
religious, pray the ancient prayer of St. Francis of Assisi: „Lord, make me an instrument of 
Thy peace.‟ If you are not religious, try to think of yourself as an instrument of peace – it is 
likely to turn into a self-fulfilling prophesy. (p. 6).  
Strümpfer is effecting what psychotherapists term „the use of the self‟: he is using his self, 
throwing into relief the shared humanity of speaker and audience. Stripping himself of titles 
and expertise, his chief means of persuasion (pisteis) is to present himself as a reasonable 
man, “a person of sound sense (phronēsis), high moral character (aretē), and benevolence 
(eunoia)” (Corbett & Connors, 1999, p. 72). Strümpfer‟s use of an ethical appeal is especially 
well-suited for the deliberative oratorical genre, which seeks to “establish future policy” on 
contentious matters (Gross, 1990, p. 10). 
 Strümpfer departs significantly from his 1980 address in which he engaged more 
readily with the social challenges of the day. Now, nine years later and at the height of 
resistance to apartheid rule, the dissident Afrikaner restricts himself to an appraisal of internal 
party politics. By way of comparison, Albino‟s (1983) cultural relativism reads tamely, too, 
when one considers the progressive role he played in the 1950s‟ debate about mixed-„race‟ 
membership. It is as if PASA reformists – in keeping with Biesheuvel‟s (1987) vision of an 
apolitical discipline – are succumbing to an increasingly blinkered existence. Although he 
advances neither a discourse of disciplinarity nor one of professionalism, Strümpfer, while 
taking issue with the association‟s creeping insularity, remains a „subject‟ of PASA‟s order of 
discourse. 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS, 1991 (L.C. GERDES – PASA) 
In her address – Impressions and Questions about Psychology and Psychologists – Lily 
Gerdes expresses the view that South African psychology “is at present grappling with 
problems of identity which suggest that it has reached adolescence and is moving toward 
maturity” (1992, p. 39). She believes that psychology is internally fragmented and that – in 
agreement with Strümpfer (1989) – it has isolated itself from other disciplines. What follows 
is an imbalance  
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between three basic assumptions, which address the generality/specificity issue. Stated briefly 
they are: (i) That in some respects all people are alike, thus recognizing their common 
humanity; (ii) That in some respects certain people are alike, thus recognizing differences 
between groups, such as age, ethnic, sex, educational level, and ethnic groups; (iii) That in 
some respects every individual is unique. Imbalance results if any one of these assumptions is 
stressed at the expense of the others. (Gerdes, 1992, p. 40) 
 Gerdes notes that “[i]n South Africa different political groupings and ideologies may 
partly be understood in terms of where they place the emphasis. Concerning the future the 
ultimate challenge to planners is to strike a balance between these three assumptions” (ibid.). 
Contradicting Vogelman (1986) and Coovadia (1987), she points out, for example, that one 
should keep an open mind when considering the psychological health of black children raised 
under difficult living conditions, as “the predominantly negative models of black South 
African childhood… could result in a serious underestimation of potential of black children” 
(1992, p. 40).  
 Gerdes continues that since “psychology lacks integration and balance it must 
inevitably experience difficulties with the projection of its image” (ibid.). Wondering if it is 
at all possible “to formulate some kind of corporate image of the discipline as a whole” 
(ibid.), she devises a “mission statement” (p. 41) for the discipline that includes, inter alia, 
the pursuit and application of knowledge vis-à-vis human problems, the promotion of 
individual and communal psychological development, future planning regarding people‟s 
psychological needs, and adherence to a code of conduct. Gerdes recommends media 
involvement – on ethical grounds – in the dissemination of information regarding important 
developments in the discipline, facilitating thereby the mental health of communities. 
Besides, “psychologists as agents of change need to combine the role of psychologist and that 
of public spirited citizen” (ibid.). Recognizing the distinction between “advertising personal 
services and heightening public awareness” (p. 42), Gerdes thinks “[p]sychology needs to 
strive for more recognition of its actual and potential contribution. To this end it has to 
become more active and pro-active, especially in regard to future planning and the wider 
application of its knowledge and skills” (ibid.). 
 As in her 1979 presidential address, Gerdes advocates „social relevance‟ by lobbying 
for a closer relationship between psychology and the public. Yet despite her recourse to such 
commonplaces as “the new South Africa” (p. 43) and “a better quality of life for all” (ibid.), 
her enduring political circumspection is evident – never more so than when she dubs the 
apartheid conundrum “the generality/specificity issue" (p. 40). For Gerdes, “balance” (ibid.) 
is preferable to choosing political sides, which runs the risk of “fragmentation” (ibid.). 
Matching Strümpfer (1981; 1989) in her elision of the „A‟-word, she enjoys a discursive 
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affinity with Biesheuvel‟s (1987) politics of non-intervention. Gerdes places herself in the 
service of a discourse of disciplinarity in which the “subject‟s diversity” (1992, p. 39), the 
“artificial dichotomy” between theory and application (ibid.), “consultation between persons 
from different fields within the discipline” (p. 40) and a mission statement that “states 
psychology‟s aims” (p. 41) are dominant concerns. 
OPENING ADDRESS, 1993 (D.J.W. STRÜMPFER – PASA) 
In A Personal History of Psychology in South Africa,123 Strümpfer apologizes for talking 
politics – “My brief was specifically not to repeat the history of psychology associations in 
this country” (1993, p. 3) – but states that he does not want to speak about “politics in the 
ordinary sense” (ibid.). Noting that Afrikaans universities were – for the most part – apartheid 
strongholds, he recalls how psychology at these institutions “was characterized by a strong 
service orientation” (p. 7). English departments of psychology, by contrast, focused on basic 
psychology: “There was a certain ambivalence towards application, with clinical psychology 
for some time the only significant exception” (p. 8). Strümpfer claims that “the call for 
„relevance‟” (p. 8) originated at these Anglophone universities, albeit “with a strong element 
of „political correctness‟” (pp. 8-9). 
 Strümpfer then observes how, over the course of his forty-seven years in the 
discipline, the research process has changed in three respects: computerization of literature 
searches and data analysis, an increase in the use of qualitative methods – which “seem more 
appropriate than ever, since it results in theories that are grounded in the experience of the 
people” (p. 17) – and a paradigm shift towards general systems theory. Apropos of the 
profession, it was political events – the assassination of then Prime Minister Verwoerd and 
ministerial inquiries into the Wilgespruit sensitivity training programs and scientology – that 
accelerated the drive towards statutory recognition, with efforts by PIRSA especially 
prominent. 
 Strümpfer is reluctant to condemn the founders of South African psychology for 
having, “in many ways, overtly and covertly, consciously and unconsciously, perhaps 
actively perhaps reluctantly, but mostly by doing nothing or too little, accepted and condoned 
much of the apartheid policy” (p. 31). Aware of the dangers of “retrospective history” 
(Gould, 1988, p. 27 quoted ibid., p. 29), he cautions that “it is very easy to be liberal-minded 
when one‟s whole milieu is one of liberalism” (p. 5). Still, he admits that “we too have to 
confess our guilt, repent with utmost sincerity, ask for forgiveness and then make atonement 
                                                                    
123 I am thankful to Professor Lionel Nicholas for mailing me a copy of this address. 
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by working, as scientists and professionals, as hard as we can at a new, better future for all” 
(p. 32) – and commits himself thereupon to creating “a more socially liberatory discipline” 
(Hayes, 1993, n.p. quoted ibid., p. 32). As for the present lack of an African psychology, it 
must be remembered that, first, the discipline originated in Europe; second, apartheid124 
policy shaped the development of South African psychology; and third, prior to the rise of 
African nationalism, “there could only have been a pseudo-African psychology if whites had 
tried to set their minds to it” (p. 31) – as it was, they did the best they could. Turning to a 
religious vernacular of „confession‟, „repentance‟, „forgiveness‟ and „atonement‟, Strümpfer 
anoints a discourse of salvation in which psychologists are urged to reconcile themselves 
with their past. The ensuing construction of a „socially relevant‟ psychology that is 
simultaneously „Afrocentric‟ and „socially liberatory‟ becomes a redemptive act through 
which the discipline earns the right to belong in “a new South Africa” (p. 33). 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1993 (B. VAN DER WESTHUŸSEN – PASA) 
By the time of his address, Bodley van der Westhuÿsen knows that PASA will soon be 
dissolved.125 Conscious of being its last president, he surpasses Strümpfer (1993) in the use of 
religious images and clauses. Philosophizing about how, “[t]o my mind people are better 
judged by their deeds than by their words”, he affirms that change brings with it “the 
opportunity to take stock” (van der Westhuÿsen, 1993, p. 3). Meditating on “leaps of faith” 
(p. 2), he quotes at length from William James‟ The Will to Believe, in-between references to 
“uncertainty” (p. 1), “dangers” (p. 2) and “choice” (ibid.). Conjuring up phantasmagorias of 
Death and The Reckoning, van der Westhuÿsen laments how “[w]e as individuals are of no 
importance. We will eventually all cross the bridge to the other side and soon be forgotten” 
(pp. 2-3). Yet all is not lost as he testifies to the one thing that will outlast them all: 
“psychology will live on” (p. 3). What matters is that psychologists ensure the discipline‟s 
“right of existence [which] lies in the impact, the effect it has as a science and a profession, 
when the community out there experiences psychology as meaningful and of value” (p. 2). In 
the manner of Strümpfer (1993), van der Westhuÿsen rallies the audience around the 
discourse of salvation. He may not speak the language of reconciliation – he never mentions 
the imminent demise of the apartheid project – but, like Strümpfer, he assures his colleagues 
                                                                    
124 By the time Strümpfer uses the ‘A’-word (p. 31), his focus is shifting already to the future. In addresses 
delivered during the apartheid era, almost all white psychologists jettisoned the word. Now, in the 
regime’s final months, it is admitted shortly before its consignment to the dustbin of political experiments 
gone wrong. 
125 I am grateful to Professor van der Westhuÿsen for sending me a copy of his address. 
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that psychology has not come to the end of the road. Despite PASA‟s approaching end, they 
can yet embrace a new associational life and bind themselves to a disciplinary project of 
„social relevance‟. 
DISCUSSION 
When he came to power in 1978, Prime Minister P.W. Botha knew that the dream of 
Verwoerdian apartheid was no longer feasible. The black population explosion, the refusal of 
three homelands to accept independence, the rise of Marxist rule in Mozambique, the 
growing despondency among Afrikaner intellectuals and the emergence of an Afrikaner 
bourgeoisie – all militated against a literal reading of the apartheid vision (P. E. Louw, 2004). 
“We are moving into a changing world, we must adapt otherwise we shall die”, Botha is 
alleged to have said, although he would deny having uttered these exact words (Lipton, 1986, 
p. 51 quoted in Giliomee, 2003, p. 586). Promising a slew of apartheid reforms, the pragmatic 
Botha met with shrill resistance from verkramptes for whom the means never justified the 
ends (D. O'Meara, 1996). But given his four-decade-long apprenticeship honing a prodigious 
managerial acumen, he was unwilling to continue with policies that had ceased to work.  
 Already while Minister of Defense, Botha had devised the beginnings of a plan for 
reforming apartheid in order to reverse the NP‟s mounting isolation. Soon enough, upon 
ascending to the highest office in the land, he was able to give effect to his ideas. Alienating 
NP politicians by recruiting to his inner circle a team of technocrats – senior military officers, 
high-ranking civil servants, academics and captains of industry – Botha and his reformers 
drew on a blend of Arend Lijphart‟s consociational democracy, Samuel Huntington‟s 
enlightened despotism and Andre Beaufre‟s total strategy. What followed was “government 
by technocratic professionals” (P. E. Louw, 2004, p. 94). While the details of this highly 
coordinated response to a surmised Muscovite „total onslaught‟ are not of concern here, the 
discursive logic of the South African state during this period, is.  
 Between 1978 and 1983, a “new language of legitimation” started to emerge in 
official state discourse (Posel, 1987, p. 419). The ideological fidelity of the years of 
Verwoerdian orthodoxy gave way to a supposedly apolitical discourse of „effectiveness‟ that 
was built on notions of “technocratic rationality, „total strategy‟ and „free enterprise‟” (ibid., 
p. 420). Pragmatic government was required to respond to „reality‟: reform had nothing to do 
with ideology and everything to do with the „objective‟ resolution of technical problems by 
qualified „experts‟. As for the „fact‟ of „total onslaught‟, a „total strategy‟ was needed to repel 
the threat of communism, which was to be accomplished via the appropriate combination of 
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objective military expertise and free-market economics (the latter‟s benefits would make 
communism less attractive to the black population). The business sector became wedded to 
the state, which, depending on the „factual‟ contingencies of the moment, ended up regulating 
the market as it saw fit. Capitalism was justified no longer by appeals to liberal ethics – it was 
warranted on practical grounds alone. Meanwhile, the net effect of depoliticizing any given 
state intervention was to render it incontestable. 
 O‟Meara comments that “the discourse of Total Strategy… encouraged the spread of 
a new technocratic managerialism throughout the wider white South African society. 
Government, business, educational institutions, the media – seemingly the entire 
establishment – became infected by this craze for technocratic rationality” (1996, p. 269). 
Correspondingly, one observes the fall of ideology in SAPA, PIRSA and PASA addresses 
from the late seventies onwards.126 Taking its place is a professionalist discourse in which 
political discussions are conspicuously absent (Gerdes, 1979; Langenhoven, 1978; 
Rademeyer, 1982), or, alternatively, a discourse of disciplinarity that interprets politics via 
the internal logic of the discipline (Biesheuvel, 1987; Gerdes, 1992; Raubenheimer, 1981). 
How this degree of political indifference can occur at a point in South African history 
described as “apartheid‟s most brutal period”, is scarcely believable (P. E. Louw, 2004, p. 
83). At a time when Steve Biko has just been killed, young white men are being forced into 
military service, the ANC is bombing SASOL installations, white professionals are starting to 
leave the country in droves, South Africa is under an arms embargo and the economy is in 
recession (Beck, 2000), not a single speaker is able to mention the word “apartheid” except 
for Biesheuvel in 1986. By then, tricameralism has failed,127 rebellion in the townships has 
been brutally suppressed, hundreds of thousands of workers and students have embarked on a 
boycott campaign, disaffected comrades are „necklacing‟ – burning alive – suspected 
collaborators and the country is now in the grip of a national state of emergency (P. E. Louw, 
2004). In the meantime, SAPA/PIRSA/PASA talk of general systems theory (Gerdes, 1979; 
Rademeyer, 1982; Raubenheimer, 1981) – convinced of its suitability for the national 
situation – is articulated in technicist ways more befitting the theory‟s cybernetic origins. 
 Strümpfer notes in an interview how “right from the start PASA was very much an 
Afrikaner organization” (Nell, 1993, p. 40). Complaining of a PIRSA takeover, former SAPA 
                                                                    
126 Although the diminishing incidence of political referents was evident in PIRSA addresses of the early 
and mid-seventies – the previous chapter traced this phenomenon to multiple crises within Afrikanerdom 
– the persistence of the trend has more to do with the staged death of politics in national (white) 
discourse. 
127 Botha attempted unsuccessfully to establish a tricameral parliament for whites, coloreds and Indians 
to the exclusion of black Africans. 
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members “simply felt they had had enough” (p. 39) and withdrew subsequently from active 
involvement in the amalgamated association. There was unhappiness about PIRSA not 
having been made to apologize for embracing apartheid dogma (Nell, 1993), the domination 
of the PASA executive by white Afrikaner men (Seedat & MacKenzie, 2008) and the new 
association‟s continued alignment with the repressive political dispensation of the day (J. 
Louw & Foster, 2004). It may be countered that the prominence of professionalist discourse 
in SAPA/PIRSA/PASA circles had less to do with their co-option by an increasingly 
technocratic state than with the establishment of the first Professional Board for Psychology 
in 1974. And yet their depoliticized order of discourse coincided with a decline in both 
scientific and political papers on „race‟ in the SAJP – their official journal (Durrheim & 
Mokeki, 1997). The attempt to dispense with politics was not simply due to professionalizing 
forces inside the discipline or because of any particular desire to steer clear of troubled waters 
– rather, “P.W. Botha‟s attempts at a policy of „non-racialism‟ during the early 1980s may 
have… [made] a race focus seem irrelevant” (ibid., p. 211). 
 While PASA‟s congresses continued – the SAJP‟s publication of Dawes‟ (1985) 
paper was dealt with by “scientific neutralists” (Seedat & MacKenzie, 2008, p. 86) like 
Biesheuvel (1987) – those who had not been interpellated by professionalist discourse were 
marching to the beat of a different drum. OASSSA, a self-avowed “political organisation 
which… situates itself within the mass democratic movement, but operates from a nonaligned 
position” (Anonymous, n.d., p. 2), was pursuing a liberationist line. Both Vogelman and 
Coovadia belonged to the United Democratic Front (A. Dawes, personal communication, 
December 21, 2012), a Charterist front for the banned African National Congress that meant 
“different things to different people” (P. E. Louw, 2004, p. 150). Founded in 1983 in 
opposition to Botha‟s tricameral reforms, the non-racial coalition of hundreds of civic, 
women‟s, youth and religious organizations (Beck, 2000) succeeded in “fudging its 
discourse” to generate a constituency spanning much of the political spectrum (P. E. Louw, 
2004, p. 150). Vogelman and Coovadia‟s rhetoric, however, would have appealed to its leftist 
supporters. But when Blade Nzimande – also a UDF figure – refuted his comrades by placing 
culture ahead of class, the cracks were starting to appear. By the time of Nzimande‟s address 
in September 1988, the UDF had been banned for six months and had ceded influence to a 
new coalition partner, the Congress of South African Trade Unions. Nzimande‟s culture-
speak was not purely a criticism of OASSSA: it was an indictment of the UDF‟s terminal 
inability to convince the black majority that it was more than an Indian and colored cabal. 
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 PASA‟s engagement with the notion of a „socially relevant‟ psychology varied across 
a series of politically conservative discourses. These included, first, a professionalist 
discourse that focused on consolidating the profession by servicing the needs of the South 
African public (Gerdes, 1979; Langenhoven, 1978; Rademeyer, 1982); second, a discourse of 
disciplinarity, which concentrated on fundamental questions rather than political ones that 
were rendered via the depoliticizing logic of the discipline (Biesheuvel, 1987; Gerdes, 1992; 
Raubenheimer, 1981); third, a cultural discourse that stressed the importance of producing 
psychological knowledge about black Africans (Albino, 1983); and fourth, a salvation 
discourse that understood the quest for „social relevance‟ as a form of disciplinary rebirth 
(Strümpfer, 1993; van der Westhuÿsen, 1993). By contrast, OASSSA‟s appraisal of a 
„socially relevant‟ discipline – which centered on the profession – was embedded in a 
liberationist discourse that stressed the negative consequences of apartheid policy on mental 
health and the attendant responsibility of social service workers to mobilize politically 
(Coovadia, 1987; Vogelman, 1986). Consequently, there was no telling what would happen 
when, in 1994, PASA and OASSSA – not forgetting the Psychology and Apartheid 
Committee – disbanded to form the Psychological Society of South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 10: PSYSSA ADDRESSES (1996–2011) 
 
PsySSA has already attained international accolades and we as members can be, rightfully, proud of our 
Society. (Patrick Sibaya, 2004) 
And so, if you asked me, what is the state of the discipline, I would say, it is a quiet or silent discipline in the 
face of an evident national cry for oral and emotional catharsis. (Boyce Mkhize, 2007) 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter analyzes addresses of the post-apartheid period and identifies two competing 
discourses. The first – a market discourse – advocates the development of a psychology that 
is financially rewarding, globally competitive and internationally recognized. Accordingly, 
„market relevance‟ is sought in which teaching, research and community service outputs are 
graded according to international standards and priorities. The second discourse of civic 
responsibility casts South Africa‟s traumatic past as unresolved and requiring, therefore, the 
intervention of psychologists. In this case, „social relevance‟ is desired in order to bring about 
the emancipation of marginalized communities. On balance, however, it is the market 
discourse that pervades the discipline‟s current discursive order. With the introduction of 
democratic rule, South Africa‟s reentry into the international community resulted in far-
reaching changes to the country‟s political, economic and higher education landscapes, which 
had to adjust themselves to the demands of a globalized neo-liberal hegemony. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1996 (T. H. VELDSMAN) 
In his address – Creating out of the Present the Future – Theo Veldsman calls on 
“psychology to recontextualise its role… in order to (re)establish its moral, socio-political 
and scientific legitimacy within an emerging new order with its reconstituted stakeholders” 
(1996, p. 1). He structures his talk around the discipline‟s response to this imperative by 
using “five key words: Forming; Bonding; Envisioning; Positioning; and Awaiting” (ibid.).  
 In terms of „Forming‟, Veldsman notes “[t]he healthy growth in our membership of 
14% over the past year” but adds that  
[a]t best our financial position is tenuous and precarious. We ended the 1995/1996 financial 
year with a deficit of R38 500, a significant improvement relative to a projected deficit of R84 
000. The estimated deficit for 1996/7 is R115 000. A working group was set up to investigate 
various financial scenarios for our Society. The group provided our EXCO with useful 
recommendations. For example, continuous education appears to be the most promising 
future source of income. (p. 2) 
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While it is not entirely unusual for Veldsman, as president, to reveal the state of the 
association‟s financial health, his reliance on phrases such as “healthy growth”, “financial 
viability”, “key stakeholders” and “financial scenarios” (ibid.) sounds more like the talk of a 
chief executive officer than a doctor of psychology. His employ of “key words” to organize 
his ideas, moreover, is consistent with information system-speak. Despite acknowledging, in 
the midst of these market tropes, PsySSA‟s obligation to address “the constraints of past 
injustices and discrimination” (ibid.), Veldsman‟s use of nominalizations and the term 
„constraint‟ – which is peculiar to mathematics, computer science and economics – adds to 
the business-like tone of his speech. 
 As for „Bonding‟, Veldsman notes that “[w]e as a helping profession ha[ve] to serve 
as a role model for reconciliation and healing in our country” (p. 3). He lists, accordingly, the 
different measures taken to address the “degrees of mistrust, suspicion, anger, guilt and/or 
apathy [that] are still hampering our bonding” (ibid.), which include regular briefs, 
newsletters, meetings and “our Society [going] electronic via e-mail and a location on the 
Worldwide Web” (ibid.). One observes again how technology-speak enters the realm of 
human interaction and is understood as facilitating interpersonal relationships.  
 Veldsman speaks of how PsySSA has been „Envisioning‟ the future by starting “a 
process of building a national agenda of mental health… against the backdrop of rectifying 
past injustices in our country and working through the associated traumas” (p. 4). He uses 
anaphora to appeal to his audience‟s pathos: “A vision energises, mobilises and inspires. 
Without a vision psychology will be adrift in our country. A widely shared vision also will 
build credibility for our Society” (ibid.). Here the suffering of South Africa‟s oppressed 
communities works in the service of a broader goal, namely, the consolidation of the newly 
formed society‟s legitimacy. 
 In terms of the suitable „Positioning‟ of the discipline “in the transforming context” 
(ibid.), Veldsman mentions the importance of “finding our place under the sun” (ibid.). The 
“context” is not only about restoration and reconciliation, but is also about securing 
PsySSA‟s vital interests. Veldsman speaks variously of “vertical” and “horizontal” 
relationships (ibid.), “policy engagement” (p. 5), “service delivery” (ibid.), “value adding 
working relationships” (ibid.) and “improvement in tariffs” (ibid.) – all indicators of 
business-model thinking. 
 Last of all, Veldsman identifies „Awaiting‟ priorities, which are mostly restatements 
of „Positioning‟ priorities. He mentions “our clients” (p. 6) and “ourselves as service 
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providers” (ibid.) – more business terms – and the need to find “the appropriate balance 
[between] looking after our own interests and satisfying the needs of those we have to serve” 
(p. 7). Veldsman adds that “[t]he thrust should be wealth through and for the people of our 
country” (p. 6), before concluding as follows: 
I put my vision for our Society before you: a fully representative, credible and legitimate 
organisation; a Society which is problem driven, relevant and involved where it matters; a 
Society which makes a difference; an open and diverse, but also unified Society; an 
organisation which is innovative, responsive and flexible; a society which empowers and 
enables its members; and finally a Society which is financially sound. (p. 8) 
 Although the PsySSA president expresses a commitment to pursuing a „socially 
relevant‟ psychology, he does so by invoking a market rationality – and to an extent hitherto 
unseen in South African psychology‟s associational life. Unlike his predecessors‟ 
commercialist forays that were merely exploratory – for example, Gerdes‟ musings about a 
“corporate image of the discipline” (1992, p. 40) – Veldsman‟s are thoroughgoing. Whereas, 
previously, talk of „relevance‟ centered around the resolution of national problems (Pratt-
Yule, 1953), Afrikaner survivalism (la Grange, 1962, 1966; Robbertse, 1967, 1969), cultural 
difference (Albino, 1983; Nzimande, 1988), the relationship between apartheid and mental 
health (Biesheuvel, 1987; Coovadia, 1987; Vogelman, 1986), and disciplinary redemption 
(Strümpfer, 1993; van der Westhuÿsen, 1993), in the post-apartheid era it is taking on another 
meaning altogether. 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS, 2000 (S. MKHATSHWA) 
Father Smangaliso Mkhatshwa, Member of Parliament and Deputy Minister of Education, 
claims that “[p]sychology has a vital role to play in assisting government to understand the 
forces at play in our national psyche or, as the case may be, individual and group psyches” 
(2000, p. 1). He asserts that social and mental problems “negatively impact… on our ability 
as a country to compete in an increasingly globally-competitive environment” (ibid.) – hence 
the need for psychologists to “assist with the healing of people whose lived reality, even to 
this day, bears testimony to the psychological and other ravages of a brutal past” (ibid.). Yet 
he suggests that psychologists are indifferent to the psychological violence of the apartheid 
era: “Six years after our liberation, what are psychologists doing about minds and 
consciousnesses disfigured by our bloody past? I ask you” (ibid.). In this impassioned appeal, 
Mkhatshwa uses erotema – the rhetorical question – to challenge his audience and advance a 
claim by insinuation (Corbett & Connors, 1999). Additionally, by phrasing the accusation of 
political apathy as a question, he not only makes it difficult for his listeners to contradict him 
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but may succeed, also, in being more persuasive than if he were to have made his assertion 
directly (ibid.). 
 Mkhatshwa requests his audience “to locate these issues and challenges within the 
broader thrust of the African Renaissance” (2000, p. 3). Asking whether psychological 
practice is “purely universal” (ibid.) or culturally relative, he puts it to his listeners: “You are 
the experts. Give us the answers” (ibid.). Mkhatshwa‟s use of the pronoun “us” implies an 
„us-them‟ opposition and a (widening) gap between psychology and the people it is meant to 
serve. This is because South African psychology‟s reliance on “theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings that are Western in nature” undermines its capacity for generating “solutions 
that are uniquely suited to our context” (ibid.). He expresses, therefore, “[t]he need for a more 
Afrocentric approach to knowledge production… [that] could provide a more meaningful 
basis for the development of appropriate and relevant strategies and approaches” (ibid.). After 
all, “[m]y own view would be that, with regard to the general production of knowledge, there 
is an increasing need to locate social science research and discourse firmly within a 
contextual culture-centred perspective” (ibid.). Committed to an Afrocentric approach, 
Mkhatshwa knows that culture has become a buzzword in the global academy. 
 Stressing the need for „culturally relevant‟ research and practice, Mkhatshwa 
continues in the discursive tradition of Albino (1983) and Nzimande (1988). His position is 
also consistent with OASSSA‟s concerning the pernicious effects of apartheid policy on 
psychological health (Coovadia, 1987; Vogelman, 1986). Where he differs from these 
speakers, however, is in his recognition of an international audience – that „increasingly 
globally-competitive environment‟ in which mental illness is an efficiency handicap and 
cultural sensitivity is de rigueur. In this respect, Mkhatshwa resembles Veldsman, who 
references on several occasions “the official acceptance of PsySSA into the international 
community… [which] can serve as leverage128 to form value adding129 working relationships 
with other national Associations/Societies” (1996, p. 5). Mkhatshwa‟s entreaties about 
„cultural relevance‟ are constrained by the nascent market discourse. 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS, 2001 (K. ASMAL) 
Kader Asmal, law professor and Minister of Education, shares Mkhatshwa‟s sentiment when 
he says, “I have no doubt that psychology has a vital role to play in the healing of our people 
and in dealing with the psychological scars wrought by apartheid” (2001, p. 1). He wonders, 
                                                                    
128 ‘Leverage’ is originally a physics term that was taken up subsequently by finance. 
129 ‘Value-added’ is a term borrowed from economics. 
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however, why it is that the general public is more inclined to turn to pop psychology – 
including “sangomas” (ibid.)130 – than to “psychology in its scientific and professional form” 
(ibid.).  He, too, resorts to anaphora and erotema in an emotionally charged series of 
questions: 
What are you doing as a profession… to heal the burdens of the past…? What are you doing 
to help the security monsters bred by apartheid and who continue to live in our midst, to come 
to terms with their past and to ensure that they do not return to their evil ways? What are you 
doing to address the recurring resort to violence at the slightest provocation…? … What are 
you doing to address the violence against women and children? What are you doing to 
address the scourge of HIV/AIDS and alcohol and drug abuse? (ibid.) 
 Perhaps aware of the affront he may have caused, Asmal appears to backpedal, 
though he is actually using a disclaimer: “I am not suggesting that the Psychological Society 
is not seized with these issues” (ibid.). His larger point is that “the profession requires 
locating the issues within a new knowledge and education and training paradigm that is 
firmly located in the context and reality of South Africa as a developing African country” 
(pp. 1, 4). For Asmal, the creation of such a paradigm entails, inter alia, training greater 
numbers of African psychologists in a profession that “is still more than 90% white” (p. 4); 
ensuring that trainee psychologists become proficient in at least one indigenous African 
language (“for the psychological profession to become truly relevant, language barriers need 
to be addressed” (ibid.)); equipping professionals for work in primary health care settings “to 
ensure relevancy” (ibid.); and providing incentives that will reverse the “brain drain” (ibid.) 
of South African psychologists to “developed nations” (ibid.). The bottom line is to “ensure 
that all our people are provided with appropriate, accessible and affordable psychological 
services” (ibid.). 
 Although Asmal advocates the transformation of the discipline in ways that will 
increase its sensitivity to “lived realities” (ibid.) in South Africa, he places sangomas in the 
same company as “tarot cards… tea leaves… palm readings… and soap operas” (p. 1), 
parting company with Albino (1983), Nzimande (1988) and his former deputy Mkhatshwa 
(2000). Like Veldsman (1996) and Mkhatshwa, however, Asmal is cognizant of the 
international community, indicating that “developing” countries must be able to compete with 
“developed” ones (2001, p. 4). He is fluent, consequently, in market discourse, as suggested 
                                                                    
130 A sangoma is a South African traditional healer for whom the supernatural world plays an important 
part in the etiology and treatment of illnesses.  
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by his references to “meeting targets”, the “shortage of skilled personnel”, “not having 
invested in their development” and the “free flow of human capital” (ibid.).131 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS, 2002 (S. BADAT) 
For the third year running, a high-profile education official is invited to deliver PsySSA‟s 
keynote address. In Challenges of a Changing Higher Education and Social Landscape in 
South Africa, Saleem Badat, education professor and chief executive officer of the Council on 
Higher Education, speaks about Kader Asmal‟s sweeping proposals for the reconstruction of 
the country‟s higher education system. 132  Badat sets himself the immediate objective of 
recounting “the „real past‟ since amnesia… seems to be becoming a serious affliction of some 
of our fellow South Africans” (2002, p. 3). Towards this end, he details how apartheid policy 
created educational imbalances that persist into the present at a juncture “that has witnessed 
the emergence of a global economy and changes in the world that have been captured by the 
concept „globalisation‟” (p. 4). For Badat, globalization myths are legion: he disputes 
Fukuyama‟s death-of-history thesis, declaring instead that what “is purveyed by eloquent 
intellectuals… as „common sense‟ is actually highly ideological, the ideology of neo-
liberalism which is the dominant ideological current of the era of globalisation” (ibid.). On 
the other hand, he acknowledges that “[g]lobalisation is a reality and [there is no] question of 
escaping it. The challenge for higher education,” he believes, “is to produce the knowledge 
and personpower that will enable South Africa to engage proactively, critically and creatively 
with globalisation” (ibid.). The inescapable truth, however, is that “economic reconstruction”, 
“political democratisation” and “redistributive social policies” (Higher Education White 
Paper, 1997 quoted ibid.) are incompatible with neo-liberal thinking. 
 Badat identifies “the great danger of a rampant and profane marketisation and 
commodification of higher education” (2002, p. 10), which may lead to the humanities and 
social sciences being “sacrificed at the altar of „market relevance‟ and „market needs‟” (p. 6). 
The rise of private higher education institutions means “the traditional unity of teaching, 
research and service is fragmenting” (ibid.). He beseeches his listeners to ensure that students 
“are not reduced to „clients‟ and „customers‟ but are embraced as real partners in higher 
learning” (p. 9), imploring them “to hold tight to the moral basis of higher education” (p. 10). 
                                                                    
131 On another note, Asmal borrows liberally from Mkhatshwa’s speech – some passages, more than a 
hundred words in length, are verbatim copies – without acknowledging his source. It is more than likely 
that Mkhatshwa and Asmal have the same speechwriter – although one wonders about the seeming 
routinization of PsySSA congresses. 
132 I am grateful to Professor Badat for sending me a copy of his address. 
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Like Asmal (2001) before him, Badat uses anaphora and erotema, forcing his audience to ask 
of the discipline whether it “produce[s] men and women that, to put it idealistically, personify 
good” (2002, p. 10). At the end of a series of searching “what” questions, he asks: 
Are we producing excellent technicians and technocrats, or excellent technicians and 
technocrats and simultaneously enlightened and critical South African and African citizens? 
Put in another way, what discourse of social responsiveness prevails in the departments of 
psychology today? Is it a notion of „social responsiveness that is thinned down and reduced to 
that of market responsiveness and the needs of being economically productive alone, emptied 
of all content except for that which advances individual or organisational economic 
competitiveness‟? (p. 11, original emphasis)133 
 Badat‟s verdict is that the “evidence seems to suggest that we are not” producing 
graduates who will “engage with the ideologies of neo-liberalism and privatisation, the 
privileging of private benefits above public good and the attitude of „greed is cool‟ and „get 
what you can and screw the rest‟” (pp. 12-13). He rejects the “rhetoric of the „rainbow 
nation‟” (p. 13) and culturally exclusivist formulations of the African Renaissance. Returning 
to the devices of anaphora and erotema, he concludes that “our responsibility” 
as professional psychologists [is that] we must be able to respond, heads held high if asked: 
… Where is the intellectual critique of globalisation and its effects…? … Where is the 
intellectual engagement with the imperative of equity and redress…? … Where is the 
intellectual vision? And where, above all, is the intellectual contribution to the development of 
an equitable, just and humane society? (p. 15, original emphases) 
 Badat is unique among his education colleagues in reflecting critically on the 
changing ethos of higher education. As a result, his address contains relatively few examples 
of market discourse and considerably more instances of Marxist signifiers, such as 
“ideology”, “bourgeoisie” and a glowing reference to Eric Hobsbawm. Yet Badat – in a 
testament to the insidiousness of business-speak – at one point advises against treating 
students as “clients”, only to suggest embracing them as “partners” (p. 9). The latter no less 
market-friendly, Badat's slip is a reminder of how difficult it can be to escape hegemonic 
discursive configurations. 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS, 2003 (M. TSEDU) 
Whereas Mkhatshwa (2000) assumes the existence of a national psyche, the editor of the 
country‟s largest weekly paper – The Sunday Times – asks whether, given “general 
acceptance that the two nations theory still applies”, such a psyche can be said to exist at all 
(Tsedu, 2003, p. 6). Speaking about The Media and the Post-1994 South African National 
Psyche, Mathatha Tsedu criticizes Desmond Tutu‟s „rainbow nation‟ metaphor – as Badat 
                                                                    
133 The quote in the latter half of this excerpt is from Singh (2001). 
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(2002) does – on the grounds that it obscures simmering interracial tensions in the country 
and “disempower[s] people from engaging with the challenges of the time” (2003, p. 6). For 
Tsedu, the national reality is one of greed, “a fiercely violent society” (ibid.), white 
superiority and black inferiority, and “[m]any people walk[ing] around carrying burdens of 
time past” (ibid.). He speaks of how black journalists frequently question themselves when it 
comes to reporting the indiscretions of black politicians for fear of “feeding the stereotype” 
(ibid.). Tsedu‟s belief, however, is that “we should show you what is real. We should tell you 
the truth as far as is possible. Anything less would be a disservice” (ibid.). As with 
Mkhatshwa (2000) and Asmal (2001), Tsedu claims that the psychological wounds of the 
past have not been addressed. Like Badat (2002) for whom the „real past‟ must not be 
forgotten, he insists that „the truth‟ must out. At a discursive level, these speakers describe the 
continuing fragility of the national life and the civic responsibility of psychologists to respond 
accordingly. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 2004 (P.T. SIBAYA) 
Despite having relatively little to say about the national situation, Patrick Sibaya‟s views are 
considerably different.134 He praises his audience, in fact, declaring that, “[b]y your gracious 
cooperation, commitment to transformation and support of membership, you have 
demonstrated to the South African populati n, and the world at large, that we are a united 
people” (2004, p. 2). Apart from one other sentence in which the president asks his listeners 
“to rededicate ourselves… to the nation of South Africa” (p. 3), the remainder of his address 
is given to organizational matters.  
 Prominent among Sibaya‟s reflections is PsySSA‟s international reputation. He cites 
“international accolades” (p. 1), the inspiration received from “contingents of international 
attendees” (ibid.) and the “world-class journal of psychology” (ibid.) published by the 
association. Proficient in market discourse, Sibaya speaks variously of “management teams” 
(p. 2), “foster[ing] productivity” (ibid.), “our core products” (p. 3), “the quality of services we 
offer” (ibid.) and a need for “quality assurance” (ibid.). Moreover, because “[p]sychology is a 
caring profession”, he reasons that “[w]e must care for one another, first…. Charity begins at 
home. Let us care for our fellow psychologists” (ibid.). Sibaya is concerned about “special 
interest groups” (p. 4) within the association “whose needs have been neglected for too long” 
(ibid.). Nonetheless, he maintains that “[t]aking a fellow psychologist to court, discredits our 
profession” (ibid.) and that “[t]hese divisions must align themselves with PsySSA and its 
                                                                    
134 I am thankful to Professor Sibaya for sending me a copy of his address. 
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constitution” (ibid.). He ends with an extended discussion of the “alarming” (p. 5) rate of 
transverse registration, which, if it “continues at the same rate, by the year 2010 almost 
everybody registered in South Africa will be a Clinical Psychologist!” (p. 6). For Sibaya, this 
state of affairs cannot be condoned because of the range of settings in which psychological 
services are needed and because practitioners “owe allegiance [to their specialties] by virtue 
of professional training and inclinations” (ibid.). 
 In stark contrast to previous years‟ speakers, Sibaya makes no mention of the social 
context in which South African psychology is located. Then again, his preoccupation with the 
internal affairs of the association and its international standing – along with his adoption of 
market parlance – are consistent with the globalizing, commodifying trends that Badat (2002) 
identifies. With almost no evidence of a psychology beholden to the public, Sibaya‟s address 
is emblematic of a new order of discourse in which post-apartheid psychology – no longer 
isolated from the worldwide discipline – must realign itself with a different set of priorities. 
OPENING ADDRESS, 2007 (B. MKHIZE) 
Advocate Boyce Mkhize, Registrar of the Health Professions Council of South Africa 
(HPCSA), begins his address by acknowledging the presence of international luminaries and 
governmental leaders in the audience, noting that “there are both global and local challenges 
confronting the profession today” (2007, p. 1).135  On the international front, “fast-paced 
developments in the global scientific space” (p. 2) have raised important ethico-moral 
questions that “have a much more direct bearing on the profession of psychology than we 
realize” (ibid.). In addition, World Health Organization statistics reveal vast numbers of 
people suffering from mental disorders, a three-in-four treatment gap and a significant link 
between physical and psychological ill-health.  
 Closer to home, Mkhize raises questions about Sibaya‟s (2004) „united people‟ thesis. 
Aligning himself with the discourse of civic responsibility, he notes how, in relation to rising 
numbers of HIV/AIDS orphans, child-headed households and traumatized surviving spouses, 
“the most fundamental question is what the profession of psychology has done to position 
itself to address these mental health problems which are inextricably interwoven with our 
social challenges today” (B. Mkhize, 2007, p. 5). In a similar vein as Mkhatshwa (2000) and 
Asmal (2001), Mkhize offers a damning assessment of the discipline: 
This country has a bag full of apartheid wounds… No active follow-up was ever done to bring 
about true reconciliation and healing so that there would be closure to some of the gruesome 
                                                                    
135 I am grateful to Mr Qiniso Mthembu of the HPCSA for sending me a copy of Advocate Mkhize’s speech. 
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revelations that our nation was exposed to. And so, if you asked me, what is the state of the 
discipline, I would say, it is a quiet or silent discipline in the face of an evident national cry 
for oral and emotional catharsis. (2007, pp. 5-6) 
 The opposite of Sibaya (2004), Mkhize impresses upon his audience that “[i]n our 
quest to professionalize our input and interventions… I urge us to look beyond ourselves… 
without falling foul [of] our own web of narrow professional interests” (p. 7). With his 
assault on market discourse in full flow, Mkhize proceeds to lecture his listeners on the role 
psychology should be playing in society: 
We want to see a discipline that is socially responsive as well as professionally and ethically 
astute. We want to see a discipline that is not so much inward looking than outward looking 
or put differently, a discipline with an inward glance but an outward focus. If in our 
deliberations we miss the discourse around the plight of the masses of our people and how 
this discipline ought to impact them in a positive way, I want to submit that we will be a 
discipline that may stand accused of existential irrelevance. (ibid.) 
Although mindful of the discipline‟s international profile, Mkhize is adamant that 
psychological research and practice in South Africa must attend to local issues first: “Our 
science and approach needs to be developed and adapted to our own local context while also 
[being] comparable to the world‟s best” (ibid.). Akin to Badat (2002), he retains a critical 
stance on the new market discourse: professionalization of “our input”,136 for example, must 
be subject to an ethic of social engagement. 
KEYNOTE ADDRESS, 2010 (H. MKHIZE) 
In her one-page address, psychologist and Deputy Minister of Correctional Services, 
Hlengiwe Mkhize, expresses her pleasure at “the enormous strides made by psychology in 
this country” (2010, p. 1) – feedback she has received “from various quarters, nationally, 
internationally and from my colleagues in government” (ibid.).137 Juxtaposing “our terrible 
history in the science and profession of psychology” (ibid.) and “the advances made by our 
rainbow nation” (ibid.), Mkhize notes “the steady pace of progress that organised psychology 
under the leadership of PsySSA has made” (ibid.). Despite that fact that “a nascent 
democracy like ours makes us merely a teenager compared to other countries, particularly in 
the Global North” (ibid.), she observes that “[o]ur country, flush from [the FIFA] World Cup, 
has come together remarkably and there is a new sense of common purpose” (ibid.). She ends 
with the prediction that psychologists “will play a very progressive role… to assist those less 
fortunate amongst us” (ibid.). 
                                                                    
136 ‘Input’ is another common term in economics (and computer science). 
137 I am thankful to Ms Fatima Seedat of PsySSA for sending me a copy of the Deputy Minister’s address. 
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 In light of the many comments made by PsySSA speakers regarding the challenges 
the discipline faces, one can be forgiven for thinking that Hlengiwe Mkhize is talking about 
psychology in another country. Largely an exercise in epideictic oratory, her address employs 
mostly “ceremonial discourse,” which is less concerned with persuading than it is with 
pleasing an audience (Corbett & Connors, 1999, p. 23). The sole objective is to praise – in 
this case, psychology – as one would a human being in a testimonial. Without providing 
details, Mkhize accentuates the achievements of the discipline, convinced of its future „social 
relevance‟. As was the case with almost all of her predecessors, she invokes the local-global 
binary, implying that the adolescent South will eventually attain the standards of the 
established Northern democracies. But in making the North her yardstick, Mkhize differs 
with her namesake (B. Mkhize, 2007) – which may explain why her delivery is somewhat 
removed from the ongoing plight of the majority of South Africans.138  
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 2011 (E. TLOU) 
In comparison with Mkhize (2010), Emmanuel Tlou is less than complimentary towards his 
colleagues, castigating them for “the self-limiting and defeatist attitude I have seen among 
many of you” (2011, p. 1).139 He accuses them of unnecessary bickering over the revised 
professional scope of practice, when, instead of fighting about “the sub-20% of the 
population who are on medical aid or hospitalised” (p. 2), the focus should be on “the rest of 
the population we could be serving” (ibid.). He reminds the audience that South Africa 
remains one of the most unequal societies in the world with over two million economically 
inactive young adults. Consequently, “[w]e need to be asking ourselves what defines the 
South African society, what is unique about it and what psychology should do to address the 
society‟s needs” (ibid.). If anything, the scope of practice should be about “how much we are 
not doing” (ibid.). 
 Tlou reenters the genre of deliberative oratory. His concern is with the future of the 
discipline, and, positioning himself within a discourse of civic responsibility, he exhorts and 
dissuades in equal measure. However, by using a metaphor in which he likens those who can 
afford psychological services to “a slice of bread” (p. 2) and the rest of the South African 
population to “a whole bakery full of freshly baked bread that is not being eaten” (ibid.), Tlou 
                                                                    
138 Mkhize creates a distancing effect when referring to ‘those less fortunate amongst us’. She frames the 
impoverishment of millions in relation to the relative prosperity of her audience, making human suffering 
a question of ‘fortune’. In this way, ‘those less fortunate amongst us’ become a charity case rather than an 
indictment of unequal social relations. 
139 I am grateful to Dr Tlou for sending me his speech. 
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appears to exploit the very market discourse whose ethic, moments earlier, he had found 
objectionable. Indeed, whereas he discourages his fellow practitioners from “engaging in turf 
wars” among themselves (ibid.), he calls on them to “protect… our profession from invasion 
by unqualified laypersons calling themselves psychotherapists and hypnotherapists and other 
kinds of healers of the mind and soul” (ibid.). Even so, Tlou‟s bread metaphor is not a sign of 
a commercialist instinct: his point is that “[w]e have lost sight of the developmental role our 
profession could play in creating a better society” (ibid.). 
DISCUSSION 
The advent and proliferation of market discourse in post-apartheid psychology reflects 
important shifts in the country‟s political, economic and higher education visions. During the 
late eighties, the ruling NP and the banned ANC held secret „talks about talks‟, motivated 
partly by American and Soviet behind-the-scenes involvement but also by a shared concern 
about the social cost of economic decline.140 Soon enough, by the early nineties, the ANC had 
converted to the so-called „Washington Consensus‟, thanks to the efforts of diplomats, the 
corporate sector, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (P. E. Louw, 2004).141 
In 1993, after participating in a series of forums, conferences, briefings, seminars and think 
tanks, the Congress – in partnership with the NP and corporate „super-salesmen‟ – signed a 
secret protocol on economic policy endorsing neo-liberal trickle-down economics 
(Terreblanche, 2002). ANC leaders were anxious to bring about a speedy political settlement 
– Zulu federalists and the white Right were threatening to derail the fragile negotiation 
process – and found themselves pressured into making economic concessions that read “like 
the wish list of a corporate sector desperate to resolve its 20-year-long accumulation crisis” 
(ibid., p. 97). To be sure, the party did unveil an interventionist Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) as its 1994 election manifesto – but two years after winning 
the elections, the Ministry of Finance announced a new macroeconomic strategy called 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), which, “decorated with all the trimmings 
of globalisation, … represent[ed] an almost desperate attempt to attract [foreign direct 
investment]” (ibid., p. 114). 
 While the view of some is that, since 1994, South Africa‟s ruling political class has 
“enthusiastically embraced the philosophy of the late capitalist „free market‟” (Bertelsen, 
1998, p. 221), it is equally true that the ANC was unfortunate enough to come to power at a 
                                                                    
140 According to scenario planners, sanctions and falling foreign investment could have precipitated all-
out revolution. 
141 At the time of its unbanning in 1990, the ANC favored a socialist economic dispensation.  
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time when the project of global capitalism was already operating at full tilt (P. E. Louw, 
2004). Caught between the expectations of a socialist-developmentalist constituency and 
those of an international neo-liberal orthodoxy, the party found itself in an impossible 
position. “[C]heckmated by the power of globalized capital and the white [corporate] 
establishment” (ibid., p. 198), the ANC-led government resorted to a policy of Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) to uplift some – rather than all – black South Africans. What 
appeared to be multiracial capitalism was, in effect, “blurred racial capitalism” (ibid., p. 178) 
– but the semblance of upward mobility it created was sufficient, for the time being, to 
stabilize the economic system. 
 Inevitably, the cracks began to show. Unable to deliver the economic prosperity that 
black South Africans were promised, Thabo Mbeki forewent the reconciliatory rhetoric of 
Nelson Mandela‟s “public relations presidency” (ibid., p. 177), opting for an aggressive 
cocktail of Africanism-Bikoism that culminated in his call for an African Renaissance. In 
punting black solidarity, Mbeki was attempting to gloss over the economic disparities inside 
black South Africa. Not only that: the African Renaissance provided the ideological 
wherewithal for Mbeki‟s plan to align Africa with the globalizing world economy – which 
was to be achieved by exporting free-market economics to all corners of the continent in the 
form of his New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD). The dream of continental 
rebirth, that is, was “the best thing that… ever happened to South Africa‟s (still mostly white) 
corporate sector” (ibid., p. 186). 
 The end of isolation impacted powerfully on the South African academy, too. 
Persuaded by the Mode 2 thesis (Gibbons et al., 1994), a group of prominent policy scholars 
developed a series of influential papers on higher education that encouraged the adoption of 
the new mode of knowledge production (Jansen, 2002).142  It was clear that, despite the 
                                                                    
142 The Mode 2 thesis asserts that, in the final quarter of the twentieth century, knowledge production 
came to be organized in fundamentally different ways. Context-driven, transdisciplinary, innovative and 
highly reflexive, the new regime was the result of a globalizing world economy, increased economic 
competition and changing public policies. What Etzkowitz (e.g. 2001) calls a ‘second academic revolution’ 
that began in the 1970s and took off in the 1980s was, theoretically, a search for ‘relevant’ knowledge 
(Hessels & van Lente, 2008). Beginning in the United States, an academic revolution predicated on the 
capitalization of knowledge spread throughout the world. In Thatcherite Britain, 
[t]he universities, long suspected by Conservatives of being incubators of socialism, were 
particular targets. They, too, were told to become entrepreneurial. Academics were to be 
useful members of the society, contributing directly to the national goal of wealth-creation. 
The government, which finances the main funding councils of research, has made it clear 
that research, which aids the nation’s profitability, should be given priority…. 
Entrepreneurial professors are the order of the day. Academics compete to obtain research 
contracts. Funding is not sought in order to do research, but research is done in order to get 
funding. (Billig, 1996, p. 8) 
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traditional „disciplinary‟ discourse‟s continued domination of the country‟s higher education 
landscape, the growing influence of the „credit exchange‟ discourse could no longer be 
denied (Ensor, 2004). In keeping with state priorities, the academy came increasingly to 
assess its teaching, research and community service outputs in terms of their global 
competitiveness, while notions of academic freedom and social emancipation assumed 
largely rhetorical significance (Singh, 2001). International best practice “would overrun the 
national reform agenda for higher education like a flood through a hole in the wall” (Maassen 
& Cloete, 2002, p. 15). The „public good‟ benefits of higher education were superseded by 
economic imperatives; „social relevance‟ was overlooked in favor of „market relevance‟. All 
the while, the contradiction of institutional reform that was rationalized in entrepreneurial 
terms and mission statements that continued to express these very institutions‟ commitment 
to social transformation persisted. 
 Beginning in the early nineties, then, a concatenation of international, regional and 
local developments facilitated the spread of a market culture that would saturate post-
apartheid psychology. Year after year, PsySSA‟s presidents and guest speakers deployed a 
market discourse that concentrated on commercial interests (Veldsman, 1996), global 
competitiveness (Asmal, 2001; Mkhatshwa, 2000) and the discipline‟s international standing 
(H. Mkhize, 2010; Sibaya, 2004). Admittedly, references to „the past‟ were prominent, too, 
and animated a competing discourse of civic responsibility (e.g. Badat, 2002; B. Mkhize, 
2007; Tlou, 2011; Tsedu, 2003). But within PsySSA‟s discursive order, the hegemonic 
discourse was that of the market – with „relevance‟ shifting closer to economics than politics 
(Painter & van Ommen, 2008).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
According to the standard account, then, calls for ‘relevance’ originated in a context of global economic 
competition and scientific achievement, with universities forced to adopt a third, industry-driven mission 
that complemented the first two missions of teaching and research.  The less-cited version is that appeals 
for ‘relevance’ emerged in response to widespread socio-economic turmoil and that Gibbons and 
colleagues (1994) “might not only present too Manichean a picture, but also an overly-optimistic vision of 
the changes affecting science and society today” (Pestre, 2003, p. 246). The result was that a discourse 
produced under conditions of social alienation was assimilated into a reinvigorated “spirit of capitalism” 
(ibid., p. 252). Reminiscent of Benda’s (2007) treasonous intellectuals and Marcuse’s (1965) repressive 
tolerance, ‘engaged scholarship’ – known otherwise as ‘social responsiveness’ – was commodified as a 
series of signposts on the road to tenure. Known variously as finalization science (Böhme, van den Daele, 
Hohlfeld, Krohn, & Schäfer, 1983), strategic research (Irvine & Martin, 1984), post-normal science 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1994), Mode 2 (Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2001), post-
academic science (Ziman, 2000), academic capitalism (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997), the triple helix 
(Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997) and systems of innovation (Edquist & Hommen, 1999), the new regime’s 
significance is open to interpretation.  
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 Asking whether PsySSA has betrayed its social mandate is unhelpful. Problems of 
definition do not allow for satisfactory answers as it is by no means certain, when speaking of 
the „public good‟, “which public” or “whose good” is intended (Calhoun, 1998, p. 20). It 
suffices, rather, to note that the association‟s reliance on market discourse mirrors the 
managerialist ethic that now pervades South African politics, economics and higher 
education. And, since globalization-as-neo-liberalism and localization-as-Afrocentrism have 
become ideologically compatible at a moment in world history when many claim that the 
“economic imperative… will sweep all before it” (Singh, 2001, p. 20), the „social relevance‟ 
over which apartheid-era psychologists agonized, may well have become an irrelevance of 
the past. 
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CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION 
 
Social relevance: We encourage a multiplicity of opinions and seek way to incorporate the voices and 
experiences of all communities and avenues of psychology. (PsySSA‟s Vision, Mission and Value Statement) 
 
SUMMARY 
The purpose of this thesis was to account for the enduring debate about „relevance‟ in South 
African psychology. As far as can be determined, it represents the first attempt to historicize 
„relevance‟ – locally and internationally – despite calls for „relevance‟ being part and parcel 
of the international history of psychology. The historical chapter delineated this fixation on 
„relevance‟, describing how the appeal for „relevance‟ in American psychology was 
reproduced in Western Europe in the late sixties as psychologists around the world struggled 
to relate their activities to the social turmoil that surrounded them. It observed further how 
psychologists throughout the Third World experienced significant difficulties in adapting a 
Euro-American package to meet the developmental needs of newly independent nations. In 
short, questions were being asked everywhere about the value of psychology in a rapidly 
changing world. 
 The thesis then attempted to theorize this preponderance of „relevance‟-speak in terms 
of the discipline‟s well-documented troubles delimiting its subject matter, its dependence on 
a basic science for its scientific pedigree, and its difficulty acommodating the social world. 
Calls for „relevance‟, that is, assumed that psychology should intervene in the „real world‟. 
However, with „reality‟ only accessible via language, the argument was made that „relevance‟ 
had to be credentialed discursively, too, which went some way towards explaining the 
seeming interminability of debates about „relevance‟.  As much as „relevance‟ spoke to issues 
of materiality, its rhetorical quality could not be circumvented, which necessitated a 
theoretical framework that was epistemologically relativist, while the question of ontology, 
effectively, was bracketed out.  
 In order to investigate the appeal for „relevance‟ in South African psychology, it was 
decided to analyze addresses delivered at annual national psychology congresses. This was 
based on the assumption that psychology congresses represented an ideal forum at which one 
could expect the relationship between the discipline and the broader public to be discussed. In 
total, sixty-four presidential, keynote and opening addresses were collected for the period 
1950 to 2011, of which forty-five comprised the actual data set. Norman Fairclough‟s three-
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
174 
 
dimensional model for critical discourse analysis was selected as an analytic frame on the 
grounds that it made provision for textual/rhetorical, discursive and social levels of analysis. 
This last level of analysis was considered important because, although the study‟s theoretical 
framework did not claim an ontological position, a bottom line reality had not been denied 
either. At all stages of the analysis, the study‟s research questions were kept foremost in 
mind: 
1. What are the terms of debate within South African psychology concerning its 
„relevance‟? 
2. How have these changed with passage of time? 
3. How is „relevance‟ articulated currently within the discipline? 
4. How can changes in South African psychology‟s discourses about „relevance‟ be 
understood? 
 On the vexed matter of origins, it can be surmised that South African psychology‟s 
debate about „relevance‟ predates the analytic period of this thesis. In fact, H.F. Verwoerd 
can be called justifiably “the father of „relevance‟”, since he – more than anyone – 
understood the power of „relevance‟ (D. Foster, personal communication, March 28, 2013). 
Ridding himself of psychology‟s „social irrelevance‟, he opted for applied psychology in 
1927 and social work in 1932 (Balstad Miller, 1993), and carried on serving his volk until his 
death. Indeed, the first significant finding of this study was that the call for „relevance‟ did 
not originate – as has been asserted – in Anglophone universities of the eighties that protested 
against the extremes of apartheid rule. Already in the 1950s, Afrikaner psychologists were 
advancing a professionalist discourse of public service that was concerned, clearly, with 
„social relevance‟. But although an Afrikaner government had been in power since 1948, 
these psychologists avoided Afrikaner nationalist discourse in the same way that NP 
politicians downplayed their republican ambitions in order to broaden their constituency. 
English-speaking psychologists, by contrast, promoted a discourse of disciplinarity that was 
preoccupied with the structure and content of the discipline – typical of apartheid-era liberals 
who preferred „reason and moderation‟ to outright political involvement.  
 In the 1960s – especially now that a republic had been declared – Afrikanerdom grew 
bolder. PIRSA psychologists would not countenance the prospect of a racially integrated 
discipline and set about articulating a volksdiens discourse that called for „ethnic-national 
relevance‟ in psychological investigation. Concern for the survival of the Afrikaner volk – 
and, by extension, the preservation of apartheid rule – necessitated research that „involves the 
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scientific basis of separate development‟. By the 1970s, however, the apartheid state was 
having to contend with one crisis after another. The neutralization of the „British bogeyman‟, 
the volk‟s economic stratification, cultural upheaval and inept political leadership oversaw the 
unraveling of PIRSA ideology. Addresses became less concerned with South African politics: 
„ethnic-national relevance‟ was replaced with a generic „social relevance‟ whose points of 
departure were now anomie, Western capitalism and a growing technocratic order. Later still, 
by the mid-seventies, the idea of „social relevance‟ lost its coherence altogether. 
 The 1980s were a flash point in the struggle against apartheid and witnessed the 
resurrection of „social relevance‟. OASSSA, influenced by UDF politics, put forward a 
liberationist discourse that causally linked apartheid policy to mental health problems; this 
generated a professional obligation according to which psychologists were encouraged to 
participate in mass politics. In contrast, PASA interpreted „social relevance‟ in politically 
conservative terms. It advanced, variously, a professionalist discourse that sought to 
consolidate the profession by meeting the general mental health needs of the South African 
public; a discourse of disciplinarity that filtered political questions via the depoliticizing lens 
of the discipline; a cultural discourse that, while advocating the importance of studying black 
Africans, lapsed into racial „othering‟; and a salvation discourse that appropriated „social 
relevance‟ as a means to invigorate a reactionary discipline. PASA‟s almost studied aversion 
to politics replicated the apartheid state‟s technocratic turn in the late seventies and early 
eighties, when Prime Minister Botha adopted a „new language of legitimation‟. Invisibilizing 
„race‟, the official „Total Strategy‟ discourse embraced a technocratic managerialism that 
would permeate the discursive practices of many white South Africans. 
 The quest for „social relevance‟ continued in the post-apartheid years in the form of a 
discourse of civic responsibility. Framed as unresolved, the country‟s brutal past was tailor-
made for the interventions of socially conscious psychologists. Yet PsySSA‟s discursive 
order was controlled by a market discourse that prescribed, correspondingly, a „market 
relevance‟. What mattered were „international accolades‟, „global competitiveness‟ and 
„improvement in tariffs‟, with a matching focus on „our core products‟, „service delivery‟, 
„fostering productivity‟ and „meeting targets‟. Upon reentering the international community, 
South Africa‟s political, economic and higher education philosophies had no option but to 
adjust themselves to the requirements of a neo-liberal hegemony. Prescribing the 
capitalization of knowledge, a new mode of knowledge production held sway – and 
psychologists everywhere were expected to play by the rules. 
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REFLECTIONS  
This study contains several limitations that can affect the validity of its findings. The first 
concerns the selection of the data corpus – specifically, the assumption that psychological 
societies represent adequately the interests of the discipline. While associations claim 
typically to do just that, there are always substantial numbers of psychologists who are either 
unaffiliated to these societies or, if they are members, participate negligibly in their activities. 
This is an observation of some pertinence in the post-apartheid era when many white 
psychologists – they constitute approximately three quarters of all psychologists in the 
country – withdrew from the associational life (C. Tredoux, personal communication, 2010). 
It may have been useful, therefore, to include an analysis of articles published in South 
African psychology journals, which are overrepresented by white psychologists. However, 
this would have increased the scope of the thesis to unmanageable proportions, prejudicing a 
detailed analysis of the collected speeches. 
It may be pointed out, alternatively, that this study of „relevance‟ should have 
included a set of interviews with prominent South African psychologists, which could have 
supplemented the collected speeches as an additional data source. Again, apart from the 
question of scope – not to mention the fact that, under such a scenario, the 1950s and 1960s 
almost certainly would have been unaccounted for – speaking to psychologists about events 
from the remote past would have either invited distorted memories or drawn blank 
responses.143 Accretions and oversights are all too common when remembering even the 
recent past. Besides, the Raubenheimer interviews conducted in the early eighties provided 
assistance in the interpretation of the empirical material. While they would not have been free 
from distortions either, it can be reasoned that these would have been of a lesser magnitude 
than had those interviews been conducted post-2010. This is not to suggest that the study‟s 
reported findings are „truer‟ – what has been presented, after all, is a „discussable truth‟ – but 
that, in terms of the study‟s relativist epistemology, better approximations of the social world, 
committed to a transparent set of rules, are always possible. To be sure, trade-offs cannot be 
avoided when deciding on data sources. 
There are also obvious gaps in the data set – in particular, the complete absence of 
SAPA addresses during the 1960s and 1970s. In what terms did SAPA view its mission at the 
time that PIRSA was advancing a volksdiens discourse? Did Schlebusch‟s liberal 
                                                                    
143 Interviews were part of the original study design. However, in several preliminary interviews that 
were conducted, psychologists were unable frequently to recall in detail the kind of information that was 
being sought. 
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individualism persist? How did SAPA position itself when the apartheid regime started to 
decline? Certainly, every effort was made to locate the SAPA archives. Unfortunately, 
reports that PsySSA and/or the University of the Witwatersrand were in possession of these 
documents, turned into blind alleys, as did conversations with several SAPA members.144 As 
for the general lack of presidential addresses from 1983 onwards, one can only speculate why 
this was the case. The scarcity of such addresses in the eighties and early nineties reflects 
possibly the state of flux that defined the national politics of the time, while the relative lack 
of addresses in the post-apartheid era is perhaps an indicator of PsySSA‟s embrace of a 
market-friendly discipline disinclined towards tradition.  
Another shortcoming is the lack of analytic balance between addresses. Much of 
Chapter 6, for example, amounted to a rhetorical analysis of just two speeches. Granted, the 
juxtaposing of la Grange and Schlebusch exemplified the divisiveness of „relevance‟ at a time 
still remembered as the most traumatic in the history of South African psychology, while an 
effort was made to analyze these speeches at the discursive and social levels. Yet these 
attempts do not dissolve a larger problem, namely, that the sheer size of the data set made it 
impractical to provide exhaustive textual/rhetorical, discursive and social analyses for every 
speech. Fairclough‟s three-dimensional model became subsequently more of an analytic 
frame than an exact guide: the thesis as a whole tried to do justice to all three levels of 
analysis but, in wanting to cover a great deal of ground, it spread itself thin at times, with 
systematic links between levels not always apparent. 145  It is evident from the analytic 
chapters that the analysis focused firstly on rhetorical and then discursive practices, with 
discussion sections in each of these chapters addressing socio-historical practices. In a sense, 
rhetoric „outdoes‟ discourse: by understating didactic detail for the sake of historical 
narrativity, discourses emerge sometimes as if summoned, giving credence to the charge that 
„anything goes‟. Moreover, with the progression of the analytic chapters, there is a distinct 
sense of history being treated as an „add-on‟, with no account of the „action orientation‟ or 
ideological effects of discourses. Although the study‟s research questions did not oblige an 
elucidation of such effects, the result of the omission is that the study can be said to suffer 
                                                                    
144 It is an open question whether a significant number of SAPA addresses from the 1960s and 1970s ever 
existed. According to the final newsletter of SAPA’s Western Cape branch, dated January 1983 and signed 
by Don Foster and Ann Levett, “[i]f the 1960’s were generally characterised by a low but consistent 
degree of SAPA activity, the lowest point was reached in 1979 when only a single meeting was held” 
(Foster papers, University of Cape Town). 
145 This may explain why, despite criticisms, CDA studies tend to focus on single texts: as this study has 
discovered, the level of analytic detail required by CDA is difficult to achieve when analyzing large data 
sets. 
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from the same weakness that afflicts many others in critical discourse analysis. Socio-
historical practices end up becoming no more than a backdrop for discursive practices, with 
CDA‟s agenda for social change reading once more like an empty promise.  
In retrospect, the study‟s social constructionist outlook – somewhat inimical to the 
question of history – does not lend itself to a strict reproduction of a critical discourse 
analysis.146 The thesis is less interested in history per se than in how ways of talking about 
„relevance‟ have changed over time. It prioritizes the analysis of addresses‟ rhetorical and 
discursive features at the expense of a more searching treatment of socio-historical practices. 
Consequently, the direction of the relationship between discourse and history is not 
explicated at all. While it is noted how milestones in South African history coincided with the 
appearance of novel iterations of „relevance‟ – for example, the declaration of a republic in 
1961, the founding of the UDF in 1983 and the birth of democracy in 1994 – these are 
presented as little more than historical concurrences. Similar in spirit to the Foucauldian 
„method‟, the thesis recognizes the difficulty involved in extrapolating cause-effect 
relationships and ends up advancing, for the most part, a non-interpretive historical account.  
This may provoke the ire of those for whom the history of psychology in South Africa 
is simply a history of oppression. The study, however, was never intended as a reenactment 
of this battle that has been waged many times over; as for the objection itself, it overlooks 
Foucault‟s reminder that, “where there is power there is resistance, and yet, or rather 
consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (1981, 
p. 95). There is a danger in casting the past as wholly repressive in comparison with a 
civilized – and hence uninterrogable – present. As it is, the overall trajectory of histories of 
South African psychology corroborates the Enlightenment postulate of history having a point. 
Until the 1970s, accounts were largely of the celebratory „Great Man‟ genre, uncritical of the 
political dispensation of the day (van Ommen, 2008). In the 1980s, descriptions of the 
discipline‟s complicity with apartheid ideology (e.g. Bulhan (1981)) started to appear.147 The 
early nineties witnessed a proliferation of similar works (e.g. Foster (1991), Nicholas (1990) 
and Duncan (1993)), while, in the post-apartheid era, a continuing but dwindling spirit of 
critique carried on into the new millennium (e.g. Duncan, van Niekerk, de la Rey & Seedat 
(2001)). The now hegemonic story of South African psychology has started functioning as a 
                                                                    
146 This is a strong indication that Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) are proponents of a bottom line 
reality. 
147 In another context, Foucault – lecturing in 1976 – spoke about “the increasing vulnerability to criticism 
of things, institutions, practices, discourses” (1980b, p. 80). It was also in the 1970s that critical histories 
of psychology started to appear internationally, attributable in some measure to the “disenchantment of 
science” (Danziger, 1994, p. 473). 
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morality tale – see Cooper and Nicholas (2012) – while the „hidden transcripts‟ of both the 
powerful and the powerless remain out of earshot (Scott, 1990). The story begins with a 
discipline in whose young life all seems well. Soon enough, it finds itself forced into 
confrontation with its shadow. Troubled increasingly by the surrounding turmoil, psychology 
grows in sensitivity to the needs of the country‟s majority. It discovers, eventually, the chi of 
liberation and plays its part in bringing down the apartheid regime. The discipline is 
victorious. The struggle is over148 – history is over149 – hence the dearth of historical writing 
on post-apartheid psychology (Painter & van Ommen, 2008). 
Regarding the study‟s findings, one that is especially open to contestation is the 
seeming characterization of English-speaking psychologists as politically disinterested. This 
constitutes a manifest oversimplification. Such a charge cannot be leveled against the likes of 
Ian MacCrone, Ronald Albino or Eleanor Pratt-Yule, for that matter. Even Simon Biesheuvel 
goes to the trouble of at least entertaining political questions: the fact that he arrives at a 
different conclusion compared to progressive psychologists does not make him, ipso facto, a 
WESSA „ghost with ears‟. Typecasting Anglophone psychologists as apolitical disciples of 
science is as mistaken a conception as that of Afrikaner pragmatism; both caricatures 
approach the cultural essentialism that epitomized apartheid logic. The wider implication, 
however, is that discourses are not the internally consistent entities that this study 
inadvertently suggests them to be. The contradictoriness of social talk that features strongly 
in the works of Potter and Wetherell has not been elicited by this analysis, which has tended 
to emphasize speakers‟ fidelity to particular discourses. Accordingly, it would seem that a 
post-structuralist conception of discourse, descending from on high, has prevailed. Some will 
argue, therefore, that the aforementioned preference for the historical narrative rather than 
expository detail may have led to an unintentional exchange of the actual discourses in the 
analytic material for the established discourses of history. To this it is countered that the 
analytic chapters, which, in keeping with the study‟s transparency criterion, provide both 
plentiful and lengthy extracts from the data set, have made a sufficiently sound case to the 
contrary. 
IMPLICATIONS 
In a recently published opinion piece on PsySSA‟s 2012 installment of the International 
Congress of Psychology, a South African critical psychologist finds himself paging through 
                                                                    
148 Early post-apartheid talk of the ‘rainbow nation’ exemplified this spirit of optimism. 
149 Fukuyama’s (2006) ‘end of history’ thesis comes to mind, in which democracy becomes an 
unsurpassable form of governance. 
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the three-hundred-and-fifty-page congress program (Painter, 2012). He comes across Freud‟s 
and Jung‟s names just once amid the titles of thousands of papers; „entrepreneurship‟, 
however, appears twenty-five times before he decides to stop counting. Curiously, the terms 
„neo-liberalism‟ and „capitalism‟ – “What is the „entrepreneur‟ other than the ideological 
form of the neo-liberal self?” (ibid., para. 28) – appear only once. He asks, “Does this mean 
that psychologists are oblivious of the contexts in which they work” (para. 27)? Answering 
himself in the negative, he reasons: psychologists “understand the demands of neo-liberalism 
and capitalism all too well and are eager to make themselves useful once again as consultants 
for the New World order” (para. 28). Entrepreneurship “no longer describes one of the 
functions of the self, but, partly through psychology, has been elevated to a personality type. 
It is an ideal to strive for” (para. 29).   
  Nonetheless, „social relevance‟ – one of PsySSA‟s stated core values – continues to 
animate discussions among South African psychologists. The theme for the Southern African 
Students‟ Psychology Conference, to be held in June 2013, is Psychology (In)action, while 
that of PsySSA‟s nineteenth national congress, to be held in September 2013, is South 
African and African Psychology in the 21st Century: Challenges and Relevance. Whereas the 
discipline drones on about „cultural‟ and „social relevance‟, no mention is made of the 
„market relevance‟ that actually controls PsySSA‟s order of discourse. A hegemonic 
discourse is invisibilized in what appears to be a case of the fish being last to discover the 
ocean. Meanwhile, psychologists go on advancing the weary discourse of civic responsibility, 
asking why, despite their best intentions, psychology in this country is no closer to meeting 
the mental health requirements of the majority of South Africans, half of whom live below 
the poverty line.  
Why does PsySSA not express – at the outset – a commitment to „market relevance‟ 
in its mission statement? There are different explanations for this, depending on how one 
understands the relationship between discourse and agency. For poststructuralists, there is no 
question of subjects making their own decisions about discursive practices: human beings are 
prisoners of discourse. Besides, in the Foucauldian scheme, it is a diffuse power/knowledge 
nexus – not psychologists or their associations – that decides what will be known. For 
rhetoricians, certainly, the situation is different: PsySSA cannot promote „market relevance‟ 
because, in the words of Fanon, it “no longer dares appear without disguise” (2006, p. 23). 
Given their protracted struggle for political freedom, few things are more enraging to 
impoverished South Africans than the perpetuation of their economic bondage. 
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The discipline faces daunting structural challenges. At the time of writing, it costs on 
average R700 for a fifty-minute visit to a clinical psychologist. To put the matter into 
perspective, the median monthly income of black African working adults is R1000. With a 
shortfall of psychologists working in rural communities, unaffordable taxi fees to get to urban 
centers, long waiting times at clinics in those centers, mental health professionals that cannot 
speak indigenous African languages, and employers unwilling to lose employees for an entire 
day, the odds are stacked against average South Africans that want to avail themselves of 
counseling services. For the many that do not wish to utilize the expertise of psychologists, 
there are non-structural barriers to treatment to contend with, including stigma around mental 
health problems, misconceptions about the nature of psychological services and the middle-
class logic of a discipline at odds with the living conditions of its patients.  
This thesis does nothing to address any of the obstacles that most South Africans 
encounter before making it into the consulting room. What it offers, instead, is what 
Fairclough calls „critical language awareness‟, providing psychologists with the opportunity 
of becoming more aware of their discursive practices. Given the constitutiveness of 
discourse, it is impossible to create a profession accessible to all South Africans while 
oblivious of a hegemonic market discourse that is unconcerned with the lives of subjugated 
communities. Invisible discourses cannot be contested, “consciousness is the first step 
towards emancipation” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 1). 
Conscientization notwithstanding, this thesis has refused, effectively, to let 
„relevance‟ go. Nowadays, psychologists once in the vanguard of the struggle dismiss it as a 
discourse of trauma: the war is over, they say, we need to move on. It is worrying when once 
critical voices relinquish the historical perspective, warning no longer of what is at stake. In 
South Africa, the rise of the market has increased disparities between the haves and have-
nots, fueling a seething discontent. If ever there were a time to challenge „market relevance‟, 
then it is surely now. It is not being suggested, however, that with sufficient effort the „social‟ 
will eventually supplant the „market‟ when it comes to the floating signifier of „relevance‟. 
The time has come, in fact, to dispense with the idiom of „relevance‟ altogether. More studies 
are required, rather, that focus on the current discursive practices of psychologists, whether 
these are identified in books, journal articles, or conference proceedings. It does not suffice 
for a critical psychology to study the discourses that circulate in the public domain, when 
psychology itself remains beyond interrogation. Until the discipline becomes the subject of 
its own reflexive gaze, its marketization will continue without relent as the country‟s majority 
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gets left behind. Of course, this is about a great deal more than psychology and its discourses: 
it is about the way the „real‟ world operates, after all. But the enormity of the task should not 
discourage one from the task at hand, namely, the invention of a new language of resistance.  
Some will baulk at the idea of doing away with „relevance‟ entirely – and yet, in light 
of the academy‟s capitulation to a neo-liberal rationality, one cannot overstate the difficulty 
involved in creating an intelligentsia committed to „social relevance‟. It merits restating that, 
regardless of one‟s imagined class solidarity, to „make‟ faculty involves successfully 
negotiating  
a force field that imposes its specific determinations upon all those who enter it. Thus she who 
wants to succeed as a scientist has no choice but to acquire the minimal scientific capital 
required and to abide by the mores and regulations enforced by the scientific milieu of that 
time and place. (Wacquant, 2008, p. 268, original emphasis) 
While a socially-conditioned habitus can have some bearing on one‟s idiosyncratic uptake of 
that capital, the field constrains the range of positions that may realistically be adopted in a 
given discipline. Stevens writes of a “double bind” (2001, p. 51), for example, that overtakes 
black South African trainees in professional psychology, forcing them to choose between the 
foreign values of the discipline and the familiar ones of their communities of origin. For 
Callaghan, South African trainees “dis-identify with activist subject positions because of the 
explicit and implicit censure of such identities in the discourse of professionalisation that is 
characteristic of psychological practice” (2005, p. 143). This assumes, of course, that 
candidates with strong political views have not already been “selected out” of training 
programmes (ibid.) since the “authority to speak” demands the foregoing of all other subject 
positions (p. 145).  
Clearly, it is not as simple a matter as „being the change you want to see in the world‟. 
Intrinsic to the academic life is a struggle between „temporally dominated‟ disciplines – the 
„hard‟ sciences and the „soft‟ humanities (Bourdieu, 1988, 2001) – a conflict well known to 
psychologists, almost all of whom will have experienced at some point the unremitting 
„horizontal‟ tension between basic and applied psychology. In South Africa, whereas in years 
gone by the basic science enjoyed the lion‟s share of both academic and intellectual capital, 
since the last decade of apartheid rule the applied science‟s standing has risen significantly 
amid insistent appeals for „socially responsive‟ research. With passage of time, the 
„relevance‟ factor has morphed into a strategic tool by means of which socially privileged 
rival groupings compete for access to these forms of capital. Paradoxically, they accomplish 
this by claiming to represent faithfully the interests of marginalized constituencies, despite 
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the manifest difficulties involved in doing so (Spivak, 1988). Whatever confessions of bias 
are made, are usually of token significance, approximating to little more than the postmodern 
penchant for a “narcissistic” – rather than an exacting “scientific” – reflexivity (Bourdieu, 
2003, p. 281). 
What about the cultural iteration of „social relevance‟? Undoubtedly, the search for an 
„African‟ perspective continues to define South African psychology‟s struggle for „relevance‟ 
(Holdstock, 2000; N. Mkhize, 2004). Drawing on the writings of African luminaries such as 
Aimé Césaire, Leopold Senghor, John Mbiti and others, the cultural uniqueness of the 
continent is held up as a potential fountainhead of indigenous psychological theory. 
Counterposed to an equally monolithic Western tradition, the African weltanschauung is 
described as past- and present-oriented, as encouraging harmonious relationships of all kinds, 
as emphasizing the processual nature of personhood, and as stressing a sociocentric definition 
of self, providing the intellectual justification for a new psychology (N. Mkhize, 2004).  
As always, an appreciation of context proves instructive. It is worth recalling that, 
when calls for an African psychology were first voiced in the late seventies and early eighties 
at a time of heightened opposition to apartheid rule, an analogous sentiment had already 
taken hold in the United States in the early seventies, roused by the Nation of Islam‟s 
sermons on the „mental slavery‟ of African Americans (Schiele, 2003). The rise of 
Afrocentrism was mostly an African-American phenomenon dating back to the civil unrest of 
the late sixties and the related demands within the academy for „relevant‟ research in African 
studies (Howe, 1998). What animated the quest for an African psychology, therefore, was a 
desire to reclaim an inferiorized heritage, informed by a celebratory spirit towards all things 
African. In Fanonian terms, the black man‟s task became one of “lay[ing] bare the white man 
in himself” (Fanon, 2008, p. 156) and paying “tribute to his own revolting ugliness” (Césaire, 
1946, p. 65 quoted ibid.). 
In post-apartheid South Africa, it is the „African Renaissance‟ movement inaugurated 
by then deputy president, Thabo Mbeki, which exemplifies this celebration of all things local. 
The idea of an African Renaissance first entered the official parlance of the ruling ANC in 
1997 and was followed in quick succession by an African Renaissance conference in 1998, 
the establishment of the African Renaissance Institute in 1999 and the launch of the South 
African Chapter of the African Renaissance in 2000 (Maloka, 2001). In his keynote address 
at the conference, Mbeki quotes from an article that appeared the day before in the Sunday 
press: 
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For long our people have suffered untold hardships. For long our collective destiny has been 
compromised by selfish rulers. This conference should not end up another academic talk-shop 
irrelevant to the needs of the common man. We want practical solutions to our problems. This 
is our chance. (1999, p. xiii) 
Mbeki aligns himself with the writer‟s “spirit of impatience”, stating that the 
conference participants, “by convening as you have, you have taken all of us an important 
step forward towards the realisation of our common goal of the renewal of our continent” 
(ibid.). He hopes for a “new African world which the African renaissance seeks to build... one 
of democracy, peace and stability, sustainable development and a better life for the people, 
nonracism and nonsexism, equality among the nations, and a just and democratic system of 
international governance.” (p. xviii). Mbeki calls for the restoration of African pride, lost 
through centuries of “contempt for the colour black... what this means is that we must recall 
everything that is good and inspiring in our past” (pp. xx-xxi). It is “the enormous brain 
power” (p. xxi) of Africa that must secure the new century for the continent.  
The African Renaissance is ostensibly an anti-imperialist project (Maloka, 2001) that 
represents a postcolonial, pan-African uprising again global domination and an academy-
inspired commitment to locally generated, „socially relevant‟ solutions. Critics point out, 
however, that it is unclear who the keepers of the African Renaissance are: does it belong to 
Africa, the ANC, the Pan Africanist Congress or the Union Buildings in Pretoria (Maloka, 
2001)? Some are sceptical of its obvious European parallels, likening its thoroughgoing 
discourse of difference to the divide-and-rule tactics of the apartheid regime, while others – 
such as the former president‟s brother – decry it as “a triumphalist syndrome that afflicts 
newly liberated African countries” (M. Mbeki, 1999, p. 213 quoted in Maloka, 2001, n.p.). 
The political currency of Africanization is not lost on commentators (Swartz, 1998), its 
ethnophilosophical leanings urging a wistful return to “traditional African practices and 
beliefs” (Maloka, 2001, n.p.).  
There is also the market. The now much-bandied-about feel-good term, ubuntu, which 
stresses the virtues of the communal life, has become the trade name of a free and open 
source computer operating system. Bused in from the nearest township, a Zulu impi deploys 
in „buffalo horn‟ formation while appreciative Versace-wearing tourists gawk in the comfort 
of air-conditioned designer shopping malls. The late South African health minister, Manto 
Tshabalala-Msimang, declares the benefits of treating AIDS patients with a vegetable 
cocktail – garlic, beetroot, lemons and African potatoes – believing that “[w]e cannot use 
Western models of protocols for research and development” (BBC News, 2008). For the 
Comaroffs (2009), what these self-conscious, stage-managed performances of culture 
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instantiate is a commodification of ethnicity. It would appear these days that even culture is 
alive to the rewards of the marketplace. 
Despite the Freedom Charter rhetoric – “The people shall govern!” – Mbeki never 
managed to shake the public‟s impression of him as a tweed-wearing (Gevisser, 2007), pipe-
smoking “black Englishman” (van Zyl Slabbert, 2006 quoted in Butler, 2007, p. 271). He 
wasn‟t the first politician to speak „for the people‟ – nor will he be the last – but in a country 
where even the vegetation has to be indigenous – the plan for Cape Town is to get rid of 
Table Mountain‟s colonizer pine trees by the year 2025 – one wonders what „cultural 
relevance‟ has in store for South African psychology. The allure of continental myth-making 
and the associated demand for „cultural relevance‟ undermines to some extent the realization 
of a non-racial society, perpetuating in the eyes of many the same „false consciousness‟ 
propagated by „positive‟ apartheid theory. But to even imagine the possibility of a „culturally 
relevant‟ psychology, one has to presume that Spivak‟s subaltern can speak after all – and if 
that were possible, whether it would make any difference in the end: 
For me, the question „Who should speak?‟ is less crucial than „Who will listen?‟. „I will speak 
for myself as a Third World person‟ is an important position for political mobilisation today. 
But the real demand is that, when I speak from that position, I should be listened to seriously; 
not with that kind of benevolent imperialism... (Spivak, 1990, pp. 59-60) 
For some, these last pages may read like a political manifesto – and, at that, in an 
epistemologically relativist thesis that lacked the courage to take an ontological stand. What 
business does it have arguing about the future of psychology in South Africa? On the 
contrary, that is precisely this study‟s recommendation, namely, that „relevance‟ is the very 
thing that must be disputed. The relativist belief in the equivalence of accounts does not mean 
that accounts should not be presented, contradicted, justified and challenged. Regardless of 
one‟s epistemological and ontological commitments, the discursive world comes with rules 
for the accreditation of statements, rules that can be replaced with new ones, borne out by 
successive generations of South African psychologists producing different inflections of 
„relevance‟ over a period spanning six decades. Indeed, at a time when many are being 
attracted to the universalist promise of cognitive science, arguments about „social relevance‟ 
are likely to persist. For, if the history of „relevance‟ reveals anything, it is that psychologists 
turn to „relevance‟ when the discipline turns to „science‟. But as this thesis has argued in its 
closing stages, the idiom of „relevance‟ has outlived its usefulness: it is now the market that 
controls the discursive order. 
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